Souliotes v. Cal. Victim Comp. Bd.

GEORGE SOULIOTES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARD, Defendant and Respondent.

B295163

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division

December 28, 2022

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BS170608 Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Reversed.

McLane, Bednarski &Litt, Marilyn E. Bednarski, David S McLane and Caitlin S. Weisberg for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Mark R. Beckington, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Todd Grabarsky, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION FOLLOWING TRANSFER FROM SUPREME COURT

WILLHITE, Acting P. J.

INTRODUCTION

After a grant of review, this matter was transferred back to us by the California Supreme Court with directions to vacate our prior published decision (Souliotes v. California Victim Comp. Bd., formerly published at (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 73 (Souliotes I)) and to reconsider our decision in light of Senate Bill No. 446 (Stats. 2021, ch. 490, § 1 (SB 446)) and Senate Bill No. 632 (Stats. 2022, ch. 133, § 1(a) (SB 632)). We now vacate our opinion. Upon reconsidering the cause with the aid of supplemental briefing from the parties, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Souliotes automatic compensation under Penal Code section 1485.55, subdivision (a) (hereafter 1485.55(a)).^[1]

BACKGROUND

After he was convicted of arson-murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, Souliotes filed an untimely federal habeas corpus petition in federal district court based on new evidence. In order to pass through a procedural "gateway" so that his untimely habeas corpus petition could be heard on the merits, Souliotes was required to demonstrate that, "in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him [or her] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (Schlup v. Delo (1995) 513 U.S. 298, 329 (Schlup).) The district court found that Souliotes met the procedural standard (hereafter, "Schlup finding"). Therefore, the court turned to the merits of his habeas claims and found that there was a reasonable probability that absent the ineffective assistance of counsel, the outcome of Souliotes's trial would have been different. The court then granted the habeas corpus petition and ordered that Souliotes be released unless the state notified the court that it intended to retry him.

The district attorney's office notified the federal court that it intended to retry Souliotes. However, a short time later, the parties reached a plea agreement. Under that agreement, Souliotes entered a West/Alford^[2] plea of no contest to three counts of involuntary manslaughter, received a total sentence of six years, with credit for time served (over 16 years), and was immediately released from custody.

Souliotes subsequently filed a claim under section 4900, which permits a person erroneously convicted of a felony to claim monetary compensation before the California Victim Compensation Board (Board). The Board denied the claim due to insufficient evidence to satisfy Souliotes's burden of proving factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.

Souliotes then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) and writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) in the superior court challenging the Board's decision. As relevant here, the court held that the federal court's Schlup finding did not constitute a "factually innocent" finding under section 1485.55(a), and therefore the Board did not have a ministerial duty to grant his request for automatic compensation without a Board hearing (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085). The court also found that the Board was bound by the factual findings and credibility determinations relied upon by the federal court to grant the writ of habeas corpus, but not those relied upon by the federal court solely for the Schlup finding. However, the court found that the Board failed to support its decision with sufficient findings supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the court partially granted the petition and remanded the matter back to the Board for reconsideration of the claim.

Souliotes appealed. On February 19, 2021, in Souliotes I, this court affirmed the judgment and held that the Schlup finding fell short of the statutorily mandated "factually innocent" finding required by section 1485.55(a). Therefore, the federal court's Schlup finding did not require the Board to recommend, without a hearing, that a section 4900 claim be paid. We further held the Board was bound by the factual findings and credibility determinations relied upon by the federal court to grant Souliotes's habeas corpus petition, but not those relied upon by the court solely for the Schlup finding. On April 1, 2021, Souliotes petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, which was granted on June 9, 2021.

While the petition for review was pending, our colleagues in Division Five in Larsen v. California Victim Comp. Bd. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 112 (Larsen) held that a federal court's Schlup finding was sufficient to satisfy the "factually innocent" criterion in section 1485.55(a). (Id. pp. 130-131, 133.) On July 16, 2021, the Board petitioned the California Supreme Court for review. On August 25, 2021, the Supreme Court granted the petition, but deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of Souliotes I.

On September 23, 2021, the Board reconsidered its initial denial of Souliotes's claim and adopted an amended decision recommending that his claim for $841,820 in compensation be granted in full. The Board found that Souliotes had shown by a preponderance that he is not only innocent of the crimes of arson and murder, but also the crime of involuntary manslaughter.

On October 4, 2021, the governor signed into law SB 446 (Eff. Jan. 1, 2022), which amended, as relevant here, section 1485.5, subdivisions (c) and (d), and section 1485.55(a). Former section 1485.5 subdivision (c) provided in pertinent part: "In a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for habeas corpus . . . shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board." (Italics added.) In SB 446, the Legislature replaced the phrase, "in considering," with the phrase "during proceedings on." In addition, former section 1485.5, subdivision (d) defined "express factual findings" as "findings established as the basis for the court's ruling or order." This provision was also amended to refer to all of "the court's rulings or orders." (Italics added.)

Former section 1485.55(a) provided in pertinent part: "[I]f the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus . . . and . . . has found that the person is factually innocent, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid." In SB 446, the Legislature inserted additional language regarding a finding of factual innocence, stating that it may be found "under any standard for factual innocence applicable in those proceedings."^[3] On July 19, 2022, the governor signed SB 632, which appropriated funds to the Board to pay approved claims under section 4900 for specified individuals, including $841,820 for Souliotes. This appropriations bill went into effect immediately.

On September 21, 2022, the Supreme Court transferred Souliotes I back to this court with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of SB 446 and SB 632. Upon transfer, Souliotes I was "not citeable." (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(3), corresponding comment, par. 3.) That same day, the Supreme Court dismissed the grant of review in Larsen, leaving that decision published and in full force (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.528(b)(3), 8.1105(e)(2)). Remittitur issued on October 5, 2022.

DISCUSSION

A. Senate Bill No. 446

California law provides that if a person has been imprisoned or incarcerated for a crime, and that crime "was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the person," he or she may present a claim for compensation against the state to the Board for injury he or she sustained by reason of the erroneous "imprisonment or incarceration." (§ 4900.) As relevant here, section 1485.55(a) describes a circumstance under which a court finding in postconviction litigation is binding on the Board and requires an automatic recommendation for compensation to the Legislature.

Prior to the passage of SB 446, former section 1485.55(a) provided that the Board "shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an was filed. (Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 446 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) March. 16, 2021.)

appropriation be made and the claim paid" when "the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus . . . and . . . has found that the person is factually innocent."

Under federal law, a petitioner for writ of habeas corpus seeking to overcome a procedural bar (such as the statute of limitations) to federal habeas review of the merits of his or her constitutional claims must pass through an "actual innocence" gateway first applied in Schlup supra, 513 U.S. 298. To pass through that gateway, as previously stated, the petitioner must persuade the district court that, "in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him [or her] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (Id. at p. 329.) If the petitioner is...