Sorcan v. Rock Ridge Sch. Dist.

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Pollyann Sorcan, Plaintiff, v. Rock Ridge School District (Independent School District No. 2909); and Bill Addy Board Chair, in his official capacity as Chair, and any successor, Defendants.

No. 23-cv-1174 (WMW/LIB)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

January 22, 2024

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Wilhelmina M. Wright United States District Judge

Defendants Rock Ridge School District and Bill Addy (collectively “Defendants”) have moved to dismiss Pollyann Sorcan's claims. (Dkt. 12.) For the reasons addressed below, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Sorcan is a member of the School Board (“School Board”) at Independent School District No. 2909, Rock Ridge (“District”). Addy is the Board Chair. During her tenure as a member of the School Board, Sorcan repeatedly questioned and commented on the District's business supported and opposed strategies and actions related to the District's business, and advocated for positions such as fiscal discipline.

On August 9, 2021, the School Board issued a censure against Sorcan for three specified reasons: (1) violating District policy and failing to take direction from the School Board Chair, (2) failing to respect data privacy laws under District Policies 205 and 406, and (3) acting against the mission of the District and undermining School Board committees. Sorcan alleges that Defendants censured her in retaliation for her political advocacy, support of the community, and attempts to be informed on relevant issues. The censure purported to: (1) remove Sorcan from School Board committee assignments until a date specified by the School Board and (2) bar Sorcan from attending committee meetings. The censure was lifted on February 13, 2023. During the censure period, Sorcan continued to attend committee meetings to which she was not assigned.

Sorcan commenced this action on April 26, 2023, alleging that the imposed censure and the School Board's misinterpretation of Minnesota's Open Meeting Law violated her First Amendment right to free speech and expression. Defendants move the Court to dismiss Sorcan's claims on alternative grounds. Defendants maintain that Sorcan fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Alternatively Defendants contend that, if Sorcan has sufficiently pled a First Amendment violation, Defendants are legislatively immune. Because this Court finds legislative immunity applies, it need not analyze whether Sorcan sufficiently pled a First Amendment violation.

ANALYSIS

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that, if accepted as true, establish a facially plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 678 (2009); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the district court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc., 601 F.3d 852, 853 (8th Cir. 2010). Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).

A plaintiff may not rely on, nor may a district court consider, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

I. Legislative Immunity

Defendants contend that the District and Addy are legislatively immune. Sorcan maintains that neither the District nor Addy can claim the privilege of legislative immunity because the District is liable under Monell, and Addy, a local level official being sued in his official capacity, is liable under Umbehr. Defendants disagree, arguing that Sorcan fails to allege liability under Monell and that local level officials sued in their official capacity, as Addy is here, can claim legislative immunity.

A. Bill Addy's Immunity

In Tenney v. Brandhove, the Supreme Court held that state legislators are absolutely immune from suit under Section 1983 for actions “in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). The Supreme Court subsequently extended this immunity to include regional legislators. Lake Country Ests., Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 406 (1979). In 1998, the Supreme Court recognized that local officials also have the privilege of legislative immunity for their legislative activities. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 46 (1998). The Court reasoned that the rationales supporting legislative immunity for legislators at federal, state and regional levels “apply with equal force to local legislators.” Id. at 52. Specifically, the Court determined that “[r]egardless of the level of government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability,” “the time and energy required to defend against a lawsuit are of particular concern at the local level, where the part-time citizen-legislator remains commonplace,” and “the threat of liability may significantly deter service in local government, where prestige and pecuniary rewards may pale in comparison to the threat of civil liability.” Id. at 52. The court also observed that local level governments have two features that provide deterrents to legislative abuse that further warrant extending the privilege of legislative immunity: (1) “Municipalities themselves can be held liable for constitutional violations, whereas States and the Federal Government are often protected by sovereign immunity,” and (2) the electoral process “applies with equal force at the local level, where legislators are often more closely responsible to the electorate.” Id. at 53.

The preceding cases address officials who were sued in their individual capacity. But the question remained as to whether government officials sued in their official capacity are legislatively immune for actions taken in their legislative capacity. The Supreme Court addressed this question as it applies to state government officials and held that state officials sued in their official capacity are legislatively immune. Supreme Ct. of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 725-26, 734 (1980); see also Church v. Missouri, 913 F.3d 736, 754 n.3 (8th Cir. 2019) (applying Consumers Union and finding the state officials sued in their official capacity were legislatively immune from suit). However, neither the Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit has explicitly addressed whether legislative immunity extends to local level officials. Rather, the only guidance provided by the Supreme Court is from a footnote in Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996).

In Umbehr, an independent contractor sued the Board of County Commissioners and individual Board members in their individual and official capacities, alleging they had violated his First Amendment right to free speech. Id. The Supreme Court addressed whether, and to what extent, the First Amendment protects independent contractors. Id. at 670. In doing so, the Supreme Court noted that the district court “held that the claims against the Board members in their individual capacities would be barred by qualified immunity,” and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling on appeal. Id. at 672. Then in a footnote citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993), the Supreme Court observed that “[b]ecause only claims against the Board members in their official capacities are before us, and because immunity from suit under § 1983 extends to public servants only in their individual capacities, the legislative immunity claim is moot.” Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 677 n.* (internal citations ommitted). In Leatherman, however, the claims against both officials who had been sued in their official capacity were dismissed by the district court, and the question of their immunity was not at issue on appeal.^[1]Indeed, the cited portion in Leatherman analyzes the municipalities' immunity, not the immunity of the local level officials sued in their official capacity. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166.

Because neither case directly addresses whether local level officials sued in their official capacity are legislatively immune for their legislative acts, this Court must look to the principles first articulated by the Supreme Court in extending legislative immunity to local officials in their individual capacity. And as addressed above, in Bogan, the rationales supporting legislative immunity for legislators at federal, state and regional levels “apply with equal force to local legislators.” 523 U.S. at 52. Considering the Supreme Court's reasoning in Bogan, this Court identifies no reason to deprive local legislators of the privilege of legislative immunity. Additionally, Sorcan fails to present any distinguishing principle that warrants treating local legislators differently from their state counterparts. Therefore, this Court concludes that local officials sued in their official capacity may be legislatively immune when acting in their legislative capacity.

i. Acting in a Legislative Capacity

Sorcan argues that even if this Court were to find that legislative immunity applies to Addy in his official capacity, the School Board's issuance of a censure and punishment does not constitute a legislative act. Defendants disagree.

Officials may claim legislative immunity for their legislative activities. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 44; Church, 913 F.3d at 736. To determine if an act is a legislative activity, courts consider the nature of the act not the motive or intent of the official performing the act. Young v. Mercer County Commission, 849 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2...