Smith v. State

214 Md.App. 195

75 A.3d 1048

Marlon SMITH

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 1295, Sept. Term, 2012.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 10, 2013.

Daniel Kobrin (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.

Benjamin A. Harris (Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: DEBORAH S. EYLER, BERGER and IRMA S. RAKER (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

RAKER, J.

Marlon Smith, appellant, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of possession of a regulated firearm after being convicted of a disqualifying crime, wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in a vehicle. Appellant presents one issue for our review: whether the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence recovered from the search of a vehicle pursuant to a traffic stop. We shall affirm.

I.

Appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, with possession of a regulated firearm after being convicted of a disqualifying crime, wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun, and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in a vehicle. Before that court, appellant moved pre-trial to suppress a firearm that was recovered from a vehicle in which he was a passenger,¹ arguing that police conducted an unlawful traffic stop without reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause. The following evidence was presented at the motions hearing.

On November 30, 2011, Detective Kenneth Ramberg observed appellant walking along the 1600 to 1700 block of Darley Avenue. After a few minutes of watching appellant engage in non-criminal behavior, Detective Ramberg saw appellant get into the passenger seat of a vehicle. As the car drove away, the Detective noticed that the vehicle's “rear deck [brake] light” did not illuminate upon application of the brakes. The vehicle's other two rear brake lights were functioning properly. Consequently, Detective Ramberg initiated a traffic stop “[t]o inform the [driver] that the light was out, and to issue a safety equipment repair order.” Appellant was seated in the passenger seat.

Once he approached the car, Detective Ramberg smelled an odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Officers asked appellant and the driver to exit the vehicle. With both of the occupants out of the car and seated on the curb, Detective Ramberg went to close the passenger door. At that point, he saw a handgun lying in open view on the passenger floorboard. The officers arrested appellant and the driver. Although neither individual initially claimed ownership of the handgun, appellant conceded later that the handgun did not belong to the driver.

Appellant moved to suppress the handgun recovered from the search of the vehicle. He argued that the traffic stop was unlawful because it was not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause. Appellant maintained that a malfunctioning rear deck brake light is not a violation of the Transportation Article of the Maryland Code so long as the vehicle has at least two functioning rear brake lights.² The court denied the motion, determining that the Transportation Article entitles a police officer to stop a vehicle and issue a equipment repair order if any brake light is inoperable.

The case proceeded to trial before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The jury convicted appellant of possession of a firearm after being convicted of a disqualifying crime, wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun, and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in a vehicle. The court sentenced appellant to a term of incarceration of five years for possession of a regulated firearm, three years for wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun, and three years for wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in a vehicle. This timely appeal followed.

II.

Before this Court, appellant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the handgun because it was recovered pursuant to an unlawful traffic stop. Specifically, appellant argues that driving a vehicle with a malfunctioning brake light is not a violation of the Transportation Article of the Maryland Code so long as at least two brake lights are functioning properly. As such, appellant argues, Detective Ramberg initiated a traffic stop based on no violation of the law, which, in Maryland, cannot support a detention for a traffic violation even if the officer acted reasonably in believing that a violation had occurred.

The State maintains that the court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress. The State contends that Detective Ramberg initiated a lawful traffic stop to issue an equipment repair order for a malfunctioning brake light. The State disagrees with appellant's interpretation of the Transportation Article and maintains that police may initiate a traffic stop to issue a repair order for any malfunctioning brake light. Thus, the State argues that the traffic stop was predicated on an actual violation of the Maryland Vehicle Laws.

III.

Appellant's only contention on appeal is that the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the handgun recovered from a search of the vehicle. When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this Court ordinarily considers only the evidence in the suppression hearing record. See Herring v. State, 198 Md.App. 60, 67–68, 16 A.3d 246, 249–50 (2011). We defer to the hearing court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and review the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, here, the State. Id. at 71–72, 16 A.3d at 253. Ultimately, however, this Court determines independently whether a constitutional violation occurred through review of the law and application of the law to the specific facts. Id. at 72, 16 A.3d at 253.

Appellant contends that police recovered the handgun from the vehicle pursuant to an unlawful traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides as follows:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

The Fourth Amendment, made applicable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right of the people against only unreasonable searches and seizures. See Williamson v. State, 398 Md. 489, 501–02, 921 A.2d 221, 228–29 (2007) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)).

A police-initiated traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the confines of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). To be reasonable, a traffic stop must be supported by “reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that the car [was] being driven contrary to the laws governing the operation of motor vehicles.” Lewis v. State, 398 Md. 349, 362, 920 A.2d 1080, 1087 (2007). The subjective motivations of the officer for conducting a traffic stop are irrelevant to determine whether the stop is constitutionally reasonable. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812–13, 116 S.Ct. 1769. This Court has held that a police officer's mistaken, yet reasonable, belief that a traffic violation has occurred is not sufficient to establish reasonable articulable suspicion. See Gilmore v. State, 204 Md.App. 556, 571–72, 577, 42 A.3d 123, 131–32, 135 (2012). In other words:

“It makes no difference that an officer holds an understandable or ‘good faith’ belief that a law has been broken. Whether the officer's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances is not the proper inquiry.... A stop based on a subjective belief that a law has been broken, when no violation actually occurred, is not objectively reasonable.”

Gilmore, 204 Md.App. at 572, 42 A.3d at 132 (quoting United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir.2006)). Accordingly, the State must establish an actual violation of the Maryland Vehicle Laws in order to effectuate a stop predicated on a traffic violation to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment. See Ray v. State, 206 Md.App. 309, 329, 47 A.3d 1113, 1124 (2012).

Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.) § 23–105 of the Transportation Article ³ provides for the issuance of a safety equipment repair order for defective equipment on motor vehicles. Section 23–105(a)(1) states as follows:

“[I]f a police officer observes that a vehicle registered in this State is being operated with any equipment that apparently does not meet the standards established under this subtitle ... the officer shall stop the driver of the vehicle and issue to him a safety equipment repair order.”

Section 23–104, promulgated under the same subtitle as § 23–105, establishes the minimum standards for equipment on motor vehicles. Section 23–104(a) requires every vehicle driven in this State to have lights “meeting or exceeding the standards established jointly by the [Motor Vehicle Administration] and the [Automotive Safety Enforcement Division of the Department of State Police].” The Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) has the express authority under § 23–104(b) to establish regulations that supplement the Transportation Article's minimum standards for equipment, including the regulation of brake lights.

Pursuant to its authority under the Transportation Article, the MVA requires at least three functioning brake lights on certain vehicles. The applicable MVA regulation instructs that vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1985,⁴ shall have “a red high mounted [brake light]” in addition to two other brake lights on the rear of the vehicle. C.O.M.A.R. 11.14.02.10(iv). If any one of the three...