Smith v. Minier

380 So.3d 889

Leslie SMITH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Marcus D. Smith

v.Rosalinde MINIER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ingeborg Steiner, and Werner Enterprises, Inc.

NO. 2021-CT-01284-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

02/22/2024

JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, HON. ROBERT P. KREBS, JUDGE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TIMOTHY M. O’BRIEN

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: GLENN F. BECKHAM, Greenwood, DAVID C. DUNBAR, CHRISTOPHER G. DUNNELLS, Ridgeland, LAUREN T. CARPENTER

EN BANC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶l. This case presents this Court with the question of whether a genuine issue of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment. Because we find that the foreseeability of a particular injury and the presence of an intervening or superseding cause are questions for the finder of fact, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We reverse the judgment of the Jackson County Circuit Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On April 2, 2013, a multi-vehicle accident occurred on Interstate 10 in Jackson County. Included in the accident was a tractor-trailer operated by Marcus D. Smith, a tractor-trailer owned by Werner Enterprises, and a personal vehicle operated by Ingeborg Steiner. As a result of the car accident, Marcus suffered a cervical fracture and multiple rib fractures. He was taken to the hospital for treatment and released the same day.

¶3. Upon his release, Marcus was prescribed Lortab, a pain medication that contains hydrocodone and acetaminophen. Marcus was initially prescribed fifty-six Lortab pills. Marcus’s wife, Leslie, followed the instructions on the medication bottle and gave Marcus two Lortab pills every six hours. But according to Leslie, Marcus would go behind her and take additional pills.

¶4. On April 8, 2013, emergency medical services (EMS) responded to the Smith home after Leslie called 911 due to Marcus’s impaired mental condition and combativeness. EMS noted that all fifty-six Lortab pills were gone. Marcus was taken to the hospital where he was diagnosed with acute liver failure due to acetaminophen toxicity. Upon discharge, Marcus was given a second supply of Lortab, this time 120 pills. Marcus ultimately died on September 24, 2013, from liver failure as a result of acetaminophen ingestion.

¶5. Leslie, as personal representative of Marcus’s estate, filed a wrongful-death action in Jackson County Circuit Court. Four of the originally named defendants were dismissed by agreed order. Rosalinde Minier¹ and Werner Enterprises are the two remaining defendants.

¶6. The defendants filed a joint motion for partial summary judgment as to the wrongful-death claim and argued that Marcus’s death from acetaminophen-induced liver failure was not legally foreseeable damage an ordinary, reasonably prudent person would expect to arise from a car accident. In response, Leslie argued it is well known that pain medication such as acetaminophen can lead to liver failure, making Marcus’s death a foreseeable consequence of the defendants’ negligence.

¶7. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed the wrongful-death claim. The trial court found that Marcus’s death as a result of acetaminophen-induced liver failure "was not legally foreseeable to the [d]efendants as a proximate cause of an automobile accident, as it [wa]s an unusual, improbable, or extraordinary occurrence arising out of the same." All remaining claims were later settled by the parties.

¶8. Because of the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment as to the wrongful-death claim and the parties’ settlement of all remaining claims, there were no issues to be tried. As a result, a final judgment was entered. Leslie, on behalf of Marcus’s estate, timely appealed the trial court’s final judgment. The appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals.

¶9. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Smith v. Minier, No. 2021-CA-01284-COA, — So.3d —, —, 2023 WL 2381726, at *1 (Miss. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2023). The court found that "[a] genuine issue of material fact exist[ed] as to the foreseeability of Marcus’[s] death caused by liver failure." Id. at —, 2023 WL 2381726, at *7. The court explained:

The Defendants argue that Marcus’[s] use of pain medication that led to his liver failure was unforeseeable, and they rely on the testimony of neurosurgeon Dr. [Oliver] Kesterson for support. Dr. Kesterson testified that in his thirty years of medical experience, he had never known a patient to die from liver failure as a result of the ingestion of pain medication.

On the other hand, [Leslie] presented expert testimony from Dr. [Neil] Julie, a gastroenterologist. Dr. Julie attached Federal Drug Administration regulations to his sworn affidavit, which explained that liver failure resulting from pain medication has been known and addressed by the government for a very long time.

Id. Furthermore, the court held that "[b]ased on the evidence presented, we conclude that the question of foreseeability of ‘misuse,’ that is, whether Marcus misused the pain medication prescribed to him by Dr. Kesterson, is a question of fact for the jury to determine." Id. at —, 2023 WL 2381726, at *6. The court concluded:

While the Defendants may not have foreseen the manner of Marcus’[s] death, a reasonable juror could determine that the Defendants should have foreseen that an injury would require medication and that an adverse reaction to that medication could occur. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Id. at —, 2023 WL 2381726, at *7.

¶10. Werner Enterprises and Minier filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court and argued Marcus’s death from acetaminophen-induced liver failure was not "a usual, probable, or ordinary occurrence from a [car] accident so as to establish foreseeability[.]" We granted the petition. After review, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1–3] ¶11. "This Court employs a de novo standard of review when considering a trial court’s grant or denial of summary judgment." White v. Targa Downstream, LLC, 358 So. 3d 627, 632 (Miss. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Watson v. Long Beach Harbor Resort, LLC, 346 So. 3d 406, 409-10 (Miss. 2022)). "The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Beachy v. Miss. Dist. Council for Assemblies of God, 371 So. 3d 1237, 1242 (Miss. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Watson Quality Ford, Inc. v. Casanova, 999 So. 2d 830, 833 (Miss. 2008)). A motion for summary judgment will only be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and "[w]hen doubt exists whether there is a fact issue, the non-moving party gets its benefit." Glover ex rel. Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 968 So. 2d 1267, 1275 (Miss. 2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So. 2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1988)).

DISCUSSION

¶12. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by granting partial summary judgment in favor of Minier and Werner Enterprises. Smith argues that a genuine issue of material fact remains and precludes the grant of partial summary judgment. Minier and Werner Enterprises argue that the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment was proper and should be affirmed. We agree with Smith and the Court of Appeals that a genuine issue of material fact remains and, therefore, the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment was improper.

[4–7] ¶13. For Smith’s wrongful-death claim on the basis of negligence to succeed, she was required to show 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) cause (both in fact and proximate), and 4) damages. Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. McCullough, 212 So. 3d 69, 76 (Miss. 2017).

"Duty and breach of duty, which both involve foreseeability, are essential to finding negligence and [therefore,] must be demonstrated first." Generally, if a person of ordinary intelligence would not have "anticipated the dangers that his negligent act created for others," then the injury would not be considered foreseeable. Moreover, "[f]oreseeability does not require that a person anticipate the precise manner in which injury will occur once he has created a dangerous situation through his negligence."

Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted). "While duty and causation both involve foreseeability, duty is an issue of law, and causation is generally a matter for the jury." Rein v. Benchmark Constr. Co., 865 So. 2d 1134, 1143 (Miss. 2004) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Donald, v. Amoco Prod. Co., 785 So. 2d 161, 174 (Miss. 1999)).

[8] ¶14. This Court has held that drivers utilizing the roads in this state owe a duty to "[keep] a proper lookout and [be] on alert for vehicles, objects and persons ahead in the highway, … [see] what he should have seen, [have] his [vehicle] under proper control, [be] on the alert on the highway, and [avoid] striking plain objects." Ready v. RWI Transp., LLC, 208 So. 3d 590, 594 (Miss. 2016) (third and sixth alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Dennis ex rel. Cobb v. Bolden, 606 So. 2d 111, 113-14 (Miss. 1992)). In the present case, a duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of a vehicle "for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of injury" was owed to Marcus by the drivers of the other vehicles involved in the accident. Burnham v. Tabb, 508 So. 2d 1072, 1074 (Miss. 1987).

[9–12] ¶15. Respectfully, Justice Coleman’s and Justice Maxwell’s dissents appear to blur the line between a foreseeable legal duty and foreseeable causation. Forseeability, as relates to duty, is a determination as to whether the plaintiff is a reasonably forseeable plaintiff. See Palsgraf v. Long...