Snook v. Midd-West Sch. Dist.

DAPHNE SNOOK Plaintiff, v. MIDD-WEST SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. Defendants.

4:14-CV-948

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 16, 2015

(JUDGE MARIANI)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Presently before the Court is Defendants Midd-West School District, Victor Abate, Ronald Wilson, Ronald Hoffman, Shawn Sassaman, Corey Smith, Jeremy Tittle, Sherryl Wagner, and Nancy Kroh's (hereinafter "School District Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Doc. 13).

On May 16, 2014, Plaintiff, Daphne Snook, filed a Complaint in the above-captioned matter (Doc. 1), and subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on May 22, 2014 (Doc. 4), naming as defendants the Midd-West School District, Victor Abate, Ronald Wilson, Ronald Hoffman, Shawn Sassaman, Corey Smith, Jeremy Tittle, Sherryl Wagner, Nancy Kroh, and Orris Knepp, III. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint sets forth seven counts: Count I, against all Defendants, for First Amendment Retaliation; Counts II and III, against all Defendants, for violations of her Procedural Due Process and Substantive Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; Count IV, against the Midd-West School District, for a violation ofthe Pennsylvania School Code, 24 P.S. §§ 1-101, et seq.; Count V, against the Midd-West School District, for breach of contract; Count VI, against all the individual defendants, for defamation; and Count VII, against all the individual defendants, for abuse of process. (Doc. 4).

School District Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 13). Defendant Orris Knepp, III, separately also moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint (Doc. 11), which the Court will address in a separate opinion. The parties have fully briefed the motion, and it is now ripe for decision. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the School District Defendants' motion.

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges the following facts;

On August 8, 2011, Snook entered into a written agreement for employment as the Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum, Instruction, and Technology for the Midd-West School District. (Am. Compl., Doc. 4, ¶ 14; see also Employment Contract, Doc. 4, Ex. 1). The contract employed Snook in this capacity for a term of four years, effective August 8, 2010, and ending June 30, 2014. (Doc. 4, ¶ 15; Employment Contract, § 3.00). Pursuant to the terms of the agreement:

The Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum, - Instruction and Technology shall, throughout the term of this Agreement, [is] subject to termination of contract for valid cause for reasons specified under Section 1080 of the Public School Code, including willful violation of any policies of the School District or any provision of this Agreement. Before her dismissal, the School District will provide the Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum, Instructionand Technology with written charges, adequate notice of a hearing and a fair and impartial hearing before the Board of School Directors. If the Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum, Instruction and Technology is found innocent of charges made, the Board of School Directors shall assume responsibility for payment of costs incurred by her in her defense.

(Employment Contract, § 7.00(a)).

In December 2013, Plaintiff became the temporary acting Superintendent after the prior Superintendent of Schools resigned supposedly because Defendants levied charges against him. (Doc. 4, ¶ 17).

Throughout Snook's tenure with the School District, she developed and implemented within the District a nationwide program for individualized reading education entitled "Readers Workshop." (Id. at ¶ 18). Plaintiff asserts that this program was "widely successful" in the District but that various factions within the School Board disliked it and worked to have it canceled, "despite the effectiveness of the program and the interest of the general public." (Id. at ¶ 19). While the program was active in the District and being debated, Snook issued statements to the press representing that the program was crucial to the successful education of the students in the District. (Doc. 4, ¶ 20). Snook contends these statements were made in her capacity as a private citizen and that certain Defendants¹ became openly antagonistic toward her as a result of her comments. (Id.).

On April 1, 2014, Defendants issued an email to all staff members of the District, including Snook, purportedly threatening to terminate anyone who continued to publiclyspeak in support of the Reading Workshop program. (Id. at ¶ 21). Several days later, on April 10, 2014, Defendants suspended Plaintiff without pay. Snook alleges Defendants failed to provide any explanation of the charges against her or an opportunity to respond. (Id. at ¶ 22). The following day, Defendants canceled a scheduled teachers planning course for the Reading Workshop program. (Id. at ¶ 23). Defendants also issued public statements stating that Plaintiff had been suspended without pay and accusing her of engaging in criminal conduct by breaching the Midd-West School District's email system and illegally monitoring emails. (Id. at ¶ 24).

In addition, Defendants contacted the Snyder County District Attorney to press charges against Snook. (Doc. 4, ¶ 25). On May 9, 2014, after conducting an investigation, the District Attorney issued a press release stating that no criminal charges would be filed against Plaintiff due to insufficient evidence that she had engaged in criminal conduct. (Id.).

Following her suspension, Plaintiff made statements to the press regarding her continued support of the Reading Workshop program, asserting her innocence with respect to allegations of criminal wrongdoing, and stating that she believed Defendants were retaliating against her for publicly advocating in favor of the Reading Workshop program. (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 27).

On May 5, 2014, Snook met with Defendants for a hearing which Plaintiff contends was erroneously labeled as a "Loudermill hearing" for a vote regarding her termination. (Id. at ¶ 28). At this meeting, Defendants allegedly did not hold a vote and simply informedPlaintiff that they intended to vote in approximately two weeks as to whether they would hire a special prosecutor. (Id.). Subsequently, on May 19, 2014, Defendants did meet and voted to hire Mark Remy as "special counsel" to handle "an unspecified personnel issue." (Id. at ¶ 29).

Snook continues to remain suspended without pay and alleges that she has not received any hearing or written statement of the charges against her. (Id. at ¶ 30).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint must be dismissed under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff must aver "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

"Though a complaint 'does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."' DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop. Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court "take[s] as true all the factual allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from thosefacts, but . . . disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Ethypharm S.A France v. Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Twombly and Iqbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).

"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This "plausibility" determination will be a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.

However, even "if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).

[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.

Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Individual Defendants in their Official Capacity

Defendants contend as a threshold matter that the claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed in each count wherein the claim asserted against them is additionally asserted against the School District.² (Doc. 15, at 7-8). Plaintiff...