Sopala v. Menard, Inc.

LUCYNA E. SOPALA, Plaintiff, v. MENARD, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-830

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

August 13, 2020

Judge Mary M. Rowland

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this negligence action against Menard for injuries she suffered after tripping and falling at a Menard retail hardware store in Melrose Park, Illinois. For the reasons stated below, Menard's motion for summary judgment [32] is granted.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts are material. Id. After a "properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 250 (internal quotations omitted).

The Court "consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and [] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotations omitted). In doing so, the Court gives the non-moving party "the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [its] favor." White v. City of Chi., 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). "The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment." Id. (citation omitted).

BACKGROUND¹

I. Parties and Procedural History

Plaintiff Lucyna Sopala ("Sopala") and her husband Marek Sopala ("Marek") were customers at Menard's retail hardware store located at 3215 West North Avenue, Melrose Park, Illinois (the "Melrose Park Menards"). (DSOF ¶¶8, 9). Defendant Menard, Inc. ("Menard") is a Wisconsin corporation with its principal place of business in Eau Claire, Wisconsin. (Dkt. 1 at 2).

Sopala filed her complaint against Menard in Illinois state court on December 26, 2018. (Dkt. 1-1) (hereafter, "Complaint"). Menard removed the case to federal courton February 8, 2019. (Dkt. 1). This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).²

II. Sopala's Fall

Sopala and her husband visited the Melrose Park Menards on January 15, 2017. (DSOF ¶¶9, 10). Sopala and Marek went up to the store's second floor. (Id. ¶12). Marek walked ahead of Sopala; he was looking straight ahead and did not see anything on the floor and did not slip. (Id. ¶¶13-15). Sopala walked down the aisle, then felt something under her right shoe, lost her balance, and fell. (Id. ¶¶16-17). The fall occurred at 1:00:52 p.m. (Id. ¶18). Sopala's fall was captured on video by one of Menard's surveillance cameras. (Id. ¶11; Exh. C).³

Neither Sopala nor Marek know how long the bath beads were on the floor before Sopala fell. (Id. ¶20). They did not know how the bath beads got there or who caused the bath beads to be on the floor. (Id. ¶ ¶21-22). Before her fall, neither Sopala nor Marek saw the bath beads. (Id. ¶23). Neither Sopala nor Marek knows of any other guest or customer that had slipped on bath beads before. (Id. ¶24). After her fall, a group of five or six people came to Sopala's side, including two Menard team members. (Id. ¶26). Marek was in a different part of the store when she fell (PSOF ¶1) but returned to her at 1:02:20 p.m. (DSOF ¶27).

By the time Marek arrived, over ten people had walked in the area of Sopala's fall. (Id. ¶28). After returning, Marek began taking pictures. (Id. ¶29). Sopala saw the Menard team members clean up the bath beads with a broom and dustpan; they did not use a mop, sponge, or rag to clean. (Id. ¶¶31-32).⁴

All Menard employees on duty are trained to remain vigilant to identify any potential safety hazards and to address those potential hazards upon notice. (Id. ¶34). Menard is aware of no trip and fall accidents similar to Sopala's within the last five years. (Id. ¶35). Francisco Delrio was the plumbing department manager and Miguel Quintero was a part-time plumbing team member at the Melrose Park Menards on January 15, 2017. (Id. ¶¶36-37). Sopala's fall occurred in the plumbing department, which takes up almost half of the second floor of the store. (Id. ¶¶38-39). Anywhere from five to eight Menard employees work in the plumbing department at any one time, and team members from other departments also walk through the plumbing department. (Id. ¶¶40-41). Delrio testified that he and the other plumbing department team members were constantly walking around the department. (Id. ¶42). While walking around the sales floor performing other tasks, Menard employees are also looking at the floor for trip hazards, and commonly carry a rag so that they can take care of spills if they see one. (Id. ¶¶43-44). Delrio testified that, in situations where a Menard employee becomes aware of a tripping hazard on the ground while walking around, the employees "[c]lean it up right away." (Id. ¶45). Delrio testifiedthat, where a Menard employee discovers a tripping hazard and does not have the tools to clean it up themselves, they will stay near the hazard, block off the area, and get a manager involved. (Id. ¶46).

Delrio testified that he walked in the area of Sopala's fall very frequently on January 15, 2017. (Id. ¶47). Quintero testified that he walked in the area of her fall "[m]ultiple times" on that date. (Id. ¶48). While walking in the area of Sopala's fall, Delrio testified that he was looking for tripping hazards. (Id. ¶49). Quintero testified that he was aware of the floor and was cognizant of hazards as he performed his other job tasks. (Id. ¶50). Prior to Sopala's incident, Quintero and Delrio were not aware of any foreign substance on the ground where Sopala fell. (Id. ¶51). Delrio and Quintero responded to the scene of her accident within a minute of her fall and noticed approximately fifteen to twenty red scented bath beads on the floor. (Id. ¶¶52-53). Menard sold the red scented bath beads, but they were stocked in an aisle several feet away from where Sopala fell. (Id. ¶54). A jar of red scented bath beads on top of other merchandise near a "4-way" display nearest to Sopala's fall was out of place; meaning that is not where the bath beads are usually displayed by Menard employees. (Id. ¶55). Delrio testified that a Menard employee or vendor would not have any business putting the jar of red scented bath beads where it did not belong, and the misplaced jar would have stuck out like a "sore thumb" to himself and any other team member. (Id. ¶¶56-57). Delrio testified that he or any other team member would have put the misplaced jar back to its stock location had they noticed it. (Id. ¶58).

Other than a guest causing them to be there, Delrio could not come up with any other explanation for why the beads were on the floor. (Id. ¶61). Of the fifteen to twenty red scented bath beads Delrio noticed on the floor when he arrived at the scene, Delrio estimated ten to fifteen percent had been stepped on. (Id. ¶62). Of the fifteen to twenty bath beads, roughly half were smashed two minutes later when Marek took the photos in Exhibit D. (Id. ¶63). Neither Delrio nor Quintero has any idea how the bath beads got on the ground. (Id. ¶69). In the six years Delrio worked in the plumbing department, he had never heard of any complaints that he or Menard received about the condition of the floor where Sopala fell. (Id. ¶77). Quintero similarly testified that he is not aware of any complaints about the floor where she fell. (Id. ¶78).

ANALYSIS

I. Local Rule 56.1

Local Rule 56.1 requires, among other things, the party opposing summary judgment provide a response that contains "numbered paragraphs, each corresponding to and stating a concise summary of the paragraph to which it is directed" and "a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." LR 56.1. "Local Rule 56.1 statements serve to streamline the resolution of summary judgment motions by having the parties identify undisputed material facts and cite the supporting evidence." Laborers' Pension Fund v. Innovation Landscape, Inc., 2019U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211194, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2019) (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit has "consistently upheld district judges' discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1." Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGo, Inc., 919 F.3d 405, 414 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal citation and quotations omitted). "We have frequently said that it is within the district court's discretion to strictly enforce local rules regarding summary judgment by accepting the movant's version of facts as undisputed if the non-movant has failed to respond in the form required." Zuppardi v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 770 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2014).

Sopala's response to DSOF ¶16 and ¶27 are unresponsive so those facts are deemed admitted. Her response to DSOF ¶25 mischaracterizes the record by pointing to a portion of Sopala's deposition that does not mention whether she saw that the bath beads were smashed, while the portion of her deposition cited by Menard shows that she testified that she did not see the bath beads smashed on the floor after she got up. (Sopala Dep. (Dkt. 34-1), pp. 22-23). Sopala's response to DSOF ¶51 appears to agree with the statement but to the extent she...