Smith v. Rev Grp.

1

CHRIS SMITH AND MARCEE SMITH, Plaintiffs, v. REV GROUP, INC. AND FREIGHTLINER CUSTOM CHASSIS CORPORATION, Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-742-JES-NPM

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division

February 9, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN E. STEELE, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation's Motion to Dismiss, or, In the Alternative Motion For a More Definite Statement and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. #12) filed on December 2, 2022. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #15) on January 3, 2023.^[1] For the reasons set forth below the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I.

The operative pleading is an Amended Complaint (Doc. #3) which alleges the following: On or about March 21, 2022, Chris and Marcee Smith (Plaintiffs or the Smiths) purchased a new 2022 Renegade Verona LE Class C Diesel motor home, Id. No 3ALACYEE6NDND9461, (the Vehicle) from non-party Holland Motor Homes & Bus Co. (Seller or Holland) in Holland, Michigan. (Doc. #3, ¶¶ 1-2, 7-8.) The purchase price of the Vehicle, including taxes and fees, was $371,856.03. (Id., ¶ 11.) The Vehicle was manufactured and distributed by defendants REV Group, Inc. (REV) and Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation (Freightliner)^[2], collectively Defendants. (Id., ¶¶ 2, 7.) Defendants issued the Smiths “several guarantees, affirmations, or undertakings” concerning the material and workmanship of the Vehicle and any remedial action in the event the Vehicle failed to meet certain specifications. (Id., ¶ 12.) Specifically, Defendants issued and supplied Plaintiffs with a written warranty which included a warranty fully outlined in their “new car warranty booklet.” (Id., ¶ 13.) The Smiths' purchase of the Vehicle was induced by Defendants' written warranty and/or service contract, upon which they reasonably relied. (Id., ¶ 15.)

Soon after the purchase, and during the warranty period, the Smiths detected various defects and nonconformities with the Vehicle, such as a “clunking noise coming from the rear when hitting highway speeds (sic),” and the “rear end making loud noise; heavy vibration when going over 60 miles per hour.” (Id., ¶¶ 19 20.) Plaintiffs took the Vehicle to one of Defendants' authorized service dealers, but the authorized dealer was unable to or failed to adequately repair the defects in the Vehicle in accordance with Defendants' written warranty and service contract. (Id., ¶¶ 21 22.) As a result, the Vehicle cannot be utilized for its intended purpose, is impaired in its use, value, and safety, and has caused the Smiths to incur expenses, losses, and damages. (Id., ¶¶ 2324, 30.)

Plaintiffs assert two claims against Defendants: (1) warranty-based claims under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (Count I); and (2) a consumer claim under Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), § 501.202, Fla. Stat. (Count II). (Doc. #3, pp. 6, 8.) Plaintiffs seek damages and reasonable attorney's fees and costs, along with an order directing Defendants to properly repair any outstanding defects in the Vehicle. (Id., pp. 8, 12.)

Defendant Freightliner urges the Court to dismiss both claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because they each fail to state a claim upon which Plaintiffs are entitled to relief. (Doc. #12.) Plaintiffs respond that they have complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pleading requirements, and therefore Defendant's motion should be denied. (Doc. #15.)

II.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a Complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). To survive dismissal, the factual allegations must be “plausible” and “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. See also, Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). This requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions without adequate factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth,” Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability fall short of being facially plausible.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court engages in a two-step approach: “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

III.

A. Count I - Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) provides that a “consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation . . . under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages....” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). Count I of the Amended Complaint brings two claims against Defendants under the MMWA, alleging a violation of a written warranty and a violation of an implied warranty. (See Doc. #3, ¶ 39: “[Defendants] made a written warranty and/or service contract and/or is subject to the provisions of an implied warranty arising under Florida law.”)

As to the written warranty claim, the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants issued and supplied Plaintiffs with a written warranty which included a warranty fully outlined in their “new car warranty booklet.” (Id., ¶ 13.) Count I alleges that the Vehicle “was accompanied by a written factory warranty,” and further described the written warranty as being “for any defects in material or workmanship” “to repair or replace defective parts, or take other remedial action [for] free [if] vehicle failed to meet the specifications set forth in the Manufacturer's warranty.” (Id., ¶ 40.) Under the written warranty, Defendants “agreed to perform effective repairs at no charge for parts and/or labor.” (Id., ¶ 41.)

As to an implied warranty, Count I alleges that Defendants are “subject to the provisions of an implied warranty arising under Florida law” (Id., ¶ 39) and that the MMWA requires that Defendants be “bound by all warranties implied by Florida law.” (Id., ¶ 44.) In a prior paragraph incorporated into Count I, plaintiffs allege that the implied warranties are for merchantability and fitness of particular purpose. (Id., ¶ 29.)

Freightliner moves to dismiss Count I because Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the MMWA. Specifically, Freightliner argues dismissal is required because Plaintiffs failed to attach a copy of the written warranty and/or service contract to the complaint, and Plaintiffs are not in privity with Freightliner as required by Florida law. (Doc. #12, pp. 3-7.) The Court discusses each argument in turn.

(1) Failure to Attach Written Warranty or Describe Terms

Freightliner argues that the Amended Complaint repeatedly references Defendants' “written warranty and/or service contract,” but that Plaintiffs failed to attach the document(s) or describe the terms of the warranty that serves as a basis for its claims.

Freightliner asserts that this alone warrants dismissal of their MMWA claim. (Doc. #12, pp. 4-5.) The Court finds that the failure to attach the written warranty does not require dismissal, and that the description of the warranty was sufficient for pleading purposes.

While plaintiff may attach a document to a complaint, Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), there is no mandatory requirement to do so. federal rule requires [Plaintiffs] to attach the warranty to the complaint.” Thomas v. Winnebago Indus., No. 8:16-cv-177-T-23TGW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83114, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 27, (citing AGSC Marine Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Underground, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79591, 2012 WL 2087441, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2012)("Although [a] failure [to attach a written contract] would result in a dismissal, without prejudice, of [a] breach of contract claim under Florida law . . . the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which apply to this case, do not have an analogous requirement.")). Rather, Rule 8(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, simply requires the complaint to include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The description of the written warranty, as summarized above, provides sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible claim under the MMWA, even without the attachment of the written warranty.

(2) Lack of Privity

The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants were “in privity with Plaintiffs based upon its issuance of a written warranty and its role in the sale, distribution, and repair of the subject Vehicle ...” which is further described in twelve subparagraphs. (Doc. #3, ¶ 18.) Nonetheless Freightliner argues that Plaintiff's MMWA claims must be dismissed because Plaintiffs fail to establish privity with Freightliner under Florida law. (Doc. #12, pp. 2, 4.) Freightliner asserts that ...