Smith v. P.A.M Transp.

1

THOMAS MICHAEL SMITH and MONALETO SNEED, Plaintiffs, v. P.A.M. TRANSPORT, INC., Defendant.

No. 3:21-cv-00262

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division

May 9, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELI RICHARDSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment and for attorney's fees and costs (Doc. No. 24 “Motion”). Defendant filed a memorandum in support of the Motion (Doc. No. 25, “Memorandum”) and a statement of material facts (Doc. No. 26 “Defendant's Statement of Facts”). Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the Motion (Doc. No. 31 “Response”), and a separate response to Defendant's Statement of Facts (Doc. No. 32 “Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Statement of Facts and Additional Facts”). Defendant then filed a reply to Plaintiffs' Response (Doc. No. 39, “Reply”), as well as a response to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Statement of Facts and Additional Facts (Doc. No. 37, “Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Additional Facts”).

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant's Motion. Specifically, the Court will grant the motion as to summary judgment but will deny the motion without prejudice as to the request for attorney's fees and costs.

BACKGROUND^[1]

I. Plaintiffs' Employment With Defendant

Defendant is a transportation company employing over 2,400 truck drivers, each of which drives either over-the-road or local routes.^[2] (Doc. No. 32 at 5). Both of the Plaintiffs, Monaleto Sneed (“Sneed”) and Thomas Michael Smith (“Smith”), are African Americans who were employed by Defendant as drivers dispatched out of Defendant's Nashville Whites Creek location. (Doc. Nos. 32-5 at 4; 33-1 at 31-32; 33-4 at 11). Sneed was hired by Defendant on February 8, 2019 as an over-the-road driver.^[3] (Doc. No. 32 at 2). Sneed worked for Defendant as an over-the-road driver for just two months before he was transferred (upon his request) to a local driver position with Defendant on April 10, 2019.^[4] (Id. at 2-3). Sneed then worked for Defendant as a local driver until he was terminated on April 16, 2020. (Id.).

Smith was hired by Defendant as a local driver on October 24, 2018. (Id. at 3). At the time he was hired by Defendant, Smith already possessed a CDL and approximately 19 years of truckdriving experience. (Id. at 8). Smith resigned from Defendant after nearly six months on April 23, 2019. (Id. at 3). At the time that he resigned, he had already accepted a job at another trucking company. (Id. at 5).^[5]

As noted above, Plaintiffs operated out of Defendant's Whites Creek location. (Id. at 4). During Plaintiffs' employment with Defendant, the racial composition of the driving force at the Whites Creek location was split approximately evenly between whites and minorities. (Id. at 6).^[6] Plaintiffs reported to Jermaine Davis (“Davis”),^[7] who, like Plaintiffs, is African American. (Id. at 3-4).

As a driver manager,^[8] Davis was responsible for assigning Plaintiffs their routes,^[9] number of loads, and the trucks they drove. (Id.).

Plaintiffs, along with most of the other Whites Creek local drivers, were designated as Texas Regional Relay (“TRR”) drivers.^[10] (Id. at 4). TRR drivers are paid a daily rate. (Id.) Other than two shuttle drivers who were paid hourly, and one driver who pulled only one TRR load for which he was paid by the mile, all but two Whites Creek TRR drivers (including Plaintiffs) were paid at the same rate, i.e. a daily rate of $180 per day. (Id. at 13).^[11] The remaining two TRR drivers (one white and one African American) were paid at a rate of $170 per day. (Id.).^[12]

During Plaintiffs' employment, Defendant provided training in a group setting to all of its newly hired (but experienced) drivers who already held CDLs. (Id. at 8).^[13] According to Defendant, this training consisted of an approximately three-day in-person group orientation at one of Defendant's orientation centers (located at either its headquarters or another location). (Id. at 9).

While employed, Plaintiffs also received training covering Federal Motor Carrier Regulations and Defendant's policies and procedures. (Id.). Following the training, the new hires were required to take and pass written tests and a road test. (Id.). Additionally, the new hires received instruction on utilizing a Qualcomm messaging system that was present in each truck. (Id.). The Qualcomm system enables communication between a driver and his or her manager or dispatcher regarding route/load assignments, truck allocations, and any arising issues, including employment-related concerns. (Id. at 10).

In addition to providing training, Defendant furnished each driver with a driver manual, which contained Defendant's Anti-Discrimination and Harassment Policy (“Anti-Discrimination Policy”). (Doc. No. 32 at 6). The Anti-Discrimination Policy advises drivers to report any harassment to “a Supervisor, Driver/Fleet Manager, or HR.” (Doc. No. 33-3 at 53). The driver manual that Plaintiffs received also included Defendant's Open Door Communications Policy (“Open Door Policy”) (collectively, with the Anti-Discrimination Policy, “Policies”) which encourages all employees to discuss “any matter openly or in confidence and without fear of retaliation.” (Id. at 54). The Open Door Policy instructs employees to “first exercise this right with [their respective] immediate supervisor, and, if necessary, to succeeding levels of management up to and including the Company's president.” (Id.).

Plaintiffs were assigned various company-owned trucks during their employment. (Doc. No. 32 at 10). During their depositions, neither Plaintiff could recall the model year of the truck(s) they drove while working for Defendant. (Id.). Defendant's records show that during the time of Plaintiffs' employment, local drivers at Defendant's Whites Creek location almost always drove 2018 Peterbilt trucks. (Doc. Nos. 25-3, 25-4).^[14] According to Defendant's records, only two 2019 Peterbilt trucks were driven (for a total of seven days) during Plaintiffs' employment, and neither one was driven by a white employee. (Doc. Nos. 25-3, 25-4). Moreover, Defendant's records show that three 2017 International trucks were used (for a total of 44 days by six drivers). (Doc. Nos. 25-3, 25-4). But according to Defendant's records, Sneed was never assigned a 2017 truck, and Smith was assigned a 2017 truck only once and drove it only a single day. (Doc. Nos. 25-3, 254).^[15]

Although Smith was not employed by Defendant long enough to accrue any vacation time, Sneed accrued five days of vacation time. (Doc. No. 32 at 11-12). Instead of using his vacation time off, Sneed requested that it be paid out on his paycheck and received such payment on March 12, 2020.^[16] (Id. at 12).

Drivers at the Whites Creek location were not required to work Saturdays but could do so on a voluntary basis.^[17] (Doc. No. 25-2 at 6). Sneed requested to work on multiple Saturdays, (see Doc. No. 25-6), and out of the approximately 52 weeks he worked as a local driver, Sneed worked eight Saturdays. (Doc. No. 32 at 13).

II. Plaintiffs' Claims and Facts Giving Rise to Those Claims

Each Plaintiff brings three types of claims: race-discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment, although in doing so they each (for whatever reason) invoke only a statute (or statutes) that the other does not invoke.^[18] (Doc. No. 1). Specifically, Sneed brings his claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”), and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 4-21-101, et seq. (“THRA”),^[19] whereas Plaintiff Smith brings his claims under § 1981. But courts use the same framework for analyzing each of the three types of Plaintiffs' claims, regardless of the statute under which the type of claim is brought. So with respect to each Plaintiff, the Court need conduct only one analysis of each type of claim, regardless of the statute under which the type of claim is brought. Frazier v. Phillip's Masonry Grp., Inc., No. 1:09-0022, 2010 WL 1882123, at *6 & n.2 (M.D. Tenn. May 11, 2010) (“THRA claims are also analyzed under Title VII law” (citing Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dept., 549 F.3d 666, 673 (6th Cir. 2008))); Pendleton v. Bob Frensley Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram, Inc., No. 3:14 C F02325, 2016 WL 2927983, at **3, 8, 10 (M.D. Tenn. May 19, 2016) (“Plaintiff brings his race discrimination claim under Title VII, § 1981, and the THRA, yet we need only conduct one analysis.” (citing multiple Sixth Circuit cases)).

Plaintiffs rely on the same set of allegations to support their claims of race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. That is to say, the same facts that Plaintiffs allege form the basis of their race-discrimination claims also form the basis of their claims of retaliation and hostile work environment. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Davis and Claytor cussed, screamed, criticized, and belittled them and other African American drivers by, for example, their tone of voice and making comments questioning Plaintiffs' productivity. (Doc. No. 31 at 2). Additionally, Plaintiffs claim that Davis and Claytor used the term “monkey ass” when referring to Plaintiffs.^[20](Id.). Plaintiffs also maintain (despite Defendant's records to the contrary) that, as compared to “white” drivers, Plaintiffs were paid less for completing the same or more work, were assigned less desirable (i.e., longer) driving routes, and were assigned “older, damaged, and less desirable trucks.” (Id.). Plaintiffs also claim that Defendant spent more time training non-African American employees.^[21] (Id. at 4).

Plaintiffs also...