Smith v. State

1

CHRISTOPHER SMITH A/K/A CHRISTOPHER ANTHONY SMITH A/K/A CHRISTOPHER A. SMITH A/K/A CHRIS SMITH APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

No. 2023-KA-00185-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi

May 7, 2024

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/04/2022

COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MONROE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, HON. JOHN R. WHITE, TRIAL JUDGE:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER GEORGE T. HOLMES

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ALEXANDRA LEBRON

DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOHN DAVID WEDDLE

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND SMITH, JJ.

CARLTON, P.J.

¶1. Christopher Smith was convicted of one count of sexual battery of a minor and sentenced accordingly. Smith now appeals his conviction, arguing that his confession during custodial interrogation was involuntary, and as a result, the Monroe County Circuit Court erred by admitting his confession into evidence. Smith also argues that the trial court erred by allowing Smith's trial to proceed in his absence.

¶2. Finding no error, we affirm Smith's conviction and sentence.

FACTS

¶3. C.B.^[1] testified that in June 2014, Christopher Smith sexually assaulted her. At the time of the assault, C.B. was six years old, and Smith was fifteen years old. C.B. immediately reported the incident to her mother, identifying Smith as the perpetrator. C.B.'s mother took her to a hospital in Amory, Mississippi, where C.B. was examined by nurse Kathy Franks, a sexual assault nurse examiner. Franks testified that she observed signs of trauma to C.B.'s pelvic area. Franks also performed a rape-kit examination on C.B. Investigators with the Monroe County Sheriff's Office sent the rape kit to the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory for testing. Test results revealed the presence of seminal fluid in C.B.'s underwear; however, the sample from the rape kit was too small to be tested for the presence of DNA.

¶4. John Michael Lay, an investigator with the Monroe County Sheriff's Department, arrived at the hospital and interviewed C.B., C.B.'s mother, and Franks. Based on C.B.'s identification of Smith as the person who assaulted her, Smith was arrested and transported to the sheriff's office.

¶5. After Smith signed a waiver of his Miranda^[2] rights, Investigator Lay and Investigator Brandon Davis interrogated him. Smith initially denied any inappropriate contact with C.B. However, Smith eventually admitted to the investigators that he sexually penetrated C.B. Investigators asked Smith to draw a picture of his penis to show how far he penetrated C.B. Investigators also asked Smith to write a letter to his parents apologizing "for putting them into this situation."

¶6. A Monroe County grand jury indicted Smith for sexual battery of a minor under the age of fourteen years old, in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-95(1)(d) (Rev. 2014). Smith filed a motion requesting a mental examination. The trial court granted the motion, and Dr. Chris Lott, a clinical and forensic psychologist, performed an evaluation of Smith. After completing the evaluation, Dr. Lott submitted a report stating that Smith was competent to stand trial. Smith also filed a motion to suppress his confession, drawing, and letter to his parents. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

¶7. After years of continuances, a trial was finally held in September 2022. Smith failed to appear in court, and Smith was tried in absentia. The jury heard testimony from C.B., C.B.'s mother, Franks, Investigator Lay, and A.O., who testified that in 2021, when she was twelve years old, Smith sexually assaulted her on two separate occasions.^[3]

¶8. The jury eventually returned a verdict finding Smith guilty of sexual battery of a minor under the age of fourteen years old. The trial court sentenced Smith to forty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with twenty years suspended and twenty years to serve, and five years of post-release supervision.

¶9. After the denial of Smith's post-trial motions, including a pro se motion for a new trial, this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Coerced Admission

¶10. Smith argues that the trial court erred by ruling that his confession was admissible at trial. Smith claims that his confession to investigators during custodial interrogation was coerced and resulted from offers of leniency, and therefore it was not freely, voluntarily, and knowingly made. Specifically, Smith asserts that the investigators induced him into making an involuntary statement where he admitted to sexually penetrating C.B. in order to avoid harsh treatment by the courts and prison inmates. Smith maintains that the investigators repeatedly told Smith that they would "help" him if he told "the truth." As a result, Smith asserts that he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a new trial.

¶11. This Court reviews the admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. Fortenberry v. State, 195 So.3d 890, 893 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). We recognize that "for a confession to be admissible at trial it must have been intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily given, and not a product of police threats, promises or inducements." Wilson v. State, 936 So.2d 357, 361 (¶8) (Miss. 2006). The Mississippi Supreme Court has explained that "[a] confession is voluntary when, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, the statement is the product of the accused's free and rational choice." Id. at 361-62 (¶8). "In determining whether a defendant's confession was intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily given the trial court sits as a finder of fact." Id. at 361 (¶8). We will reverse the trial court's decision regarding the voluntariness of a confession "only upon finding the ruling was manifestly erroneous or contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence." Johnson v. State, 129 So.3d 148, 151 (¶11) (Miss. 2013).

¶12. In cases like the one before us where "a defendant claims that the police have induced a confession through coercion[,] the trial court is required to hold a hearing to determine the voluntariness of that confession." Wilson, 936 So.2d at 362 (¶9). The hearing must be held outside of the presence of the jury, and the State possesses the "burden of proving the voluntariness of the confession via testimony of an officer, or other person having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion or offer of reward." Id.; see also Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671, 673 (Miss. 1966). When the defendant is a minor, a trial court must also evaluate "the circumstances surrounding the interrogation," including "the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights." Jennings v. State, 127 So.3d 185, 191 (¶9) (Miss. 2013) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)); see also McGowan v. State, 706 So.2d 231, 235 (Miss. 1997). Once the State has established a prima facie case that the confession was voluntary, "[t]he defendant must rebut the State's prima facie case by offering testimony that violence, threats of violence, or offers of reward induced the confession." Ruffin v. State, 992 So.2d 1165, 1169 (¶9) (Miss. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶13. Prior to trial, Smith filed a motion to suppress his inculpatory interrogation comments, the letter to his parents, and the drawing of his penis. Smith challenged his purported waiver of his Miranda rights based on his young age and inexperience, and he also challenged the voluntariness of his confession. Smith argued that the investigators promised him leniency in exchange for Smith confessing to the sexual battery of C.B. Smith attached the transcript of his interrogation to the motion.

¶14. The trial court held a hearing on the motion outside the jury's presence and ultimately determined that based on the totality of the circumstances, including Smith's "age, intelligence, and the circumstances related to the interrogation or the questioning by the officers involved," Smith's confession, letter, and drawing were admissible. The trial court explained that due to the nature of the crime, Smith's age "has no special bearing on his ability to be questioned without a parent and voluntarily waive his rights." The trial court also referenced Dr. Lott's evaluation of Smith and his determination that Smith was competent to stand trial.

¶15. The supreme court has explained that "[o]nce a trial judge determines admissibility, the defendant/appellant faces a heavy burden in trying to reverse on appeal." Ruffin, 992 So.2d at 1169 (¶8). As stated, we will not reverse the trial court's finding that Smith's confession was voluntary and admissible "so long as the court applied the correct principles of law and the finding is factually supported by the evidence." Id.

¶16. The record reflects that based on C.B.'s statement to Investigator Lay, Smith was arrested and transported to the sheriff's department. The transcript from Smith's interview reflects that Investigator Lay and Investigator Davis advised Smith of his Miranda rights. The investigators also read the Miranda waiver form to Smith, making sure he understood each individual right. After Smith signed the Miranda waiver, the investigators began interrogating him.

¶17. Smith argues that his age is "a crucial factor" in determining whether his confession was voluntary. The record reflects that at the time of the incident and his interrogation, Smith was fifteen years old. Smith did not have a parent present during his interrogation, and he never requested that a parent be present. Regarding Smith's age, the supreme...