Smithson v. Hamlin Pub, Inc.

JOANNE SMITHSON, Plaintiff, v. HAMLIN PUB, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 15-cv-11978

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

February 8, 2016

Hon. Gerald E. Rosen

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

At a session of said Court, held in the U.S. Courthouse, Detroit, Michigan on February 08, 2016

PRESENT: Honorable Gerald E. Rosen United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This ADEA/Elliott-Larsen age discrimination action is presently before the Court on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff's former employers, Defendants Hamlin Pub, Inc., 997 Management, Inc., and Hamlin Pub Rochester Hills, LLC (collectively referred to herein as "Hamlin Pub").¹ Plaintiff Joanne Smithson has responded to the motion and Defendants have replied. Having reviewed and consideredthe parties' briefs and supporting evidence, the Court has determined that the relevant allegations, facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in these submissions, and that oral argument would not significantly aid the decisional process. Therefore, the Court will decide this matter "on the briefs." See Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2). This Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's ruling.

II. PERTINENT FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Joanne Smithson was employed for eighteen years as a waitress and bartender at the Hamlin Pub in Rochester Hills, Michigan. On October 16, 2014, her employment was terminated. Claiming that she was the victim of the Defendants' scheme to replace their older staff with younger, more attractive women, on January 13, 2015 she filed a charge with the EEOC alleging age discrimination and harassment in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (the "ADEA"). The EEOC issued Plaintiff a form "Dismissal and Notice of Rights" (referred to herein as a "Right-to-Sue" letter) on March 4, 2015.² On June 1, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant action in this Court alleging claims of hostile work environment and harassment in violation of the ADEA (Counts I and II), and in violation of the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (the "ELCRA") (Counts III and IV), as well as anELCRA claim of gender discrimination (Count V). Relying on provisions in Plaintiff's employment application and employee handbook, Defendants now move for summary judgment claiming Plaintiff's claims are time-barred and/or barred by her agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising in connection with her employment.

RELEVANT EMPLOYMENT DOCUMENTS

Joanne Smithson began working as a waitress and bartender at the Rochester Hills Hamlin Pub in 1996, when the restaurant was under different ownership. The former owner never had Smithson fill out an application nor did she have to go through any formal interview process. [Smithson Aff., Plaintiff's Ex. 1, ¶¶ 3, 5]. When new owners took over in 2003, the General Manager had Smithson fill out an employment application. Id. at ¶ 6.³ Smithson signed that employment application which contained the following agreement directly above the signature line:

I certify that the answers given herein are true and complete to the best of my knowledge. I authorize you to verify any of the information concerning my employment, education, credit or medical history with the appropriate individuals, companies, institutions or agencies. In the event I am hired, I understand that my employment will be "at will": that is, either Allied Food and Beverage or I may terminate the employment relationship, with or without cause, at any time. No one can make any oral agreement to modify this "at-will" policy. further, it is understood that any false or misleading information given in my application or interview may result in discharge. I agree that any action or suit against Allied Food and Beverage arising out of my employment or termination of employment, including but not limited to claims arising under State or Federal civil rights statutes must be brought within 180 days of the event giving rise to the claims or be forever barred. I understand also that I am required to abide by all rules and regulations of Allied Food and Beverage.

[Plaintiff's Employment Application, Defendant's Ex. 2 (emphasis added).]

Hamlin Pub also issued employees an Employee Handbook. Plaintiff signed an acknowledgment of the Employee Handbook she received in 2007 in which she reiterated her agreement to a 180-day limitations period and further agreed to arbitrate any dispute concerning her employment. In relevant part, the agreement Plaintiff signed stated:

I understand and agree that in the event that a dispute arises concerning my employment with The Hamlin Pub, I hereby agree to arbitrate any and all disputes arising out of my employment or termination of employment through the procedures and policies of the American Arbitration Association, unless other procedures are agreed upon in writing between The Hamlin Pub and myself. The parties hereby agree that the determination of the arbitrator shall be binding and final upon all parties. The award of the arbitrator may be filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court for the County in which The Hamlin Pub resides and the Court upon the arbitration award may render judgment and execution may be issued upon the judgment. . . .

* * *

I agree that any arbitration or judicial proceeding arising out of a dispute relative to employment with The Hamlin Pub shall not be brought unless the same is commenced within a period of one-hundred eighty (180) days following the occurrence giving rise to such dispute. My failure to commence such proceeding within the one-hundred eighty (180) day period shall constitute an irrevocable waiver of any rights I may have had to prosecute such claims or action. If a court of competent jurisdiction deems this provision to be overly restrictive, the court may amend the provision to be reasonable under State law.

[See Defendants' Ex. 3 (emphasis added).]

As indicated, Plaintiff's employment was terminated on October 16, 2014. Shedid not file her Complaint in this action until June 1, 2015, i.e., 228 days after the date of the termination of her employment. Plaintiff never filed a demand for arbitration nor did she attempt to arbitrate the claims regarding her employment or the termination of her employment set forth in the Complaint.

III. DISCUSSION

A. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper "if the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As the Supreme Court has explained, "the plain language of Rule 56[] mandates the entry of summary judgment. . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986) (emphasis added).

In deciding a motion brought under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813 (6th Cir. 2006). Yet, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials, but must "cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record" as establishing that one or more material facts are "genuinely disputed." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Moreover, any supporting or opposing affidavits or declarations "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Finally, "the mereexistence of a scintilla of evidence that supports the nonmoving party's claims is insufficient to defeat summary judgment." Pack, 434 F.3d at 814 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). The Court will apply the foregoing standards in deciding Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this case.

B. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY THE CONTRACTUAL PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS

It is well-settled that parties to a contract may agree to an abbreviated period of limitations different from the period authorized by statute so long as it is reasonable. See Order of United Commercial Travelers Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608, 67 S.Ct. 1355, 91 L.Ed. 1687 (1947) ("It is well established that ... a provision in a contract may validly limit, between the parties, the time for bringing an action ... less than that prescribed in the general statute of limitations, provided the shorter period itself shall be a reasonable period."); Thurman v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 397 F.3d 352, 357-59 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[C]ontracting parties may agree to an abbreviated statute of limitations so long as it is reasonable."); Rice v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 450, 455 (6th Cir. 2009). Both the Sixth Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court have expressly held that there is nothing inherently unreasonable about a six-month limitation period. See Thurman, supra; Myers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 849 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir. 1988); Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 473 Mich. 457, 470, 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005); Timko v. Oakwood Custom Coating, Inc., 244 Mich. App. 234, 243-44, 625 N.W.2d 101, 106 (2001). In Myers, supra, the Sixth Circuit set forth the parameters for determining thereasonableness of a contractual limitation period in the face of a longer statutory period:

"The boundaries of what is reasonable under the general rule require that the claimant have sufficient opportunity to investigate and file an action, that the time not be so short as to work a practical abrogation of the right of action, and that the action not be barred before the loss or damage can be ascertained."

Myers, 849 F.2d at 262 (quoting Camelot Excavating Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 410 Mich. 118, 125, 301 N.W.2d 275, 277 (1981)).

By application of this...