Smitter v. Thornapple Twp.

494 Mich. 121

833 N.W.2d 875

SMITTER

v.THORNAPPLE TOWNSHIP.

Docket No. 144354.

Calendar No. 3.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 9, 2013.

Decided June 19, 2013.

Charfoos Reiter Hébert, P.C. (by James A. Reiter and James J. Ranta), for Thornapple Township and the Michigan Municipal League Workers' Compensation Fund.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Richard A. Bandstra, Chief Legal Counsel, and Susan Przekop–Shaw, Dennis J. Raterink, and William F. Denner, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Second Injury Fund.

YOUNG, C.J.

Plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment as a part-time firefighter for defendant Thornapple Township. At the time of his injury, plaintiff was also employed by another employer. Thornapple Township paid plaintiff the maximum weekly wage loss benefits under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA),¹ and plaintiff additionally received benefitspursuant to a disability insurance policy provided by the township. Thornapple Township did not reduce its workers' compensation liability by coordinating plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits with his disability benefits under MCL 418.354(1)(b). Subsequently, Thornapple Township sought reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund ² under the dual employment provisions, MCL 418.372, based on the uncoordinated amount of wage loss benefits.

The issue to be determined in this case is the amount that the fund is required to reimburse an employer for its portion of an injured employee's weekly benefits when the employer fails to coordinate benefits. We hold that the coordination of benefits is mandatory, except in very narrow employment circumstances that are inapplicable in this case. Coordination of benefits serves to reduce the amount of weekly benefits an employer is legally obligated to pay an employee under the WDCA. Any additional sum of weekly benefits volitionally provided by the employerdoes not alter the employer's statutory obligation to the injured employee.

If an injured worker was engaged in more than one employment at the time of injury, the WDCA apportions liability between the employment that caused the injury and the Second Injury Fund. When the employment that caused the injury provided less than 80 percent of the employee's wages, the fund is required to reimburse its “portion of the benefits due the employee....” ³ Because the fund's liability is “dependent” upon the employer's liability, and coordination of the employer's benefits is compulsory, the fund is required to reimburse its portion of the benefits due on the basis of the coordinated amount of benefits. We reverse the judgmentof the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the magistrate for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties submitted this case under stipulated facts. Plaintiff, Robert Smitter, was employed both as a part-time firefighter for Thornapple Township and as an employee of General Motors Corporation. Smitter earned approximately 11 percent of his total wages with Thornapple Township and 89 percent of his wages with General Motors. On May 3, 2005, Smitter sustained a work-related injury while fighting a fire. He was disabled from both employments for approximately 26 weeks. Given his average weekly wage, Smitter was entitled to workers' compensation wage loss benefits at the maximum rate of $689 a week. Smitter also received $800 a week in “Sickness & Accident” benefits pursuant to a disability insurance policy fully funded by Thornapple Township. The township did not coordinate the benefits paid from the disability insurance policy against its workers' compensation obligation. Rather, the township voluntarily paid the state maximum rate of wage loss benefits to plaintiff, in addition to the benefits plaintiff received pursuant to the insurance policy.

Initially, Thornapple Township sought reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund in the amount of $17,897.87 for the entirety of plaintiff's wage loss benefits. The fund agreed to pay $2,077.99—the amount of its liability if the township had coordinated plaintiff's benefits. On February 2, 2007, Thornapple Township filed an application for a hearing, seeking reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for “wage loss benefits attributable to earnings from General Motors Corporation” for plaintiff's period of disability. Relying on Rahman v. Detroit Board of Education,⁴ the magistrate ordered that the fund reimburse Thornapple Township in the amount of $15,966.75, representing 89 percent of the uncoordinated wage loss benefits paid to Smitter.

The Workers' Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) ⁵ affirmed the decision of the magistrate. The majority commiserated with the fund's being required to “support the Township's public policy of treating its firefighters to benefits beyond the statutory requirements,” agreeing with the fund that it was “unfair to allow an employer to forfeit coordination and force another party to fund that choice.” ⁶ However,because Rahman controlled the facts of the case, the fund could “not take advantage of the injury employer's ⁷ entitlement to coordination unless the employer coordinates benefits.” ⁸

The Court of Appeals initially denied the fund's application for leave to appeal,⁹ but this Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.¹⁰ On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the WCAC.¹¹ The panel noted that it was bound to follow Rahman pursuant to MCR 7.215(J)(1), that the holding in Rahman was consistent with the statutory language, and that there was no principled reason for distinguishing Rahman from the present case. This Court granted the Second Injury Fund's application for leave to appeal. ¹²

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

While this Court's review of a decision by the WCAC is limited, we review de novo questions of law in a workers' compensation case.¹³ Likewise, questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law reviewed de novo.¹⁴

In interpreting a statute, our obligation is to discern the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words actually used in the statute.¹⁵ “A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that ‘a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.’ ” ¹⁶ When the statutory language is unambiguous, the proper role of the judiciary is simply to apply the terms of the statute to the facts of the particular case.¹⁷ In addition, words used by the Legislature must be construed and understood in accordance with their common, ordinary meaning.¹⁸

III. ANALYSIS

A. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

In order to analyze properly the issues presented in this case, we must examine the interplay between several provisions of the WDCA.

There is no question that plaintiff received an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with Thornapple Township.¹⁹ Because plaintiff was completely disabled for approximately 26 weeks, MCL 418.351(1) describes the township's liability for weekly wage loss benefits. It provides in relevant part:

While the incapacity for work resulting from a personal injury is total, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid as provided in this section, to the injured employee, a weekly compensation of 80% of the employee's after-tax average weekly wage, but not more than the maximum weekly rate of compensation, as determined under [MCL 418.355]. Compensation shall be paid for the duration of the disability.

MCL 418.354 provides for the coordination of benefits, reducing an employer's obligation to pay weekly wage benefits under the WDCA when an employee simultaneously receives payments in accordance with specified benefit programs. At the time of plaintiff's injury,²⁰MCL 418.354 provided in relevant part as follows:

(1) This section is applicable when either weekly or lump sum payments are made to an employee as a result of liability pursuant to [MCL 418.351, MCL 418.361, or MCL 418.835] with respect to the same time period for which old-age insurance benefit payments under the social security act, 42 U.S.C. 301 to 1397f; payments under a self-insurance plan, a wage continuation plan, or a disability insurance policy provided by the employer; or pension or retirement payments pursuant to a plan or program established or maintained by the employer, are also received or being received by the employee. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the employer's obligation to pay or cause to be paid weekly benefits other than specific loss benefits under [MCL 418.361(2) ] and (3) shall be reduced by these amounts:

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(b) The after-tax amount of the payments received or being received under a self-insurance plan, a wage continuation plan, or under a disability insurance policy provided by the same employer from whom benefits under [ MCL 418.351, MCL 418.361, or MCL 418.835 ] are received if the employee did not contribute directly to the plan or to the payment of premiums regarding the disability insurance policy....

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(2) To satisfy any remaining obligations under [MCL 418.351, MCL 418.361, or MCL 418.835], the employer shall pay or cause to be paid to the employee the balance due in either weekly or lump sum payments after the application of subsection (1).

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(15) With respect to volunteer fire fighters, volunteer safety patrol officers, volunteer civil defense workers, and volunteer ambulance drivers and attendants who are considered employees for purposes of this act pursuant to [MCL 418.161(1)(a) ], the reduction of weekly benefits provided for disability insurance payments under subsection (1)(b) and (c) and subsection (11) may be waived by the employer. An employer that is not a self-insurer may make the waiver provided for under this subsection only at the time a worker's compensationinsurance policy is entered into or renewed.²¹

MCL 418.372, known as the dual employment...