Smith v. Presidio Networked Sols.

1

KAMI SMITH, Plaintiff, v. PRESIDIO NETWORKED SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 22-736

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

September 5, 2024

Slomsky, J.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................................................2

II BACKGROUND....................................................................................................................................................3

III. LEGAL STANDARDS..........................................................................................................................................4

IV ANALYSIS..............................................................................................................................................................6

A. Plaintiff is not Entitled to Attorneys' Fees................................................................................................................6

B. Plaintiff's Request for Costs will be Granted in Part and Denied in Part.................................................................13

1. Delivery Services/Messengers........................................................................................................................................16

2. Court Fees.....................................................................................................................................................................16

3 Depositions.....................................................................................................................................................................18

4. Litigation Support.............................................................................................................................................................20

5. E-Discovery.....................................................................................................................................................................20

V. CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................................................22

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendant Presidio, her former employer, alleging six (6) claims: (1) gender discrimination, disparate pay and hostile work environment claims, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) (Count I); (2) gender discrimination and hostile work environment claims, in violation of Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951, et seq. (“PHRA”) (Count II); (3) retaliation, in violation of Title VII (Count III); (4) retaliation, in violation of the PHRA (Count IV); (5) disability discrimination, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”) (Count V); and (6) retaliation, in violation of the ADA (Count VI). (Doc. No. 1.)

After ruling on cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, three claims remained in this case: (1) gender discrimination, in violation of Title VII (Count I); (2) disability discrimination, in violation of the ADA (Count V); and (3) retaliation, in violation of the ADA (Count VI). (Doc. Nos. 165, 166.) An eight-day jury trial followed, beginning on July 8, 2024 and ending on July 16, 2024.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff on only one Count-retaliation for Plaintiff's request for a reasonable accommodation of disability leave, in violation of the ADA (Count VI). (Doc. No. 202 at 6.) On this Count, the jury declined to award Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages. (See id.) Instead, the jury awarded her $1.00 in nominal damages. (Id. at 7.) On July 17, 2024, the Court entered Judgment in favor of Plaintiff for $1.00 in accordance with the jury's verdict. (Doc. No. 203.)

On July 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, seeking $762,687.50 in attorneys' fees and $89,034.25 in costs. (Doc. No. 215.) On August 14, 2024, Defendant filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. No. 216), and on August 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed their Reply (Doc. No. 218). On August 27, 2024, the Court held a hearing on the Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (Doc. No. 219.) At the hearing, the Court requested additional letter briefing from the parties, which they filed on August 27, 2024. (Doc. Nos. 220, 221, 222.) Plaintiff's Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Doc. No. 215) is now ripe for disposition, and for the following reasons, the Petition will be granted in part and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND

On July 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed her Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (Doc. No. 215.) The Petition seeks $762,687.50 in attorneys' fees and $89,034.25 in costs. (Id. at 2.) Six (6) attorneys and one (1) law clerk comprise Plaintiff's legal team. (Id. at 4.) The attorneys are: John P. McAvoy, Allison E. Gotthold, David F. McComb, Jonathan Weiss, Zachar[y] A. Silverstein and Scott Zlotnick. (Id.) The law clerk is Jenna L. Kurtz. (Id.) They attest that they spent a total of 1,907.7 hours working on Plaintiff's case. (Id.)

In her Motion, Plaintiff submits that an award of attorneys' fees is warranted because her legal team “vindicated [her] statutorily protected right against retaliation under the ADA through excellent advocacy in a case that was hard fought from its [g]enesis by her former employer.” (Id. at 3.) Further, her lawyers took her case “on a contingency fee basis when very few firms would or could.” (Id.) She concludes that “Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to be paid by Defendant Presidio.” (Id.)

On August 14, 2024, Defendant filed a Response in Opposition. (Doc. No. 216.) In general, Defendant submits that Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees and costs is excessive and unreasonable, and for these reasons the Court should deny the attorneys' fees, or in the alternative, reduce the amount. (Id. at 6.) In this regard, Defendant asserts that even if this Court were to entertain Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees, the fees should nonetheless be reduced to $0 as Plaintiff fails to “make a good faith effort to exclude from [the] fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary[.]” (Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).)

Defendant next argues that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) and its progeny bars recovery of attorneys' fees in this case. (Id. at 6-7.) In Farrar, the Court held that “[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” (Id. (citing Farrar, 506 U.S. at 576).) Further, while Defendant recognizes that there are exceptions to this rule, it alleges that none of them apply to the case at hand. (Id.) Finally, regarding costs, Defendant submits that the requested costs are extraordinarily improper, not taxable as a matter of law, and Plaintiff has failed to follow the proper procedures in submitting them. (Id. at 8.) And “[e]ven if this Court could entertain Plaintiff's request for costs, it is, like her fee request, extraordinarily improper” because Plaintiff “seeks costs that she never incurred and that are not taxable [as] a matter of law.” (Id.)

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under the ADA, a prevailing party is permitted to recover an award of attorney's fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (“the court or agency in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party [in an ADA retaliation case] . . . a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs . . .”). A fee award “is within the district court's discretion so long as it employs correct standards and procedures and makes findings of fact not clearly erroneous.” Loughner v. U. of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Pa. Environ. Def, v. Canon-McMillan, 152 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 1998)). To obtain attorneys' fees, a plaintiff must establish that they are the prevailing party and that the requested fees are reasonable. Hare v. Potter, 549 F.Supp.2d 698, 702 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1996)). For cases involving only nominal damages, “‘the ‘technical' nature of a nominal damages award ... does not affect the prevailing party inquiry'” for the purposes of awarding attorneys' fees, [but] ‘it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded....'” Pierce v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. Act. No. 17-5539, 2019 WL 3536955, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2019) (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114). Specifically, “[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Id. (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57, 264 (1978)). The Third Circuit Held in Velius that in making this determination:

[t]he Court has “substantial discretion” under Farrar “to decide whether no fee or some fee would be reasonable, as long as [it] acknowledge[s] that a nominal damages award is presumptively a technical victory that does not merit an award of attorneys' fees.” If the Court determines that no fee or a low fee is reasonable, it need not apply multi-factor tests or calculate the lodestar.

466 Fed.Appx. at 140-41.

Regarding costs, in addition to 42 U.S.C. § 12205, which allows a prevailing party to recover litigation expenses and costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 permits a court to tax as costs certain items incurred in litigation, such as “fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses.” 28 U.S.C § 1920. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54...