Snyder v. United States

1

JAMES FRANKLIN SNYDER, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES and STATE OF IDAHO, Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-00176-BLW

United States District Court, D. Idaho

August 4, 2023

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE

B Lynn Winmill U.S. District Court Judge

The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff James Franklin Snyder's Complaint as a result of his status as an inmate and his in forma pauperis request. Dkt. 3, 1.^[1] The Court must review the Complaint to determine whether any of the claims should be summarily dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Having reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully informed, the Court enters the following Order determining that Plaintiff cannot proceed and must file an amended complaint clarifying his causes of action according to the instructions in this Order.

REVIEW OF COMPLAINT: ADA AND RA CLAIMS

1. Standard of Law for Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Iqbal/Twombly “facial plausibility” standard is met when a complaint contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id., citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

In addition, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)^[2] requires the Court to screen all pro se prisoner and pauper complaints before they are served on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. The Court must dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Pro se complaints must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Rule 12(b)(6) authority to dismiss claims was expanded by the PLRA, giving courts power to dismiss deficient claims sua sponte, either before or after opportunity to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff brings many unrelated claims with few supporting facts. The Court will discuss the deficiencies in the Complaint and provide Plaintiff with an amendment period.

2. ADA Title I Claims: Employment

Plaintiff brings claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).^[3] First, he asserts that his rights under Title I of the ADA have been violated. Title I applies exclusively to employment. Zimmerman v. Oregon Dep't of Just., 170 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 1999). That provision prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to ... [the] privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Plaintiff has not clearly stated any employment claim, and, thus, cannot proceed under Title I without further amendment showing that his claims arise from employment.

3. ADA Title II Claims: Discrimination and Accommodation

Plaintiff next asserts that the state of Idaho, the county of Kootenai, and their employees have discriminated against him under Title II of the ADA. Title II of the ADA applies to state prisons. See Penn. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998). A Title II ADA claim must be brought against the state or the state entity. See U.S. v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006). Title II prohibits a “public entity” from discriminating against a “qualified individual with a disability” on account of that individual's disability and from denying the benefits of, or excluding a qualified individual from participating in, “the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

Plaintiff suffers from the following alleged qualifying disabilities: Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBI), severe post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), paranoia (as a result of being a victim of violence-his semi-truck was hijacked and he was run over twice), mental disability, and physical disabilities, including having had over 100 fractures and compound fractures (all limbs and facial reconstruction). See Dkts. 3-8.

Plaintiff has subtitled his Complaint “Failure to Train,” and his “Causes of Action” section states that he is bringing “failure to train” claims. It appears he is asserting that government actors should have been made aware of the symptoms of TBI and PTSD by their supervisors, identified him as a person with that disability when they encountered him, and treated him differently. (If he is claiming discrimination on the basis of other qualified disabilities, he must so state in his amended complaint.) As a result of the inadequate training, he asserts, state actors refused to accommodate his differences and removed him from government rehabilitation and other programs because of his differences.

District courts in the Ninth Circuit have found ADA failure-to-train claims cognizable. See, e.g., Robertson v. Millett, No. CV-22-00009-PHX-GMS, 2022 WL 16571702, at *5-6 (D. Ariz. Nov. 1, 2022); Reed v. Nelson, No. 2:20-CV-0512-DMC-P, 2021 WL 2417655, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2021); Est. of Jackson v. City of Modesto, No. 1:21-CV-0415 AWI EPG, 2021 WL 4819604, at *11-12 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2021).

In these cases, the courts applied the Monell ^[4] framework to ADA failure-to-train claims, meaning that a plaintiff must allege facts showing all of the following: “(1) the existing training program is inadequate in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform; (2) the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [employees] came into contact; and (3) the inadequacy of the training actually caused the deprivation of the alleged constitutional right.” Hollandsworth v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 440 F.Supp.3d 1163, 1181 (D. Haw. 2020) (citing Merritt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989)); see Reed, 2021 WL 2417655, at *3- 4; Est. of Jackson, 2021 WL 4819604, at *11-12.

An example of a failure-to-train claim that proceeded beyond summary dismissal is Estate of LeRoux v. Montgomery County, Maryland, No. 8:22-CV-00856-AAQ, 2023

WL 2571518 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2023). There, the court reasoned:

Plaintiffs have alleged that there were a number of reasonable accommodations that could have been implemented in the hours that led to the shooting that would have allowed Mr. LeRoux to effectively communicate and, in turn, survive the encounter. For example, in Counts I and V, Plaintiffs claim that Mr. LeRoux would still be alive if reasonable accommodations - such as dispatching the Mobile Crisis Team, the Crisis Intervention Team, or an officer trained in CIT - had been provided. ECF No. 25, at ¶¶ 118, 170. Likewise, in Counts II and VI, Plaintiffs claim that reasonable de-escalation techniques - including calling mobile crisis services, using crisis intervention techniques, or waiting for the crisis negotiator before engaging Mr. LeRoux by surrounding his vehicle, swearing at him, and directing their weapons at him - were similarly reasonable accommodations. Id. at ¶¶ 133, 183. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have alleged a number of possible accommodations that allegedly were available to Defendants. Further, Plaintiffs allege that had these modifications been provided, individuals with specialized training “could have evaluated [Mr. LeRoux], stabilized the mental health crisis, and arranged mental health services.” Id. at ¶ 20.

Id. at *11. See also Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1037 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing summary judgment, in part, where officers shot a man who was running around in a convenience store and ignored two commands to drop the scissors, because the officers “had the time and the opportunity to assess the situation and potentially employ ... accommodations ... including de-escalation, communication, or specialized help”).

Many of Plaintiff's claims do not show a clear connection between his disability and the discriminatory or retaliatory act. He asserts both that discrimination occurred because he was disabled and that it occurred because state actors were trying to punish or get even with him for suing a law enforcement officer for excessive force; both of these “causes” are included in the Complaint. Claims that state actors did not accommodate his disabilities or that supervisory state actors did not properly train state actors to accommodate his disabilities should be brought as ADA claims; claims that he was retaliated against because he sued a law enforcement officer should be brought as civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983 (more fully explained below).

The following potential ADA failure-to-train claims must be separated, clarified, and supported with additional facts:

• Plaintiff alleges that he “today is prejudicially discriminated against held in specialty housing in Medium Maximum custody based off north Idaho's unlawful discrimination and failure to train state and county employee's.” Dkt. 3-2, p. 9 (verbatim).

• Plaintiff asserts that he was moved frequently in the programs, that his medicine was changed, and that his instructors were changed-all of which left him lost and confused. He asserts these problems arose because the state of Idaho did not train its staff to properly deal with persons with TBI and PTSD. Dkt. 3-2 p. 10.

• Plaintiff alleges that the State and County failed to train Judge Mitchell, who kept placing him in programs and specialty courts, from

...