Smith v. State

974 N.W.2d 576

Carlos Orlandos SMITH, Appellant,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

A21-1095

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: May 25, 2022

Carlos Orlandos Smith, Moose Lake, Minnesota, pro se.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

Appellant Carlos Orlandos Smith was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated robbery in 1994. For the aggravated robbery, the district court imposed a 96-month sentence, which reflected an upward durational departure. For the first-degree murder, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of life without the possibility of release. On direct appeal, we affirmed Smith's convictions and sentences. In April 2021, Smith moved to correct his sentence. The district court denied Smith's motion, and Smith now appeals that decision, arguing that the court abused its discretion. The district court correctly concluded that Smith's claims under Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2020) fail on the merits, the law of the case doctrine bars Smith's challenges to his sentence, and Smith forfeited review of his notice claim; as such, we affirm.

FACTS

The relevant facts are not disputed. On the evening of October 5, 1993, Smith and three companions encountered Marcus Jackson and Raymond Barnett in front of Barnett's house, located approximately one block from the intersection of Selby Avenue and Milton Street in St. Paul.¹ Jackson went inside the house, and Smith and his companions proceeded to assault Barnett after a disagreement about an incident that had occurred days prior. After beating Barnett, Smith and his companions took Barnett's shoes and his pager. Smith possessed a firearm during this altercation.

Smith and his companions then left Barnett's home and walked to the intersection of Selby and Milton, where Smith approached Dural Woods to buy marijuana. Smith paid Woods for the marijuana. But Smith then tried to get his money back from Woods, claiming that the goods Woods sold him were not what he wanted. Woods refused, a struggle ensued, and both men drew guns. Smith shot Woods multiple times, killing him. The police later arrested Smith in Minneapolis; he was ultimately charged with first-degree murder and second-degree murder for shooting and killing Woods, and aggravated robbery for his encounter with Barnett.

A jury found Smith guilty of first-degree murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185(3) (1996), and aggravated robbery, Minn. Stat. § 609.245 (1992).² The district court scheduled a sentencing hearing for May 24, 1994. Five days before the sentencing hearing, the State filed written motions seeking an upward durational sentencing departure and consecutive sentences.

During the 1994 sentencing hearing, defense counsel questioned the timeliness of the State's sentencing motion. Without citing a specific rule, defense counsel argued that the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure "require seven days’ notice." After hearing the arguments of the parties and the victim impact statements, the district court imposed a 96-month sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction, which reflected an upward durational departure from the presumptive sentencing range of 44 to 52 months imprisonment. For the first-degree murder conviction, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of life without the possibility of release.

Smith filed a direct appeal, arguing among other things that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to a double upward departure for the aggravated robbery conviction and imposing the life sentence consecutively.³ State v. Smith , 541 N.W.2d 584, 587 (Minn. 1996). We affirmed Smith's sentences, concluding that the particular cruelty of Smith's actions justified the departure and that the consecutive sentence was not a departure from the guidelines because it was permitted under Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F.2 (1995). Id. at 590.

Nearly 25 years later, on April 5, 2021, Smith moved pro se to correct his sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Liberally construed, Smith's motion appeared to assert four claims. First, Smith claimed that the district court violated Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (2020), which prohibits conviction of a crime and an included offense for the same act, when it convicted him of aggravated robbery and first-degree murder because the offenses were part of the same act. Second, he claimed that the court violated Minn. Stat. § 609.035, which prohibits the imposition of sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident, when it sentenced him on both convictions because the conduct was part of a single behavioral incident. Third, he claimed that the district court violated Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), when it relied on aggravating factors that were not found by a jury. Fourth, he claimed the district court abused its discretion because his sentences unfairly exaggerated his criminality. Smith asked the district court to either vacate his aggravated robbery sentence or reduce his aggravated robbery sentence to the presumptive 48-month duration and then run his life sentence concurrently.

The district court denied Smith's motion to correct his sentence. Relying on a variety of legal theories, the court concluded that Smith's claims failed. In analyzing Smith's first claim, which alleged that the district court violated section 609.04 when it convicted him of both robbery and murder because the two offenses were part of the same act, the court concluded that the claim implicated more than just his sentence and therefore was not properly brought in a Rule 27 motion. Rather, Smith should have brought the claim under the postconviction statute, and the claim failed because it was barred by the postconviction statute of limitations.

In two separate footnotes, the district court addressed Smith's second claim, which alleged a violation of section 609.035 on the basis that the aggravated robbery and first-degree murder convictions were part of a single behavioral incident. In footnote 2 of the order, the court rejected the claim on its merits, concluding that because Smith's conduct involved more than one victim, it comprised more than a single behavioral incident. In footnote 3 of the order, the district court questioned whether Smith's section 609.035 claim could be raised in a motion to correct a sentence and described in more detail why the claim failed on the merits.

In analyzing Smith's third claim, which alleged a Blakely violation, the district court observed that the Blakely rule does not apply retroactively. Because Smith's conviction became final 8 years before Blakely was decided, the court concluded that Smith's Blakely argument failed on its merits.

As for Smith's fourth claim, which alleged that his sentences unfairly exaggerated his criminality, the district court observed that under the law of the case doctrine, courts will not revisit an issue that was previously raised and rejected. Because the issue in question was raised and rejected in Smith's direct appeal, the court concluded that the law of the case doctrine barred Smith's fourth claim.

On appeal to this court, Smith renews his argument that the district court violated section 609.035 when it imposed separate sentences for the convictions of aggravated robbery and first-degree murder because the convictions arose out of a single behavioral incident. He also asserts that the district court erred by questioning whether his section 609.035 claim could be raised in the motion to correct his sentence. Smith further claims that the record does not contain aggravating factors that justify an upward departure. Lastly, Smith contends for the first time that the State violated Minn. R. Crim. P. 7.03, and Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 4 (2020), by filing its written motion for a sentencing departure 5 days before the 1994 sentencing hearing.

ANALYSIS

We review a district court's denial of a motion to correct a sentence for an abuse of discretion. Evans v. State , 880 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 2016). The district court abuses its discretion when it "exercise[s] its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or [makes] clearly erroneous factual findings." Reed v. State , 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010).

A defendant may move to "correct a sentence not authorized by law" at any time. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 ; see Reynolds v. State , 888 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2016) (holding that applying the 2-year time bar in the postconviction statute to motions to correct sentence violates the separation of powers and affirming that motions to correct sentence have no time limit). A sentence is unauthorized when it is "contrary to law or applicable statutes." State v. Schnagl , 859 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2015). Additionally, the right to challenge an unauthorized sentence cannot be waived. State v. Maurstad , 733 N.W.2d 141, 146–47 (Minn. 2007).

I.

We first address the district court's treatment of Smith's claim under Minn. Stat. § 609.035. Section 609.035 prohibits the imposition of sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident. Munt v. State , 920 N.W.2d 410, 416–17 (Minn. 2018) ; State v. Johnson , 273 Minn. 394, 141 N.W.2d 517, 524 (1966). Here, the court properly concluded that multiple crimes did not arise out of a single behavioral incident and thus correctly denied Smith's section 609.035 claim.⁴

To determine whether crimes arise out of a single behavioral incident, we look at "the factors of time and place" as well as "whether the segment of conduct involved was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective." Munt , 920 N.W.2d at 416 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Acts committed against separate victims...