Souryavong v. Lackawanna Cnty.

159 F.Supp.3d 514

Michael Souryavong, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Lackawanna County, et al., Defendants.

Nelson Rolon, Plaintiff,

v.Lackawanna County, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-CV-1534

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-CV-1581

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed February 1, 2016

Cynthia L. Pollick, The Employment Law Firm, Pittston, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Harry T. Coleman, Law Office of Harry Coleman, Carbondale, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

A. Richard Caputo, United States District Judge

Presently before the Court are five (5) post-trial motions: (1) Plaintiffs' motion for liquidated damages (Doc. 147); (2) Plaintiffs' motion to strike Defendant's certificate of counsel as to Rule 68 Offers (Doc. 158); (3) Plaintiffs' motion for pre-judgment interest (Doc. 160); (4) Plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees and costs (Doc. 163); and (5) Plaintiffs' motion for defense counsel's time records, bills, and invoices (Doc. 179). Because Defendant Lackawanna County (“Defendant” or the “County”) failed to establish that its violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) was in good faith, Plaintiffs' motion for liquidated damages will be granted. However, because a plaintiff cannot be awarded both liquidated damages and pre-judgment interest under the FLSA, Plaintiffs' motion for pre-judgment interest will be denied. Because Defendant's Rule 68 Offers are relevant to my determination of attorney fees and costs, Plaintiffs' motion to strike will also be denied. Unlike Defendant's Rule 68 Offers, however, defense counsel's time records and billing invoices are not relevant to my determination of attorney fees or costs and Plaintiff's motion for these records will therefore be denied. Finally, because Plaintiffs have not demonstrated their entitlement to all fees and costs as requested, their motion for attorney fees and costs will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

This action represents the consolidation of two (2) matters arising out of the County's failure to pay overtime to Plaintiffs Michael Souryavong, Edwin Velez, and Nelson Rolon (collectively “Plaintiffs”), employees who were working in excess of forty (40) hours per week for the County. Plaintiffs were all members of the Lackawanna County Deputy Sheriff's Association (the “Association”), which is the union that represents Lackawanna County's Deputy Sheriffs for purposes of collective bargaining with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.

On June 7, 2013, Plaintiffs Souryavong and Velez initiated this action against the County and the Association by filing a Complaint (Doc. 1). They asserted claims for a breach of the collective bargaining agreement and for violations of the FLSA, the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (“WPCL”), and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”) against the County. Plaintiffs also asserted a claim against the Association for a breach of its duty of fair representation.

On June 12, 2013, Plaintiff Rolon filed a similar complaint asserting the same claims against the same defendants. (Rolon v. Lackawanna County et al. , No. 13–cv–1581, M.D. Pa., Doc. 1.) All three (3) plaintiffs are represented by Cynthia Pollick, Esq. Both cases were consolidated under the caption Souryavong et al. v. Lackawanna County, et al. , No. 13–cv–1534.

On May 27, 2015, summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs was granted in part and denied in part. (Docs. 82 & 83.) Summary judgment was granted for Plaintiffs with respect to claims based on events relating to the County's failure to pay Plaintiffs within the FLSA's minimal statute of limitations, which is two (2) years. The remainder of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with respect to claims based on events that fell outside of the two (2) year statute of limitations was denied because there remained disputes of material fact as to (1) whether the County's FLSA violation was willful,¹ which would expand the statute of limitations to three (3) years, and (2) whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 516.4.² Summary judgment in favor of the Association on Plaintiffs' breach of duty of fair representation claim was also denied because there remained material facts in dispute relating to whether the Association acted in bad faith in how it proceeded with Plaintiffs' grievances.

On November 2, 2015, a consolidated jury trial commenced. At the close of Plaintiffs' case, judgment as a matter of law was granted in favor of the Association. On November 5, 2015, trial concluded and judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against the County on their FLSA claims with respect to events that occurred within the minimum two (2) year statute of limitations.³ The jury awarded Souryavong damages in the amount of $608.30, Velez in the amount of $4,672.50, and Rolon in the amount of $307.50. Since the conclusion of trial, Plaintiffs have filed five (5) motions, each of which are discussed below.

II. Discussion

A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Liquidated Damages (Doc. 147)

On November 5, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a motion for liquidated damages. On November 11, 2015, the County opposed Plaintiffs' motion, arguing that Plaintiffs are not entitled to liquidated damages because the County “acted in good faith” relative to Plaintiffs' overtime. Specifically, the County asserts that it “had objectively reasonable grounds for believing that it was in compliance with the FLSA and was in fact in compliance with the FLSA in each department of its governmental unit but failed, as the result of a computer generated program, to aggregate an employee's hours from department to department.” (Doc. 165, at 6.)

On November 20, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a reply brief, arguing that they need not establish an intentional violation of the FLSA to recover liquidated damages, and that lack of knowledge is insufficient to establish good faith. Plaintiffs emphasize that the record here is silent as to efforts made by Lackawanna County to comply with the FLSA. Plaintiffs further argue that even after finding out that the County was violating the FLSA in March 2011, it continued to violate the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiff Velez his overtime pay up until January 2012, therefore demonstrating an intentional violation of the FLSA. This motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for adjudication.

Plaintiffs' motion for liquidated damages will be granted. The FLSA provides for liquidated damages and states that such damages shall be paid unless “the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.” 29 U.S.C. § 260. In order to show “good faith,” the defendant employer “must show that he took affirmative steps to ascertain the Act's requirements, but nonetheless violated its provisions.” Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co. , 940 F.2d 896, 907–10 (3d Cir.1991) (emphasis added). The fact that an employer had been violating the FLSA for a long time without complaints from employees does not demonstrate good faith as required by the statute. Id. at 908.

Here, there was no evidence that the County took affirmative steps to ascertain the FLSA's requirements or acted in “good faith” with regard to its failure to pay overtime to Plaintiffs. Although the County requested a hearing on the motion “should the Court so require,” such a hearing would be unnecessary since any evidence of good faith that the County might have on the issue should have been presented at trial, since a critical issue for the jury to determine was whether the County willfully violated the statute. Absent a showing of affirmative steps that Defendant took to comply with the FLSA, Defendant's mere assertion that the computer system failed to capture overtime hours of Plaintiffs fails to establish good faith. See Martin , 940 F.2d at 907–10 (concluding that the district court had “no discretion to deny liquidated damages” because the defendant had not demonstrated that it took affirmative steps to ascertain the legality of its pay practices and remanding for an order awarding mandatory liquidated damages). Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for liquidated damages will be granted.

B. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant Lackawanna County's Certificate of Counsel as to Rule 68 Offers (Doc. 158)

On November 5, 2015, Defendant filed a Certificate of Counsel as to Rule 68 Offers. (Doc. 146.) This document attaches offers that the County made to Plaintiffs on November 28, 2014, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The offers allowed judgment to be entered against the County to Plaintiff Souryavong in the amount of $12,124.72; Plaintiff Velez in the amount of $6,356.04, and Plaintiff Rolon in the amount of $854.41, excluding attorney's fees, yet including all of Plaintiffs' claims for relief. None of these offers were accepted by Plaintiffs. After proceeding to trial, each plaintiff was awarded an amount for less than the amount in the Rule 68 Offer: Souryavong was awarded $608.30, Velez was awarded $4,672.50, and Rolon was awarded $307.50. Plaintiffs have moved to strike Defendant's Certificate of Counsel attaching these Rule 68 offers, arguing that the offers are and void because they were not approved by the Court and that they serve no purpose since they were not filed in response to anything filed by Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs' motion to strike will be denied. First, the offers are relevant to my assessment of costs. Where a plaintiff fails to obtain a judgment for an amount more favorable than the amount in an unaccepted Rule 68 offer, the plaintiff may not recover costs incurred after the offer was made. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d) (providing that “[i]f the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs...