Snell-Jones v. Hertz Corp.

LA TACHE SNELL-JONES, individually andon behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE HERTZ CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

No. 19-cv-00120

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

March 13, 2020

Judge Andrea R. Wood

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff La Tache Snell-Jones is a former branch manager for Defendant The Hertz Corporation ("Hertz"). Snell-Jones claims that despite routinely working over 40 hours in a workweek for Hertz, she never received overtime compensation. Instead, Hertz treated her as exempt from the overtime provisions in both the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL"), 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq. Therefore, Snell-Jones has brought the present collective and class action lawsuit against both Hertz and Defendant Haley Hudson alleging violations of the FLSA, the IMWL, and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act ("IWPCA"), 820 ILCS 115/1 et seq., along with claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Hertz and Hudson have each filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. Nos. 20, 34.) For the reasons that follow, Hertz's motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Hudson's motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

For the purposes of the motions to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and views those facts in the light most favorable to Snell-Jones as the non-moving party. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007).

As alleged in her complaint, Snell-Jones worked at Hertz, a worldwide vehicle rental company, from October 2013 until her allegedly retaliatory termination in September 2017. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 10, Dkt. No. 1.) She began as a manager trainee and shortly thereafter was promoted to manager associate. (Id. ¶ 17.) By October 2014, Snell-Jones had been promoted to a branch manager position, which she held until her termination. (Id.)

Although Snell-Jones had a "managerial" title and some management responsibilities, in practice "she did not have any authority to hire or fire other employees, and her ability to make any suggestion or recommendation regarding hiring, firing, advancement, promotions or other change of status of other employees was used, if ever, infrequently, and not given any sufficient weight." (Id.) Instead, those responsibilities were predominantly exercised by others higher in the corporate hierarchy, including Hudson, Hertz's Human Resources Business Partner for Illinois (as well as Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Indiana). (Id. ¶ 19.) By contrast, Snell-Jones largely worked "as a front-line employee, processing rentals and returns, handling customer complaints, moving and arranging fleet (vehicles), including picking up and dropping off customers, locating and transporting vehicles[,] processing body damage to vehicles, and taking vehicles for repairs." (Id. ¶ 20.) Because of these responsibilities, Snell-Jones could devote only a minimal amount of time to actual management or executive tasks such as managing schedules, handling employee concerns, evaluating employees, or meeting with managers. (Id.)

During her time at Hertz, Snell-Jones was a salaried employee. (Id. ¶ 18.) For that reason, Hertz treated her as exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA and the IMWL. (Id.) Indeed, Hertz had a policy that salaried managers were not entitled to overtime for any hours they worked in excess of 40 hours per week. (Id. ¶ 21.) Nonetheless, Hudson maintained a policy under which all branch managers were required to work from open to close. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 22.) For Snell-Jones, that meant she worked from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. for at least six days a week. (Id.) Thus, from October 2014 until her termination on August 14, 2017, Snell-Jones regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week without ever receiving overtime. (Id. ¶ 24.) Moreover, in light of Hudson's policy requiring all branch managers to work full 11-hour days, 6 days a week, Snell-Jones contends that there are at least 100 other current or former Hertz branch managers under Hudson's supervision that have similarly been denied overtime. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 25, 29.)

DISCUSSION

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This pleading standard does not necessarily require a complaint to contain detailed factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Snell-Jones has brought FLSA, IMWL, and IWCPA claims against both Defendants, whereas her contract claims are brought solely against Hertz. Together, Defendants seek todismiss all claims. The Court will first address the statutory claims against both Defendants and then proceed to the contract claims directed at Hertz.

I. FLSA and IMWL Claims

A. Hertz's Status as Employer

Hertz argues that Snell-Jones's allegation that Hertz was her employer is conclusory and supported by no facts. It further contends that Snell-Jones's claim is belied by a charge of discrimination she filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which lists a different entity known as Hertz Local Edition as her employer.

Both the FLSA and the IMWL make an employer liable for its failure to pay overtime wages. See Villareal v. El Chile, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 2d 778, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2011). The FLSA defines an "employer" as including "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d); see also Natal v. Medistar, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1003 (N.D. Ill. 2016) ("[C]ourts employ the same test under both [the FLSA and the IMWL] to determine a defendant's status as an employer."). The definition is "broad and comprehensive in order to accomplish the remedial purposes of the Act." Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir. 1987).

According to Hertz, Snell-Jones's bare allegation that Hertz was her employer is insufficient to survive dismissal. It faults her for failing to provide basic allegations concerning her employment with Hertz such as: "(1) who hired [her]; (2) who paid her; (3) who supervised her; and (4) where she worked." (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 6, Dkt. No. 21.) However, Hertz points to no authority requiring such detailed allegations where a plaintiff simply alleges that she worked for a single corporate entity. Instead, Hertz relies for support on cases dealing with the situation where a plaintiff alleges a joint employment relationship involving twoor more businesses. See Ivery v. RMH Franchise Corp., 280 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1128 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Gross v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., No. 17-CV-3214, 2018 WL 558515, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2018); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.106(a) ("Where two or more businesses exercise some control over the work or working conditions of the employee, the businesses may be joint employers under FMLA."). Here, Snell-Jones points to only one business, Hertz, as her employer. She states the dates she worked for Hertz, the positions in which she worked, and her duties. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 17-20.) Those allegations sufficiently plead Hertz's status as Snell-Jones's employer.

Hertz further attempts to muddy a relatively simple issue by attaching as an exhibit Snell-Jones's EEOC charge concerning her purported retaliatory termination from Hertz. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 21-1.) There, Snell-Jones identified her employer as "Hertz Local Edition" (id.), which Hertz claims is a separate entity. In response, Snell-Jones points to multiple documents that identify Hertz as her employer. (Decl. of John H. Ray, III, Dkt. No. 26.) Of course, those documents were neither attached to the complaint nor incorporated by reference. See Marks v. CDW Comput. Ctrs., Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1302, 1309 (N.D. Ill. 1995) ("The complaint is deemed to include documents attached to it as an exhibit or documents incorporated in it by reference.") And the Court declines to convert the present motion into one for summary judgment by addressing the parties' factual dispute at this time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ("If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.").

Similarly, the EEOC charge is not attached to Snell-Jones's complaint and Hertz does not contend it is incorporated by reference. Nonetheless, Hertz asserts that this Court may take judicial notice of the charge. It is true that a court may take judicial notice of an EEOC charge.Metz v. Joe Rizza Imports, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 983, 989 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2010). At the same time, however, a court may only take judicial notice of a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute. Fed. R. Evid. 201; Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 648 (7th Cir. 2018). Thus, while the fact that Snell-Jones filed an EEOC charge is one of which this Court may take judicial notice, it is not the case that the allegations therein are not subject to reasonable dispute. Indeed, Snell-Jones's EEOC charge sets forth her own allegations of misconduct just like her complaint in this action. See Conner v. Ill. Dep't of Nat. Res., 413 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that to bring a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must first "file a charge with the EEOC detailing the alleged...