Soria v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.

397 F.Supp.3d 397

Cynthia SORIA and Giovanni Soria, as Parents and Natural Guardians of G.S., and Cynthia Soria and Giovanni Soria, Individually, Plaintiffs,

v.NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

19 Civ. 2149 (AT)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed August 7, 2019

Peter Glenn Albert, Karl Joseph Ashanti, Brain Injury Rights Group, Ltd., New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Sharon Vicky Sprayregen, Siegel Teitelbaum & Evans, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.

ORDER

ANALISA TORRES, District Judge:

Plaintiffs, Cynthia and Giovanni Soria, are the parents of G.S., a seven-year-old boy who suffers from a brain injury. Compl. ¶¶ 6–7, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction (1) vacating a New York state administrative officer's decision denying the parents' request for an interim order for tuition reimbursement from Defendant, the New York City Department of Education (the "DOE"), for their son's non-public school placement at the International Institute for the Brain ("iBrain"), and (2) ordering the DOE to fund G.S.'s placement at iBrain for the 2018–2019 school year until final adjudication of Plaintiffs' underlying administrative proceedings. Pl. Mot., ECF No. 13. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

I. Framework of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the "IDEA"), a student with a disability is entitled to a "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE"). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). An "individualized education program" or "IEP" for each child's FAPE is developed by her parents, at least one teacher, and a representative of the local educational agency. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i); id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).

However, a parent who believes that her child is not being provided with a FAPE may place her child in a private school, see Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass. , 471 U.S. 359, 369–70, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985), and "seek tuition reimbursement from the school district by filing what is known as a due process complaint," triggering "an administrative procedure by which the board of education appoints an Independent Hearing Officer (‘IHO’) who conducts a formal hearing and fact-finding," M.O. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ. , 793 F.3d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), 1415(b)(6) ; N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1). The IHO then renders a written decision on the parent's due process complaint by determining whether "(1) the proposed IEP failed to provide the student with an appropriate public education; (2) the parent's private placement was appropriate to the child's needs; and (3) equitable considerations support the parent's claim." Reyes ex rel. R.P. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ. , 760 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2014). The IHO's decision is binding upon both parties unless appealed to a State Review Officer ("SRO"). 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) ; N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1), (2). An SRO's decision may be challenged by filing a civil action in a federal district court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). That court, in turn, "basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).

While the above-described administrative and judicial proceedings are ongoing, under the "pendency" or "stay-put" provisions of the IDEA and New York law, "unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child." Id. § 1415(j) ; see also N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(4)(a). This allows the parties to preserve "the educational status quo while the parties' dispute is being resolved." T.M. ex rel. A.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist. , 752 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2014). An IHO then holds a hearing and issues an interim order on pendency ("IOP") that determines (1) the student's "pendency placement" and (2) whether the DOE must provide tuition reimbursement so the student may "stay put" in her then-current educational placement while the parent's due process complaint is being adjudicated. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) ; see also S.G. v. Success Acad. Charter Schs., Inc. , No. 18 Civ. 2484, 2019 WL 1284280, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2019) ; M.M. ex rel. J.M. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ. , No. 09 Civ. 5236, 2010 WL 2985477, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2010). "If the student's ‘current educational placement’ is in private school, the responsibility for private school tuition ‘stays put’ as well. Thus, if the district has been paying for private school tuition, the district must continue to do so until the moment when the child's pendency changes." M.M. ex rel. J.M. , 2010 WL 2985477, at *2 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The parties may file an interlocutory appeal of an IHO's IOP decision to an SRO, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 279.10(d), and then seek review of the SRO's decision before a federal district court, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). This is the procedural posture before the Court.

II. Factual Background

Plaintiffs are the parents of G.S., a seven-year-old boy who suffers from a brain injury. Compl. ¶¶ 6–7. The DOE has classified G.S. as a child with a disability. Id. ¶ 8. During the 2017–2018 school year, G.S. was a student at the International Academy of Hope, or "iHope." Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs filed a due process complaint pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) seeking tuition reimbursement at iHope for the 2017–2018 school year. See id. ¶ 10. On June 6, 2018, New York City IHO Suzanne M. Carter awarded full tuition and costs at iHope to Plaintiffs (the "IHO Carter Decision"). Id. ; Ashanti Decl. Ex. A, ECF No. 15-1. The DOE did not appeal this decision. Compl. ¶ 11.

On June 22, 2018, Plaintiffs provided the required ten-day notice to the DOE indicating that they were unilaterally moving G.S. from iHope to iBrain for the 2018–2019 school year, where G.S. remains a student. Id. ¶¶ 8, 12–13. Plaintiffs filed a second due process complaint, this time seeking tuition reimbursement for the 2018–2019 school year at iBrain and additionally, as relevant here, seeking an IOP directing the DOE to fund G.S.'s tuition at iBrain until the due process complaint is resolved, arguing that such funding was appropriate because G.S.'s placement at iBrain was "substantially similar" to his placement at iHope, which had been fully funded pursuant to the IHO Carter Decision. Id. ¶ 14; Ashanti Decl. Ex. D, ECF No. 15-4. On August 27, 2018, New York City IHO Mindy G. Wolman denied Plaintiffs' IOP request (the "IHO Wolman Decision"), Compl. ¶ 17; IHO Wolman Decision, Ashanti Decl. Ex. F, ECF No. 15-6, holding that G.S. was not entitled to pendency funding under Section 1415(j) at iBrain because (1) Plaintiffs unilaterally moved him there, and (2) the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs was insufficient to establish that G.S.'s program at iBrain was "substantially similar" to his program at iHope. IHO Wolman Decision at 4–6.

Plaintiffs appealed the IHO Wolman Decision to the New York State Review Office. Compl. ¶ 18. On November 9, 2018, SRO Steven Krolak issued a decision (the "SRO Decision") (1) that assumed without deciding that G.S. could be entitled to an IOP order despite being moved unilaterally by his parents, (2) but that affirmed IHO Wolman's denial of the IOP, stating that SRO Krolak lacked sufficient information to determine whether G.S.'s programs at iHope and iBrain were "substantially similar." SRO Decision at 11–14, Ashanti Decl. Ex. H, ECF No. 15-8.

On March 8, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the DOE in this Court, seeking an order (1) vacating the SRO Decision and (2) directing the DOE to fund G.S.'s tuition at iBrain for the 2018–2019 school year. Compl. at 5–6. On May 3, 2019, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction seeking such relief. See Pl. Mot.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A district court reviewing a state administrative decision under the IDEA "must engage in an independent review of the administrative record and make a determination based on a preponderance of the evidence." M.H. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ. , 685 F.3d 217, 240 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "In deciding what weight is due to an IDEA administrative decision," the district court's analysis will often " ‘hinge on the kinds of considerations that normally determine whether any particular judgment is persuasive’ ... includ[ing] the quality and thoroughness of the reasoning, the type of determination under review, and whether the decision is based on the administrative body's familiarity with the evidence and the witness." Reyes ex rel. R.P. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ. , 760 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting M.H. , 685 F.3d at 244 ). Although the "federal court is required to give due weight to the rulings of a local or state administrative hearing officer, ... [j]udicial deference is particularly appropriate when the state hearing officers' review has been thorough and careful." M.C. ex rel. Mrs. C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ. , 226 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). The standard of review "requires a more critical appraisal of the agency determination than clear-error review but nevertheless falls well short of complete de novo review." G.B. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ. , 145 F. Supp. 3d 230, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting M.H. , 685 F.3d at 244 ). "When seeking to overturn an SRO's decision, the [p]arents bear the burden of demonstrating that the decision was insufficiently reasoned or supported." N.B. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ. , 711 F. App'x 29, 32 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order).

II. Analysis

Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) that (1) overturns the SRO Decision and (2) orders the DOE to fund G.S.'s placement at iBrain for the 2018–201...