Smith v. State

1

MELONIE DAWN SMITH, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STATE OF IDAHO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 50483

Court of Appeals of Idaho

October 31, 2024

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District State of Idaho, Bingham County. Hon. Darren B. Simpson District Judge.

Judgment summarily dismissing amended petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P McGreevy, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon Raul R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

GRATTON, CHIEF JUDGE

Melonie Dawn Smith appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing her amended petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In February 2017, Guy Lopez reported to the Bingham County Sheriff's Office that his friend, Smith, had confessed to killing David Davis. Smith told Lopez that a man named Kevin Day shot Davis in the legs outside her home, after which Davis entered her house and she shot Davis in the head to stop his suffering. Smith then asked Lopez to help her dispose of the body and burn the evidence. Lopez, who had just come from Smith's home, described seeing Davis's body wrapped in plastic, and brain matter, blood, and bones scattered in the home. Later that night, officers approached Smith's home, where she initially refused entry without a warrant. However, after some discussion and observing potential evidence inside, officers secured the home and obtained a search warrant. Upon executing the search warrant, the officers found Davis's body as described by Lopez. Smith was charged with first degree murder and destruction of evidence. She moved to suppress the evidence and argued that the search was unconstitutional. The district court denied her motion, citing exigent circumstances and the inevitability of discovery.

At trial, the State sought to introduce Exhibit 4 into evidence, which contained Sergeant Phillips' body camera footage depicting Smith's repeated refusals to allow officers into her home. Smith's attorney objected, stating he expected Lopez would testify before the exhibit was admitted because the officers' claim to Smith that "We have information out here that someone needs medical assistance" stemmed from Lopez's statements. Smith's counsel explained Smith thought the police officers were exaggerating because that is not what Lopez said. Thus, Smith's attorney lodged a conditional objection, arguing there may not be sufficient foundation for the video if Lopez does not testify first. The district court overruled the objection, provided that the State lay the proper foundation for its admission. Later, when the State moved to admit Exhibit 4 during Sergeant Phillips' testimony, the district court found sufficient foundation had been laid and admitted Exhibit 4. The prosecutor also moved to introduce Exhibit 7 (containing the video from Sergeant Phillips' dashboard camera) during Sergeant Phillips' testimony. Exhibit 7 was admitted without objection and revealed the same conversation as Exhibit 4.

Also at trial, Smith's mother, Bettie Duke (Duke), who was at the house when officers entered, testified that she did not remember telling her other daughter and grandson, Kellie and Jeremy Leslie (the Leslies), that Smith said she shot Davis. The district court allowed the Leslies to testify over Smith's hearsay objections. Kellie Leslie testified that Duke said Smith had shot Davis in the head. Jeremy Leslie testified that Duke stated somebody had been killed in their house and that she did not see anything but had heard the gunshots. During closing arguments, the State argued that the testimony of the Leslies was substantive evidence that Duke told them that Smith had shot Davis in the head, although the testimony had been admitted as impeachment evidence, not for the truth of the matter asserted. Smith's counsel did not object to the prosecutor's characterization of the testimony. Smith was found guilty of first degree murder, Idaho Code §§ 18-4001, -4002, and -4003; and destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence, I.C. § 18-2603, and was sentenced to life in prison.

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction, and the Idaho Supreme Court granted review. State v. Smith, 168 Idaho 463, 471, 483 P.3d 1006, 1014 (2021). On review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Smith's motion to suppress evidence based on the officer's warrantless entry into her house because such entry was justified: (1) to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, (2) as a protective sweep of the residence, and (3) under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. at 472-476, 483 P.3d at 1015-1019. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision overruling the hearsay objections of Smith's trial counsel and also held that "Smith has waived any argument stemming from the prosecutor's comments during closing argument related to the Leslies' testimony." Id. at 477, 483 P.3d at 1020. Next, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Smith met only the first of three criteria required to show fundamental error in regard to her claim that "the admission of Exhibit 4 and the prosecutor's closing argument impermissibly commented on Smith's invocation of her Fourth Amendment rights." Id. at 478, 483 P.3d at 1021. After rejecting Smith's "cumulative error" argument, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed her judgment of conviction. Id. at 482, 483 P.3d at 1025.

Smith filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and police misconduct. At Smith's request, the district court appointed counsel to represent her. Smith's attorney filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief with a supporting affidavit. The State moved to summarily dismiss Smith's amended petition. After a hearing, the district court granted the State's motion for summary dismissal. Smith appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner's admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). Over questions of law, we exercise free review. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).

III. ANALYSIS

Smith contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing several of her claims. First, she asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed her ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on trial counsel's failure to object to Exhibits 4 and 7 and to the State's improper closing argument. Second, Smith asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed her ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct claims based on the State's improper closing argument comments regarding the Leslies' testimony. She argues the court dismissed the prosecutorial misconduct claim on grounds not argued by the State and without providing twenty-days' notice. Third, Smith asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed her police misconduct claim based on law enforcement's failure to preserve the scene of the crime because she did not forfeit the claim, and she raised a genuine issue of material fact on the merits.

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court's own initiative, if it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering summary dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner's favor, but the court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). Moreover, as the trier of fact, the district court is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary disposition; rather, the district court is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidence. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). Such inferences will not be disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id.

Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law. Kelly v State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the appellant has alleged facts in his petition that if true, would entitle him to relief. Stanfield v. State, 165 Idaho 889, 894, 454 P.3d 531, 536 (2019). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is appropriate when the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that ...