Smith v. Mendrick

Robin Smith, Plaintiff, v. James Mendrick, et al., Defendants.

Nos. 19-cv-07319, 19-cv-7652

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

September 23, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARY M. ROWLAND United States District Judge

Plaintiff Robin Smith alleges that he has experienced various constitutional and statutory injuries as a pretrial detainee at DuPage County Jail. He sues the DuPage County Sheriff James Mendrick, Chief Deputy Sheriff Anthony Romanelli, the DuPage County Jail, and three healthcare professionals pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Personal Act (RLUIPA).

Defendants Mendrick, Romanelli, and the DuPage County Jail have moved to dismiss the claims against them. [44]. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants in part and denies in part their motion.

I. Background

This Court accepts as true the following factual allegations from the amended complaint [31]. See Bilek v. Fed. Ins Co., 8 F.4th 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2021).

Plaintiff is an inmate in pretrial detention at DuPage County Jail. [31] ¶ 1. Defendant James J. Mendrick is the DuPage County Sheriff whom Plaintiff sues in only his official capacity. Id. ¶ 8. Defendant Chief Deputy Sheriff Anthony Romanelli serves as the Corrections Bureau Chief at DuPage County Jail. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff also names as a Defendant the DuPage County Jail. Id. ¶ 14. The remaining Defendants, who have not moved to dismiss, are: Nury Y. Marcelo, the Director of Nursing at the DuPage County Jail; Defendant Alma Martija, a medical doctor who has worked at the DuPage County Jail; and Defendant James Corcoran, a psychiatrist at DuPage County Jail. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Plaintiff sues Romanelli, Marcelo, Martija, and Corcoran in their individual and official capacities. Id. ¶¶ 9-12.

Plaintiff suffers from various ailments and physical disabilities, including: (1) arthritis and/or other chronic ailments limiting his ability to perform day-to-day activities; (2) bipolar schizophrenia; (3) compromised vision and vision-related migraines; and (4) fungal infections. Id. Plaintiff claims that despite his requests, Defendants have refused to provide treatment and/or accommodations for his ailments and disabilities. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff also asserts that he sincerely holds a belief in Islam and that he requested an accommodation from jail officials to eat a halal meal after sundown during the duration of Ramadan. Id. ¶ 50. Although the jail allowed him to eat after sundown, it did not provide him with full-sized, halal meals. Id. ¶ 51.

To redress his alleged injuries, Plaintiff brings an eight-count complaint for: failure to treat arthritis and other physical disabilities against Mendrick, Martija, Marcelo, and DuPage County Jail pursuant to section 1983 (Count I); failure to treat his mental health issues against Corcoran, Mendrick, and DuPage County Jail pursuant to section 1983 (Count II); failure to treat or accommodate his vision and migraine issues against Martija, Mendrick, Marcelo, Romanelli, and DuPage County Jail pursuant to section 1983 (Count III); violation of the ADA against DuPage County Jail, Mendrick, and Marcelo (Count IV); violation of the Rehabilitation Act against Mendrick and DuPage County Jail (Count V); failure to treat his fungal infection against Martija pursuant to section 1983 (Count VI); violation of the RLUIPA against Mendrick and DuPage County Jail (Count VII); and violation of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment against Mendrick and DuPage County Jail pursuant to section 1983 (Count VIII).

Defendants Corcoran, Marcelo, and Martija have answered the amended complaint. [47]. Defendants Mendrick, Romanelli, and DuPage County Jail have moved to dismiss the claims against them. [44].

II. Standard

A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint, not the merits of the case. Gunn v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the complaint must provide enough factual information to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face and raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, 887 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a complaint to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). A court deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion accepts plaintiff's well- pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all permissible inferences in plaintiff's favor. Degroot v. Client Servs., Inc., 977 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff need not plead “detailed factual allegations, ” but “still must provide more than mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action for her complaint to be considered adequate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.” Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Deciding the plausibility of the claim is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Bilek, 8 F.4th at 586-87 (quoting W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2016)).

III. Analysis

A. DuPage County Jail

Initially, Defendant DuPage County Jail moves to dismiss on the basis that the “DuPage County Jail” is not a legal entity that can be sued. [44] at 3-4. This Court agrees that DuPage County Jail is not a proper defendant in this case.

First, it is well-settled that, unlike municipalities, a jail constitutes a “non-suable entity” under section 1983. See Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012); see also, e.g., Ojeda v. Kramer, No. 15 CV 7309, 2017 WL 1250834, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2017) (“As a division of the Kane County Sheriff's Office, the Kane County Jail itself is not a suable entity” under section 1983).

Moreover, the only proper defendant for ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in the carceral context is the “relevant [governmental] department or agency . . . or its director, acting in his or her official capacity.” Flores v. Lamb, No. 18-CV-523-DRH, 2018 WL 1933061, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2018); see Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 670 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2012). As the Sheriff, Mendrick is the official overseeing operations at DuPage County Jail. See DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage Cty., 209 F.3d 973, 976 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Eason v. Pritzker, No. 18-CV-2553, 2020 WL 6781794, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2020) (noting that an Illinois county sheriff was “responsible for overseeing the general conditions of confinement at the jail”) (quoting Crockwell v. Dart, No. 13 C 4880, 2013 WL 6796788, at *4 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 23, 2013)); Leinenweber v. DuPage County, No. 08 CV 3124, 2009 WL 458622, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2009) (“The responsibility for maintaining the jail and setting jail policies rests with the county sheriff.”). Thus, Mendrick is the only proper defendant against whom Plaintiff can assert his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.^[1]

Further, the RLUIPA does not permit a cause of action against defendants in their individual capacities, nor does it authorize claims for money damages; instead, the statute recognizes only claims for prospective injunctive relief against a defendant acting in his or her official capacity. See Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285 (2011); Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2011); West v. Grams, 607 Fed.Appx. 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2015). Thus, again, Mendrick is the only proper RLUIPA defendant in this case. See Kyles v. Gladieux, No. 1:19-CV-450-WCL-SLC, 2020 WL 3498432, at *2 (N.D. Ind. June 29, 2020) (holding that a county sheriff, in his official capacity, is the proper RLUIPA defendant).

In sum, DuPage County Jail does not constitute a proper defendant for any of the claims Plaintiff asserts in his amended complaint. This Court therefore dismisses DuPage County Jail from this case.

B. Personal Involvement

Next, Defendants Mendrick and Romanelli argue that Plaintiff's section 1983 claims against them fail because Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled their personal involvement with Plaintiff's alleged constitutional injuries. [44] at 4-7. Defendants correctly recognize that individual liability under section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017); Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015).

But Defendants' arguments concerning personal involvement are misplaced as to Mendrick. The amended complaint sues Mendrick in only his official capacity as DuPage County Sheriff. [31] ¶ 8. Because an “official capacity suit is the same as a suit against the entity of which the officer is an agent, ” Serio v. Rauner, No. 15 C 6262, 2018 WL 4409389, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2018) (quoting DeGenova, 209 F.3d at 974 n.1), Plaintiff need not allege Mendrick's personal involvement in his alleged constitutional injuries, Everett v. Baldwin, No. 13 C 04697, 2016 WL 8711476, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2016).

As to Romanelli, Plaintiff asserts a section 1983 claim against him in both his individual and official capacities. [31] ¶ 9 & Count III. Thus, to state cognizable section 1983 claims against Romanelli individually, Plaintiff must allege his personal...