Smith v. Roger Williams Law Sch.

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Jimmy Smith v. Roger Williams University Law School

No. 21-cv-190-PJB-AKJ

Opinion No. 2023 DNH 021

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

February 27, 2023

ORDER

Paul J. Barbadoro United States District Judge

Plaintiff Jimmy Smith, a law school graduate appearing pro se, has sued his alma mater, Roger Williams University Law School (RWULS). Mr. Smith claims that RWULS discriminated against him because of his race. Invoking Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), RWULS moves to dismiss (Doc. No. 96), arguing that Mr. Smith's complaint fails to state a claim for relief. Mr. Smith has timely objected (Doc. Nos. 98 and 100), to which RWULS has replied (Doc. No. 99). The defendant's motion is granted. Accepting all of Mr. Smith's well-pleaded facts as true the court finds that Mr. Smith has failed to state claim for racial discrimination.

Factual Background^[1] Mr Smith, an African American, began his studies at RWULS in 2016, graduating in 2021. Prior to initiating this lawsuit Mr. Smith sued RWULS in a separate action. See Smith v. Roger Williams University Law School, No. 21-cv-133-PJB-AKJ (D.R.I. filed Mar. 19, 2021) (“Smith I”). Mr. Smith asserts that RWULS “took adverse actions” against him in retaliation for filing Smith I, “subjected him to discrimination,” and “denied [him] the benefits of his educational programs.” Am. Compl. (Doc. No. 70-2) ¶¶ 33, 81, 82. He further alleges that RWULS has “denied [him] opportunities for advancement” and “retaliated against him” due to his race. Id. ¶¶ 88-89. In addition, Mr. Smith asserts that RWULS “cherry-picked a male who appears to be black to have an honor board complaint” against him. Id. ¶ 98.

Mr. Smith further alleges that he was removed from a Facebook group in retaliation for filing Smith I. In addition, he alleges that he was not invited to the final competition of his trial class. Id. ¶ 134. Another student was also not participating in the final trial. That student was the subject of a disciplinary complaint lodged by Mr. Smith. Id. ¶ 138. Mr. Smith also alleges that RWULS' legal arguments in Smith I and this case are retaliation for his complaints about racial discrimination. Id. ¶ 149. In addition, Mr. Smith alleges that a disciplinary complaint he lodged against a white student was resolved informally. Id. ¶ 161-62. Mr. Smith also alleges that in the Fall of 2019, he was robbed of $200 by a RWULS employee. Finally, Mr. Smith's amended complaint contains a series of allegations pertaining to his mail being “monitored,” other students using drugs, and Mr. Smith encountering a law school faculty member at a casino. Id. ¶¶ 202-07, 210-215.

Procedural History

Mr. Smith filed his original complaint (Doc. No. 1) on April 30, 2021. The case was then delayed after Mr. Smith appealed the court's denial of his motion for a temporary restraining order. See Doc. Nos. 3 (motion), 19 (amended motion), May 12, 2021 docket entry (denying motion), and 28 (notice of appeal). On preliminary review, the Magistrate Judge, construing the pro se complaint liberally, allowed a claim for racial discrimination to proceed. November 18, 2021, Order (Doc. No. 37). The court allowed that claim to proceed without prejudice to RWULS's “right to seek dismissal or assert any available defense available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, . . . .” Id. at 5. Mr. Smith moved to amend his complaint in March 2022. (Doc. No. 70). The court granted the motion to amend, in part, allowing Mr. Smith's racial discrimination case to proceed pursuant to state and federal laws. See April 18, 2022 Report and recommendation (Doc. No. 79), adopted July 22, 2022 (Doc. No. 95). The defendant's timely motion to dismiss is now ripe for review.

Standard of Review

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must make factual allegations sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. A claim is facially plausible if it “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In testing a complaint's sufficiency, the court employs a two-step approach. See Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortufio-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). First, the complaint is screened for statements that “merely offer legal conclusions couched as fact or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. (cleaned up). A claim consisting of little more than “allegations that merely parrot the elements of the cause of action” may be dismissed. Id. Second, after crediting as true all non-conclusory factual allegations and the reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations, the court determines if the claim is plausible. Id. The plausibility requirement “simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of illegal conduct. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The “make-or-break standard” is that those allegations and inferences, “taken as true, must state a plausible, not a merely conceivable, case for relief.” Sepulveda-Villarini v. Dep't of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010).^[2]

Analysis

Mr Smith's racial discrimination claims (counts 1, 9, and 10 of the amended complaint) are separately asserted under two federal statutes - 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d -and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (“RICRA”), R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1. Section 1981 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ....” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Title

VI provides that “[n]o person . . . shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. RICRA similarly protects against discrimination based on one's “race, color, religion, sex, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1.

While the three relevant statutes are not identical, they all require factual allegations sufficient to support a plausible claim that RWULS acted with discriminatory intent. See Doe v. Brown Univ., 43 F.4th 195, 208 (1st Cir. 2022). Here, stripped of conclusory factual allegations, the court finds that Mr. Smith has failed to plead facts sufficient to support a plausible claim that RWULS discriminated against him because ofhis race.

First, the court can find no plausible basis for Mr. Smith's claim that RWULS's defense in this case or Smith I bears any hint of retaliation, let alone retaliation based on Mr. Smith's race. Next, and more importantly, Mr. Smith's amended complaint offers only vague and conclusory allegations about racial discrimination. Indeed, the only non-conclusory factual allegation Mr. Smith ties to his race is that a disciplinary complaint he lodged against a white student was resolved informally. Am. Compl. (Doc. No. 70-2) ¶161-62. But he offers no facts from which it can be plausibly inferred that he was treated differently or that this resolution was racebased. See Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F.Supp.3d 195, 224 (D. Mass. 2017) (granting judgment on the pleadings to college where plaintiff failed to allege that “other students who were found responsible for similar violations and received lesser punishments.”). Nor -- given that Mr. Smith himself was involved in the complaint noted above -- is this a situation where more details are “likely within [the defendant's] control. See Doe v. Tr. of Dartmouth Coll., Civ. No. 21-cv-83-JD, 2021 WL 2857518 at *8 (D.N.H. July 8. 2021).

In his objection, Mr. Smith points to paragraph 89 of his amended complaint, where he asserts that RWULS has “retaliated against me and treated me differently due to either my race, color and/or sex.” This is insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, as it presents no factual allegations underpinning the legal conclusion asserted. See Doe v. Brown Univ., 43 F.4^th at 413 (finding allegations of racial discrimination sufficient where plaintiff alleged facts supporting his claim that white students were permitted to exercise certain rights that he was not and that a college official used a derogatory slur against him).

Moreover many of the factual allegations in the amended complaint undercut a claim of being treated differently. For example, he alleges that he was not invited to the final competition of his trial class. Am. Compl. (Doc. No. 70-2) ¶...