Smith v. U.S. Gypsum Co.

CHRISTEEN SMITH, Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY, Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO.4:13-CV-02122

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

October 17, 2014

(BRANN, J.)

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before this Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 15), filed by Defendant United States Gypsum Company. For the reasons provided below, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim, and that the Court decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Pennsylvania Human Relations Act claim.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Christeen Smith ("Smith") is a former employee of United States Gypsum Company ("USG"), a wallboard production facility located in Washingtonville, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 17). On August 9, 2013, Smith filed a complaint in this Court alleging that USG discriminated against her on the basis of her gender after USG terminated her for her failure to properly disclose prior convictions on her employment application. (Doc. 1). She brings these claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"). (Doc. 1).

On October 4, 2011, Smith completed an application for employment with USG. (Doc. 16-9, at 253). As a part of this application, Smith was required to certify that her responses were accurate and complete, and that "false or incomplete statements [would] be grounds fordisqualification or dismissal from employment, no matter when discovered." (Doc. 16-9, at 253). The employment application asked Smith to disclose any prior convictions, to which she responded in the affirmative, but indicated on the application that she would explain the circumstances of the conviction in the interview. (Doc. 16-9, at 249). USG alleges that Smith explained to its human resources manager during her interview that she was a victim of domestic violence and was convicted of assault for threatening to kill her abusive boyfriend in the presence of a police officer who had been called to investigate a domestic dispute. (Doc. 17). USG hired Smith despite the conviction, and she began employment as an Operator in the Quality Department at USG on December 5, 2011. (Doc. 16; Doc. 17).

In February of 2012, USG management discovered that Smith had been incarcerated for two years on charges of aggravated assault for paying an undercover officer $500 to murder her boyfriend. (Doc. 17; Doc. 20). USG alleges that while a background investigation was conducted, Smith's conviction was omitted from the background check. (Doc.16-9 at 290). In light of this new information, USG placed Smith on suspension and ultimately terminated her for providing false and misleading information during the hiring process (Doc. 17). Her termination prompted the present action. Currently before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on July 25, 2014 (Doc. 15), Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition, filed on August 15, 2014 (Doc. 21), and Defendant's Reply Brief, filed on August 29, 2014 (Doc. 22). This matter is now ripe for disposition.

II. DISCUSSION

A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of material fact is "genuine" only if the evidence "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences "should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).

The party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion," and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that "the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party, and the entire record must be examined in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). Essentially, "the employer must persuade [the court] that, even if all of the inferences which could reasonably be drawn from the evidentiary materials of record were viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, no reasonable jury could find in the plaintiff's favor." Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir.2008) (citations omitted).

The court need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in the complaint or a sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, (1990). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must not make credibility determinations,weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, the court is limited to a determination of "whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.

B. TITLE VII CLAIM

Smith argues that USG "discriminated against Plaintiff, a female, because of her criminal record." (Doc. 21, at 19) (emphasis added). Title VII "prohibits discrimination with respect to 'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of . . . sex." Vernon v. A&L Motors, 381 Fed. Appx. 164, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). In a motion for summary judgment in a case alleging discrimination under Title VII, the Court must apply a three-step burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Specifically, Smith "bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 802. "The elements of a prima facie case depend on the facts of the particular case" and "cannot be established on a one-size-fits-all basis." Thus, "the prima facie test remains flexible and must be tailored to fit the specific context in which it is applied." Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797-798 (3d Cir.2003). If the plaintiff "fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, then summary judgment in favor of defendant is appropriate." Fullman v. Potter, 480 F.Supp.2d 782, 790 (E.D. Pa. 2007)(citing Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 797). If the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant "to identify a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action." Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009). This burden is "relatively light." Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013). Once the defendant has presented a legitimate justification for its actions, "the burden of production [shifts] back to the plaintiff to provide evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that the employer's proffered justification is a pretext for discrimination." Taylor v. HarrisburgArea Cmty. Coll., No. 1:12-CV-0169, 2014 WL 347036, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2014)(citation omitted).

Although Smith alleges Title VII discrimination based on gender, she fails to establish a prima facie case necessary to overcome a motion for summary judgment. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Smith must show: "(1) that [s]he is a member of a protected class," (2) that she was qualified for the position; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that her termination occurred "under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination such as might occur when the position is filed by a person not of the protected class." Jones v. Sch. Dis.of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). USG does not dispute Smith's ability to establish the first and third elements (Doc. 16), but does dispute whether she has met the second and fourth prongs of the prima facie case. As it relates to the second prong, there is a dispute as to whether Smith was qualified for the position. (Doc. 16). While Smith was presumably qualified for the position at the time of hire, USG submits that later discoveries as to her criminal background disqualified her. See White v. Planned Sec. Servs., CIV.A. 10-2017, 2011 WL 6258307 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2011) aff'd, 480 F. App'x 115 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that while plaintiff was qualified for the position at the time of hire, his later activities "arguably . . . disqualified him"). However, Smith has established that she received a positive evaluation during the time she was employed for USG, (Doc. 16-9, at 154), and USG concedes as much (Doc. 16, at 16). Thus, for purposes of this analysis and in viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Smith, the Court finds that the evidence in the record sufficiently establishes that Smith was qualified for her position. As such, the Court now turns to the fourth requirement.

The fourth prong of Smith's prima facie case requires a minimal showing that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances creating an inference of discrimination. "Common circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination include the hiring of someone not in the protected class as a replacement or the more favorable treatment of similarly situated colleagues outside of the relevant class." Klimsczak v. Shoe Show Companies, 420 F.Supp.2d. 376, 382 (M.D. Pa. 2005)(quoting...