Sooroojballie v. Port Auth.

NEIL SOOROOJBALLIE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK & NEW JERSEY,GARY FRATTALI, INDIVIDUALLY, Defendants-Appellants.

18-3148-cv

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

June 4, 2020

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4^th day of June, two thousand twenty.

PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, PETER W. HALL, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judges.

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:

MARJORIE MESIDOR, Phillips & Associates, PLLC (Stephen Bergstein, Bergstein & Ullrich, LLP, on the brief), New York, New York.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS:

KATHLEEN GILL MILLER, The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New York, New York.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Kuntz, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART and VACATED IN PART, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey ("the Port Authority") and Gary Frattali (collectively, "defendants") appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, entered on October 5, 2018. Plaintiff Neil Sooroojballie commenced this action against his former employer and supervisor under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging employment discrimination on the basis of his race and national origin. On September 17, 2018, a jury found in favor of Sooroojballie on his hostile work environment claim under Title VII and § 1981, awarding him compensatory damages in the amount of $2,160,000 against the Port Authority and Frattali, and punitive damages in the amount of $150,000 against Frattali. Defendants challenge the judgment on the following grounds: (1) the district court should have dismissed the § 1981 claim against the Port Authority at summary judgment because Sooroojballie failed to offer evidence of a municipal policy or custom as required under that statute; (2) the district court erred in allowing time-barred acts and allegedly retaliatory acts to be considered by the jury with respect to the hostile work environment claim, and the admissible evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict as a matter of law; (3) the district court erred in its instructions to the jury; (4) the awards for compensatory and punitive damages were excessive, and Frattali was improperly precluded from introducing evidence of his finances in connection with the punitive damages award; and (5) the award for attorneys' fees and costs was excessive. We assume the parties'familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

I. Section 1981 Claim Against the Port Authority¹

Defendants argue that the district court erred in concluding that, because the Port Authority is not a municipality, and Frattali is not being sued in his official capacity, there was no requirement that Sooroojballie demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See also Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[W]hen the defendant sued for discrimination under § 1981 or § 1983 is a municipality—or an individual sued in his official capacity—the plaintiff is required to show that the challenged acts were performed pursuant to a municipal policy or custom." (citations omitted)).

As an initial matter, Sooroojballie asserts that this challenge is waived because the Port Authority failed to renew it at trial. We disagree. Although a motion at trial pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is necessary to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "where the trial court's denial of a summary judgment motion is not based on the sufficiency of the evidence, but on a question of law, the rationale behind Rule 50 does not apply, and the need for such an objection is absent." Rothstein v. Carriere, 373 F.3d 275, 284 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, the district court's determination was not based upon any disputed facts about the Port Authority's structure or purpose, but rather was a legal determination regarding its legal status.² Thus, the Port Authority's challenge to that summary judgment decision was not waived,and the legal issues underlying the denial of summary judgment are subject to de novo review. Keeling v. Hars, 809 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2015).

The Port Authority is "a body corporate and politic" created in 1921 by an interstate compact between New Jersey and New York that was approved by Congress, see N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 6451 (McKinney 1922); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-25 (West 1922); see also 42 Stat. 174 (1921), and is referred to "as the municipal corporate instrumentality of the two states for the purpose of developing the port" of New York, N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 6459 (McKinney 1922). The Supreme Court, in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, acknowledged that the Port Authority has been characterized as "a state arm or agency" and as "[a] discrete entity created by constitutional compact among three sovereigns" that "is financially self-sufficient." 513 U.S. 30, 38 n.8 & 52 (1994); see also N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 6416 (McKinney 1979) (noting that the Port Authority would be funded by New York and New Jersey until it could "meet all expenditures" itself); N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-16 (West 1990) (same). Moreover, the Port Authority "shall be regarded as performing an essential governmental function in undertaking the effectuation" of its purposes. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 6610 (McKinney 1962); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-35.4 (West 1990). Given the structure, funding, and purpose of the Port Authority, the Port Authority stands in the shoes of a municipality for purposes of § 1981 or § 1983, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. Cf. Raysor v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[T]he section 1983 claim against the Port Authority was properly dismissed because there was no showing that the injury was caused by execution of a custom or policy of the Port Authority, as required by Monell . . . ."). Accordingly, because of Sooroojballie's failure to offer any evidenceof a policy or custom that was linked to the alleged constitutional deprivation in the case, the district court erred in failing to dismiss the Monell claim against the Port Authority on summary judgment as a matter of law.³

II. Hostile Work Environment⁴

Defendants argue that the district court failed to exclude improper evidence at trial. In particular, defendants assert that certain acts that were time-barred were improperly introduced to the jury. Moreover, defendants contend that Sooroojballie was permitted to testify about his alleged retaliation, a claim dismissed by the district court on summary judgment. Defendants claim that, if this evidence were properly excluded, the non-time-barred acts would be insufficient as a matter of law to support the hostile work environment claim.

To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment[;] and (2) that a specific basis exists for imputing the objectionable conduct to the employer." Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). "[A] plaintiff need not show that h[is] hostile working environment was both severe and pervasive; only that it was sufficiently severe or sufficiently pervasive, or a sufficient combination of these elements, to have altered h[is] working conditions." Redd v. NewYork Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Pucino v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2010)). "[T]he conduct complained of must be severe or pervasive enough that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive, and the victim must subjectively perceive the work environment to be abusive." Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2014). We may consider the following factors to determine whether an environment is hostile or abusive: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).

1. Time-Barred Acts

Sooroojballie filed his discrimination and retaliation complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on July 11, 2014. In its order on the motion for summary judgment, the district court found that all conduct that occurred prior to January 12, 2014—180 days before he filed his EEOC complaint—was time-barred. The acts that were thus time-barred were: (1) Frattali's denial of boiler training for Sooroojballie; (2) Frattali's failure to assist Sooroojballie with the Junior Supervisory Assessment ("JSA") Evaluation, a process by which the Port Authority fills supervisory positions, in June and August of 2013; (3) Frattali's refusal to approve a meal reimbursement for Sooroojballie in November 2013; and (4) the December 30, 2013 counseling memorandum which alleged...