Sokmen v. United States

1

MICHAEL SOKMEN et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

No. 2:22-cv-01529-ODW (ASx)

United States District Court, C.D. California

July 20, 2023

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [28]

OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Estate of Ender Ali Sokmen (“Plaintiff Estate”) Michael Sokmen, and Leyla Kalender Sokmen initiated this wrongful death lawsuit against Defendant United States of America. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Defendant now moves for partial summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56, seeking summary judgment in its favor on certain of Plaintiffs' damages claims. (Mot Partial Summ. J. (“Motion” or “Mot.”), ECF No. 28.) The Court carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion and deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion.

II. BACKGROUND

Michael Sokmen and Leyla Kalender Sokmen (together, “Parent Plaintiffs”) are the surviving parents and heirs of Decedent Ender Ali Sokmen (“Decedent”). (Def.'s Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts & Conclusions of Law (“SUF”) 11, ECF No. 28-1.) On the morning of February 13, 2020, Decedent was driving his motorcycle southbound on Valley View Boulevard in Cypress, California, when he collided with a van Plaintiffs allege was driven by an employee of Defendant. (SUF 1 (citing Compl. ¶ 15); Compl. ¶ 16.) As a result of the collision, Decedent flew off the motorcycle and subsequently hit the curb, sustaining blunt force trauma to his head. (Decl. Sarah Quist ISO Mot. (“Quist Decl.”) Ex. C (“Expert Report”) 3, ECF No. 28-5.)

Approximately twenty to thirty seconds after the collision, a witness arrived on the scene. (SUF 3.) When the witness turned over Decedent, the witness thought Decedent was “probably already dead.” (Quist Decl. Ex. B (“Downie Dep”) 91:1219, ECF No. 28-4.) A few minutes later, an ambulance arrived on the scene. (SUF 7.) Decedent was then taken to Long Beach Memorial Hospital, and shortly after he arrived, he was pronounced dead. (Compl. ¶ 20; SUF 8.)

On March 7, 2022, Plaintiffs brought this action, asserting claims against Defendant for (1) negligence; (2) wrongful death; and (3) survivor action^[1]. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-48.) On June 9, 2022, Defendant answered the Complaint. (Answer, ECF No. 12.) Defendant now moves for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, asserting that (1) certain of Plaintiffs' damages claims are not available as a matter of law and (2) with respect to other damages claims, Plaintiffs have insufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact. The Motion is fully briefed. (Opp'n, ECF No. 29; Reply, ECF No. 31.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there “is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by making bald assertions in its legal papers. See S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter Kidde & Co., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982). Moreover, “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). However, at the summary judgment stage, the Court “does not assess credibility or weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether there is a genuine factual issue for trial.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 559-60 (2006) (Roberts, J., concurring in part).

The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. To meet its burden, “the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden of production, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1103.

IV. DISCUSSION

In its Motion, Defendant organizes Plaintiffs' damages claims according to who asserts them. (Mot. 1.) First, Defendants address Plaintiff Estate's damages claims, sought as part of its survival action. Then, Defendants address Parent Plaintiffs' damages claims, sought as part of their wrongful death action. The Court adopts this approach herein.

A. Plaintiff Estate's Damages Claims

Defendant challenges Plaintiff Estate's claims to damages for (1) funeral costs, travel costs, lost earning capacity, and future lost wages; and (2) pain and suffering. The Court considers each of these two groups of claims in turn.

1. Funeral Costs, Travel Costs, Lost Earning Capacity, and Lost Wages

Defendant argues that Plaintiff Estate's damages claims for funeral costs, travel costs, and future lost wages are not recoverable as a matter of law. (Mot. 7-8.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff Estate has insufficient evidence to show that lost earning capacity-that is, earnings that Decedent would have earned during his life had he not been injured-is in genuine dispute. (Id. at 8.)

In a survival action, “the damages recoverable are limited to the loss or damage that the decedent sustained or incurred before death.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.34; see People v. Runyan, 54 Cal.4th 849, 861-62 (2012) (“No civil claim can be asserted, on a decedent's personal behalf, for injury or damage to the decedent that occurs, or accrues, after the decedent has died.”); see also Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Section 377.34 limits damages in survival actions to the victim's pre-death economic losses. In cases where the victim dies quickly, there often will be no damage remedy at all under § 377.34.” (citation omitted)).

Here, Plaintiff Estate's claimed damages for funeral costs, travel costs, and lost future wages are, as a matter of law, not available because Decedent did not incur these damages prior to his death. Similarly, lost earning capacity damages are, as a matter of law, not available; Decedent died almost instantly after the collision, so there was no intervening pre-death period where wages would otherwise have been earned. Chaudhry, 751 F.3d at 1104.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendant's Motion as to Plaintiff Estate's claims for funeral costs, travel costs, lost earning capacity, and lost wages.

2. Pain and Suffering

Plaintiff Estate seeks pain and suffering damages as part of its survival action. This damages claim is made possible by the recently amended California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34, which, as of January 1, 2022, allows decedents' personal representatives to seek damages for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. See, e.g., Brown v. Gordon, No. 21-cv-08098-LB, 2022 WL 2391002, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2022). Defendant nevertheless argues that Plaintiff Estate cannot recover for Decedent's pain and suffering because there is no evidence to establish that Decedent was conscious to feel pain at any time before his death. (Mot. 9.)

To determine the scope of California's newly enacted remedy for pain and suffering in survival actions, this Court looks to precedent regarding pain and suffering damages more generally. In a wrongful death action under the Jones Act, for example, the Ninth Circuit noted that the decedent must have “remained conscious for a legally substantial period of time after [they] sustained the injuries that eventually resulted in [their] death.” Cook v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 626 F.2d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 1980). Similarly, courts in this and other jurisdictions generally hold that there must be “some level of awareness” for a plaintiff to recover for pain and suffering. McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989); see also Nelson v. Acosta-Corrales, No. 12-1419-JAR-JPO, 2014 WL 1048007, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 18, 2014) (“[E]vidence must exist showing that a deceased consciously suffered in the time between the trauma and death.”); cf. Nunez v. Santos, 427 F.Supp.3d 1165, 1190 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2019) (recognizing that “pre-death pain and suffering damages” in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases “must be actual and must be proved”). What constitutes a “legally substantial period of time” varies depending on the circumstances of each case. Cook, 626 F.2d at 751-52 (holding the decedent's conscious suffering for two and one-half minutes was sufficient to support a substantial jury award for pain and suffering).

Applying these principles here, Plaintiff is precluded from pursuing pain and suffering damages if there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Decedent was not conscious during the events leading to his death. In considering whether Defendant meets its initial burden of demonstrating that Decedent was not conscious to experience pain and suffering, it is helpful to separate the analysis into two different time periods: (1) the period of time from...