Smith v. Wolfe

GARY L. SMITH, JR., #432-339, Petitioner v. JOHN WOLFE, WARDEN, andThe ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondents

CIVIL ACTION NO. CCB-16-2956

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

January 23, 2017

MEMORANDUM

Gary L. Smith, Jr. filed this timely, self-represented petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, attacking his 2014 convictions in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, Maryland for second-degree assault of a police officer, resisting arrest, rogue and vagabond, theft, and related offenses.¹ (ECF 1). Respondents, the Warden of Eastern Correctional Institution where Smith is confined and the Attorney General of the State of Maryland, filed an answer (ECF 6) to which Smith has replied.² (ECF 8).

Having reviewed the parties' submissions, the court finds no need for an evidentiary hearing. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts and Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016); see also Fisher v. Lee, 215 F. 3d 438, 455 (4th Cir. 2000) (petitioner did not show he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2)).For the reasons set forth herein, the court shall DENY and DISMISS the petition with prejudice and SHALL NOT ISSUE a certificate of appealability.

BACKGROUND

As outlined by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, on April 28, 2014, three police officers responding to a report that someone meeting Smith's description was "looking into car windows" and "jiggling door handles." (ECF 6-7, pp. 2-6). The officers found Smith asleep inside a black Honda. Once alerted to the officers' presence, Smith awoke and moved his hands under the driver's seat. Id. After Smith refused orders to stop this movement, the officers drew weapons and ordered Smith out of the vehicle. Id. Smith exited the car, initially complied with directives, then shoved one of the officers and fled. Id. Smith was caught and resisted arrest. During this process, several items fell from his person. Id. During a search incident to Smith's arrest, police recovered a driver's license that had been reported stolen and 55 golden dollars that were the property of the owner of the black Honda. Id. The owner of the black Honda testified that Smith did not have permission to be in the vehicle and that the vehicle's glove compartment, where the coins had been stored, had been "broken." Id. Smith filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by the police, but this motion was denied on September 19, 2014. (ECF 6-2, pp. 35-36).

On October 14, 2014, Smith was tried before a jury. (ECF 6-1; 6-3; 6-7). Smith was found guilty of two counts of second-degree assault of a police officer, failure to obey a reasonable and lawful order, resisting arrest, two counts of rogue and vagabond, theft under $100, malicious destruction of property under $1000, and theft under $1000, and was sentenced to serve ten years and eleven months' incarceration. (Id.).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On direct appeal, Smith raised the following questions:

(1) Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress?

(2) Was there sufficient evidence to convict him of failure to obey a reasonable and lawful order to prevent a disturbance of the peace?

(3) Was there sufficient evidence to convict him of malicious destruction of property? and

(4) Did the trial court impose an illegal sentence by failing to merge:

a. the sentence for failure to obey a lawful order into resisting arrest;

b. each of the sentences for rogue and vagabond into its corresponding conviction for theft?

c. the sentence for malicious destruction of property into the rogue-and-vagabond conviction relating to Richard Strautz?

(ECF 6-4). In its September 3, 2015 unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Smith's judgment of conviction. (ECF 6-7). Smith's request for certiorari review as to whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress (ECF 6-8) was denied by the Maryland Court of Appeals on December 21, 2015.³ Smith v. State, 445 Md. 489 (2015).

On March 29, 2016, Smith filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. (ECF 6-1; ECF 6-9). On July 29, 2016, the post-conviction court held a hearing and denied relief in a statement of reasons dictated from the bench. (ECF 6-9). The ruling was entered on August 8, 2016. Smith did not file a timely application for leave to appeal the ruling, which became final on September 7, 2016.⁴

CLAIMS PRESENTED HERE

Smith now asserts that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to argue against any finding of an illegal Terry⁵ stopand (b) failed to argue the State's lack of an attenuation analysis. (ECF 1 at 3, 32). Respondents argue that Smith's Fourth Amendment challenge does not present a cognizable basis for federal habeas corpus relief, and his ineffective assistance claims are procedurally defaulted because Smith failed to seek leave to appeal the denial of his state post-conviction petition. (ECF 6).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An application for writ of habeas corpus may be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The federal habeas statute at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets forth a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings." Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997); see also Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447 (2005). The standard is "difficult to meet," and requires courts to give state-court decisions the benefit of the doubt. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also White v Woodall, ___ U.S.___, ___, 134 S. Ct 1697, 1702 (2014), quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (state prisoner must show state court ruling on claim presented in federal court was "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.").

A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the state's adjudication on the merits: 1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). A state adjudication is contrary to clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) where the state court 1) "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law," or 2)"confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme Court]." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).

Before applying this standard, the court must determine whether each claim is cognizable for federal review and, if deemed cognizable, whether the claim has been fully presented for adjudication in the state courts. Smith failed to meet this first threshold as to his Fourth Amendment claim, and cannot meet the second requirement for his claims concerning ineffective assistance of counsel.

ANALYSIS

Smith's first claim centers on the constitutionality of the seizure of evidence obtained by police at the time of his arrest, and is therefore premised on alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. The law concerning Fourth Amendment claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings is well established. "[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that the evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 494 (1976) (footnotes omitted).

[A] district court, when faced with allegations presenting Fourth Amendment claims, should, under the rule in Stone v. Powell, supra, first inquire as to whether or not the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment claims under the then existing state practice. This may be determined, at least in this Circuit, from the relevant state statutes, the applicable state court decisions, and from judicial notice of state practice by the district court. Second, . . . when the district court has made the 'opportunity' inquiry, it need not inquire further into the merits of the petitioner's case, when applying Stone v. Powell, supra, unless the prisoner alleges something to indicate that his opportunity for a full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim or claims was in some way impaired.

Doleman v. Muncy, 579 F.2d 1258, 1265 (4th Cir. 1978); see also Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557, 570 n.8 (4th Cir. 1999) (indicating continued application of Stone post-AEDPA); Grimsley v. Dodson, 696 F.2d 303, 304 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Stone v. Powell marked, for most practical purposes, the end of federal court reconsideration of Fourth Amendment claims by way of habeas corpus petitions where the petitioner had an opportunity to litigate those claims in state court.").

The record shows that Smith was provided with the opportunity to fully litigate his Fourth Amendment claims challenging the validity of his seizure (and the ensuing search) by filing and arguing through counsel a motion to suppress. After extensive argument and testimony during an evidentiary hearing, the motion was denied. (ECF 6-2). The issue was raised on direct appeal and in a request for certiorari review. (ECF 6-4, pp. 13-16; ECF 6-8). The Court of Special Appeals, after thoroughly examining the facts surrounding the seizure of the evidence, the testimony, and the legal reasoning of the circuit court, upheld the denial of the motion to suppress, stating as follows:

Suppression Hearing

Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to suppress evidence

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