Spahr v. Collins

Ronald G. Poliquin, The Poliquin Firm LLC, Dover, DE - Attorney for Plaintiffs.

Kenneth L. Wan, Robert M. Kleiner, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE - Attorneys for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

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NOREIKA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (D.I. 29). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 15, 2019, Plaintiffs Amy Spahr and Matthew Cain (“Plaintiffs”) filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants Amy Collins, Romona Mirro, ^[1] and Jane Powell (“Defendants”), alleging that Defendants deprived them of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants are all family service specialists who were employed by the State of Delaware Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families (“DFS”). (D.I. 3 ¶¶ 3-5).

Plaintiffs are the parents of C.C., and Plaintiff Spahr is the mother of S.S., who were eleven-months-old and seven years old, respectively, at the time of relevant events.^[2] (Id. ¶ 7). On January 17, 2018, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Collins came to Plaintiff Spahr's home, demanded to speak with her, and after Spahr declined to do so, Collins responded that she would return with police. (Id. ¶ 8). Collins did just that, returning hours later with several police officers who were met by Plaintiff Cain after knocking on the door. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11). Collins insisted on entering the home to examine its cleanliness, Cain refused entry, but after calling the home's co-owner, Thomas Redden (Plaintiff Spahr's father), and obtaining his permission, Collins entered and examined the house and deemed it a suitable living space. (Id. ¶¶ 12-18). After leaving,

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Collins then went to S.S.'s school and interviewed the child without Plaintiff Spahr's consent. (Id. ¶ 20).

Later that evening, Plaintiff Spahr attempted to pick up C.C. from Redden's house, but no one answered the door. Plaintiffs claim that no one at the Redden home answered the door because Collins instructed Redden's family that C.C. would be put into foster care if they spoke with Spahr or did not themselves take custody of C.C. (Id. ¶¶ 21-30). Spahr then returned to her own home where she found Collins waiting for her. Plaintiffs allege that Collins then presented Spahr with a Child Safety Agreement and threatened Spahr that her children would be sent to foster care if she did not sign it. (Id. ¶¶ 21-28). According to Plaintiffs, Spahr was not given time to review the plan and could not read it because it was dark outside. (Id. ¶ 30). Collins ultimately signed the agreement.

The Child Safety Agreement, attached to the Complaint, provides further context. In a section entitled “What is causing immediate safety threats to the child(ren)?”, Collins wrote “Amy and Matthew Cain have ongoing domestic violence and children are present. S.S. has been in between the fights trying to stop fights. Concerns for children who may be harmed during domestic incidents.” (Id., Ex. 1). The plan provides that S.S.'s natural father will keep S.S. “until further notice” and that C.C. will reside with the Redden family (Spahr's father and stepmother) “until DFS completes its investigation can [sic] deemed the child safe.” (Id.) The plan further provides that “[i]f Amy attempts to remove C.C. from maternal grandparents care they will call DFS and 911.” By the plan's terms, the agreement was to be effective for a maximum of thirty days after signature. The plan also provides that “the agreement will be reviewed to determine if the agreement will continue, be amended, terminated, or a new agreement will be developed.” (Id.). Plaintiffs assert the plan was voluntary and could be rescinded at any time. (Id. ¶ 31).

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Days later, after consulting with a lawyer, Plaintiffs informed Defendants that they wanted their children returned immediately. (Id. ¶ 35). But Plaintiffs assert that “[f]or the next 21 days, Defendants . . . actively prevented Plaintiffs . . . from recovering their minor children.” More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants misrepresented to the Delaware State Police, Dover Police Department, and Redden that there was a court order separating Plaintiffs from their minor children. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41, 46, 47). The net result of this, per Plaintiffs, is that Defendants “unlawfully detain[ed] S.S. and C.C. from the care of their parents.” Meanwhile, Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that “DFS never filed any documentation with the Family Court prohibiting Spahr and Cain from seeing C.C.” (Id. ¶ 53; D.I. 7 ¶ 53).

Ultimately, Plaintiffs were able to reunite with their children after twenty-one days. Though not clearly described in the Complaint, it appears that a judge became involved at some point, as Plaintiffs allege that “[Defendant] Powell called the Dover Police Department and advised them on what the judge had ordered.” (Id. ¶ 54). This led officers to accompany Plaintiff Cain to Redden's home to retrieve C.C. and return the child to parental custody. Plaintiffs allege that the ordeal caused Plaintiff Cain to lose his employment, inflicted severe emotional distress on Plaintiffs and their children, and caused lasting damage to the relationship between Plaintiffs and Thomas Redden. (Id. ¶¶ 55-57).

Plaintiffs brought a procedural due process, unlawful removal, familial association, and Monell claim against all three Defendants. Defendants filed an answer to the Complaint (D.I. 7) and moved for judgment on the pleadings. (D.I. 29). That motion is now before the Court.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted if the movant establishes that “there are no material issues of fact, and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Zimmerman v. Corbett,

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873 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2017). A motion for judgment on the pleadings that asserts that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is reviewed under the 12(b)(6) standard. Turbe v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991). Thus, for the Complaint to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, it must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the Complaint, the Court must accept as true all factual allegations and view those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir.1989). But courts are “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” and “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice” for the purposes of pleading factual matter. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

The Court's standard of review is different for defendants who plead absolute and qualified immunity. Defendant Powell contends that she is entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity and Defendants Collins and Mirro assert that they deserve qualified immunity. “[T]o earn the protections of absolute immunity' at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a defendant must show that the conduct triggering absolute immunity clearly appear[s] on the face of the complaint.” Weimer v. Cty. of Fayette, Pennsylvania, 972 F.3d 177, 187 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to qualified immunity, “[u]nless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

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III. DISCUSSION

Count I asserts a procedural due process, unlawful removal, and familial association claim against each Defendant. Count II asserts a Monell claim against each Defendant. The Court will address each claim in turn.^[3]

A. Procedural Due Process

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim. To raise a procedural due process claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,' and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.'” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir.2006).

The law recognizes “the constitutionally protected liberty interests that parents have in the custody, care and management of their children[, ]” though this interest is “limited by the compelling governmental interest in the protection of children - particularly where the children need to be protected from their own parents.” Croft v. Westmoreland Cty. Child. & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 2003). Much like other areas of the law where rights are not absolute, the importance of process is amplified. Thus, “[t]he procedural component of parental due process rights [] requires rigorous adherence to procedural safeguards anytime the state seeks to alter, terminate, or suspend a parent's right to the custody of his minor children.” McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 827 (3d Cir. 2003).

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Here, Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim rests on the allegations that Plaintiff Spahr was coerced into signing the Child Safety Agreement. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Collins told Plaintiff Spahr that her children would be sent to foster care if Plaintiff did not sign off on the Child Safety Agreement, and that she was given no time to read the agreement....