Smith v. Travelpiece

31 F.4th 878

Fernando M. SMITH; Jamie Crabtree ; Pristine Pre-Owned Autos, Inc., a West Virginia corporation Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v.Michael Lee TRAVELPIECE, sued in his individual capacity as a West Virginia State Police Officer Defendant – Appellee.

No. 20-1418

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: September 22, 2021

Decided: April 20, 2022

ARGUED: Lonnie Carl Simmons, DITRAPANO BARRETT & DIPIERO, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants. Michael Deering Mullins, STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Katherine M. Smith, STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before KING, THACKER, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion in which Judge King and Judge Thacker joined.

RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:

Fernando M. Smith, Jamie Crabtree, and Pristine Pre-Owned Autos were the subjects of an unconstitutional search. Relying on the fruits of that search, prosecutors obtained grand jury indictments against Smith and Crabtree. After a court suppressed the evidence and dismissed the criminal charges against them, they sued the trooper who conducted the search under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the facts alleged only state a Fourth Amendment claim for the unlawful search and seizure of their property, their claim accrued at the time of the search, and therefore this suit is untimely.

I. Background

After an alleged victim's complaints and information from a West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles investigator, Police Trooper Michael Lee Travelpiece suspected Pristine Pre-Owned Autos was engaged in illegal business practices. He obtained a broad search warrant from a county magistrate judge to search Pristine's premises. He executed the warrant that same day, seizing business records, computer equipment, a vehicle, and other materials from Pristine.

Based on the evidence seized by Trooper Travelpiece, a local grand jury indicted Pristine's co-owners—Fernando M. Smith and Jamie Crabtree. These charges reflected allegations that they were selling salvage-title vehicles without disclosing the salvage-title status. Soon after the indictments, Smith and Crabtree were arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and posted a personal recognizance bond.

Smith and Crabtree later moved to suppress the evidence obtained from Trooper Travelpiece's search of Pristine. They claimed that the search warrant lacked probable cause and was overbroad. And four years later, the state court agreed, suppressing all the evidence. The court held that Trooper Travelpiece's warrant application omitted material facts that undermined probable cause and made patently misleading representations. Having suppressed the evidence, the court dismissed the charges with prejudice.

Smith, Crabtree, and Pristine (collectively, "Plaintiffs") then sued Trooper Travelpiece in state court almost five years after the illegal search but just over a year after the court dismissed the criminal charges. In the suit, Plaintiffs asserted a § 1983 claim alleging that Trooper Travelpiece violated their constitutional rights.¹ After Trooper Travelpiece removed the case to federal court, the district court found the claim barred by the two-year statute of limitation. On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge that conclusion, arguing the district court erred in holding that the claim accrued at the time of the unlawful search and seizure and was therefore untimely. We review this challenge de novo, accepting the facts as alleged. Covey v. Assessor of Ohio Cnty. , 777 F.3d 186, 191–92 (4th Cir. 2015).

II. Discussion

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action to redress constitutional harms committed under color of state law.² To define that cause of action, federal law derives certain aspects from "the law of the State in which the cause of action arose." Wallace v. Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). For other aspects, federal law looks generally to "common-law tort principles." Id. at 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091.

Applying a § 1983 claim's statute of limitations requires examining both state law and general common law. State law determines the applicable term of limitations for a § 1983 claim. Owens v. Okure , 488 U.S. 235, 239, 249–50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). As the claim here arose in West Virginia, West Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b).³

But general common-law principles, without reference to West Virginia's law, determine when the claim accrues and when the statute of limitations begins to run. Wallace , 549 U.S. at 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091. Under those common-law principles, "it is the standard rule that accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief." Id. (cleaned up).⁴ This standard inquiry requires determining when all the cause of action's elements are met, see Green v. Brennan , 578 U.S. 547, 136 S. Ct. 1769, 1777, 195 L.Ed.2d 44 (2016), since only at that point is there a "complete and present" cause of action on which to file suit. But this " ‘standard rule’ does not always control the start of the limitations period for a § 1983 claim." Owens v. Baltimore City State Attorneys Office , 767 F.3d 379, 389 (4th Cir. 2014). When "the common law provides a distinctive rule for determining when the limitations period for a particular tort begins to run, a court must consider this refinement in determining when the limitations period for the plaintiff's analogous claim under § 1983 should commence." Id. (cleaned up).

To identify the elements and accrual rule for a § 1983 claim, we "look first to the common law of torts" to identify the most analogous tort. Manuel v. City of Joliet , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920, 197 L.Ed.2d 312 (2017). But to identify the most natural common-law analogy, "it is necessary to isolate the precise constitutional violation." Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) ; see McDonough v. Smith , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2155, 204 L.Ed.2d 506 (2019). Only having isolated the precise constitutional violation may we identify the common-law cause of action that provides the "closest analogy." Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Once that common-law analogy is identified, the court incorporates its elements and accrual rules where consistent with "the values and purposes of the constitutional right at issue." Manuel , 137 S.Ct. at 921 ; see Wallace , 549 U.S. at 388–90, 127 S.Ct. 1091 (incorporating the accrual rule for false imprisonment); Heck , 512 U.S. at 483–87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (incorporating the favorable-termination element for malicious prosecution).

Thus, identifying when Plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued requires that we first isolate the precise constitutional violation alleged. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim focuses on an improper search warrant. The search warrant, it is alleged, was improper because the Defendant made false statements and material omissions in his affidavit in support of the warrant. Plaintiffs claim that this violated their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment and their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

These allegations directly implicate the Fourth Amendment. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation." U.S. Const. amend. IV. When an officer improperly obtains a search warrant using deceptive falsities or omissions and uses that ill-gotten warrant to search and seize property, the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is violated. See Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 155–56, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) ; United States v. Colkley , 899 F.2d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 1990).⁵

Plaintiffs claim that the improper search warrant also violated their procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In short, they claim that Trooper Travelpiece's lies and omissions during the warrant process deprived them of the fair procedures that are required before a search and seizure of property can occur. But "[t]he Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and public interests always has been thought to define the ‘process that is due’ for seizures of person or property in criminal cases." Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) ; see City of W. Covina v. Perkins , 525 U.S. 234, 246, 119 S.Ct. 678, 142 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[W]e have never before suggested that procedural due process governs the execution of a criminal search warrant.").

Dressing a Fourth Amendment claim up in due process language does not transform it into a Fourteenth Amendment claim. See Manuel , 137 S. Ct. at 918–19 (holding that a Fourth Amendment detention claim cannot be "convert[ed]" into a due process claim); Colkley , 899 F.2d at 302 (refusing to import due process principles into the warrant-application proceeding).⁶ One might just as well dress up any Fourth Amendment claim this same way. When a police officer searches a suspect's home with no warrant, one might complain that the officer did not follow the procedures laid out in the Fourth Amendment requiring a warrant by oath or affirmation from an impartial judge. But no matter its dress, that is a Fourth Amendment unreasonable-search claim and not a due-process claim. So too here.

Nor do the allegations here implicate claims for improper detention or prosecution. See Manuel , 137 S. Ct. at 919 ; Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem , 85 F.3d 178, 182 (4th...