Sparano v. JLO Auto.

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JAMES SPARANO, Plaintiff, v. JLO AUTOMOTIVE, INC., doing business as EXECUTIVE KIA, Defendant.

No. 3:19-cv-00681 (VAB)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

September 30, 2021

RULING AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S PARTIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Victor A. Bolden United States District Judge

James Sparano (“Plaintiff”) has sued JLO Automotive Inc., doing business as Executive Kia (“JLO Automotive” or “Defendant”) for alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693k, and the Credit Repair Organization Act ^[1] 15 U.S.C. § 1679 et seq., as well as for state law breach of contract claims. See Compl., ECF No. 1 (May 6, 2019) (“Compl.”).

Mr Sparano has moved for partial summary judgment on the alleged Truth in Lending Act violations. See Pl.'s Mot for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 56 (Sept. 22, 2020); Mem. in Supp. of Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 56-1 (Sept. 22, 2020) (“Pl. Mot. Summ. J.”). In response, JLO Automotive has moved for summary judgment on all claims. Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 57 (Sept. 24, 2020); Def.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 58 (Sept. 24, 2020) (“Def. Mot. Summ. J.”).

For the following reasons, Mr. Sparano's motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED. The motion for summary judgment by JLO Automotive is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

JLO Automotive is a new and used car dealer in Connecticut. See Pl.'s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement ¶ 2, ECF No. 56-2 (Sept. 22, 2020) (“Pl. SMF”); Def.'s Response to Pl.'s Local Rule 51(a)(1) Statement ¶ 2, ECF No. 60-2 (Oct. 13, 2020) (“Def. SMF Response”); see also Def.'s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1, ECF No. 59 (Sept. 24, 2020) (“Def. SMF”); Pl.'s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 1, ECF No. 61-5 (Oct. 14, 2020) (“Pl. SMF Response”).

On November 5, 2018, Mr. Sparano purchased a used 2010 Hyundai Elantra (the “Vehicle”) from JLO Automotive. Pl. SMF Response ¶ 3. The Vehicle was purchased under a retail installment contract. See id.; see also Ex. H to Aff. of John Gogliettino IV, ECF No. 58-1 (Sept. 24, 2020) (“Retail Installment Contract”).

The retail installment contract (the “Agreement”) showed the following terms of Mr. Sparano's loan obligation: an annual percentage rate of 18.99%; finance charge of $6, 796.86; amount financed of $10, 985.72; total payments of $17, 782.36; total sale price of $18, 732.30; number of payments as 66; the monthly payment amount of $269.43; and payments due monthly, beginning December 05, 2018. Id.; Def. SMF ¶ 6; Pl. SMF Response ¶ 6 (“Admitt[ing] that the review copy . . . included [these] terms[.]”); see also Ex. A to Aff. of John Gogliettino IV, ECF No. 58-1 (Sept. 24, 2020) (“Review Copy”).

Mr. Sparano was provided with an unsigned, paper “review copy” of the Agreement (“Review Copy”). See Def. SMF ¶¶ 5, 7-8; Pl. SMF Response ¶¶ 5, 7-8; Pl. SMF ¶ 7; Def. SMF Response ¶ 7. The Review Copy provided for optional Guaranteed Auto Protection and a service contract, which Mr. Sparano purchased.^[2] Def. SMF ¶¶ 7, 13-14; Pl. SMF Response ¶ 7, 13-14; see also Review Copy at 2 (provisions for “optional extended warranty or service contract” and “[o]ptional Guaranteed Auto Protection”); Retail Installment Contract at 2 (providing Mr. Sparano's signature beneath provisions for “optional extended warranty or service contract” and “[o]ptional Guaranteed Auto Protection”).

Mr. Sparano signed a declaration stating that he was “given the opportunity” to review a paper version of the Review Copy before signing the Agreement.^[3] Def. SMF ¶ 11; Pl. SMF Response ¶ 11 (“[a]dmitt[ing] that . . . plaintiff . . . signed [a declaration acknowledging electronic signature process]”); see also Ex. C to Aff. of John Gogliettino IV at 3, ECF No. 58-1 (Sept. 24, 2020) (“ESign Decl.”). Mr. Sparano, however, has asserted, contrary to this declaration, that he did not receive a paper Review Copy until after the transaction was completed. See Pl. SMF Response ¶¶ 5, 8-9.

Included in the documents that Mr. Sparano signed is an authorization for automatic electronic payment. See Pl. SMF ¶ 8; Def. SMF Response ¶ 8; Ex. K to Aff. of John Gogliettino IV, ECF No. 58-1 (Sept. 24, 2020) (“Authorization for Electronic Recurring Payments”). This authorization provides for automatic withdrawal of weekly payments in the amount of $67.36 by the Credit Acceptance Corporation (“Credit Acceptance”).^[4] See id.; Def. SMF ¶ 23. The parties dispute whether this weekly payment schedule altered Mr. Sparano's overall debt obligation.^[5]See Pl. SMF Response ¶ 23.

The parties further dispute when Mr. Sparano received a copy of the relevant paperwork to review. See Id. ¶¶ 5, 8-9. Mr. Sparano claims that he only received a copy of the paperwork after the transaction was completed. Id. There is no dispute, however, that, regardless of the timing, Mr. Sparano only received disclosures of the monthly payment terms. See Pl. SMF ¶ 12; Def. SMF Response ¶ 12 (“Plaintiff's decision to satisfy his monthly obligation with weekly payments does not necessitate new disclosures[.]”).

B. Procedural History

On May 6, 2019, Mr. Sparano filed a Complaint against JLO Automotive. See Compl.

On July 12, 2019, JLO Automotive filed an Answer to the Complaint, with affirmative defenses. See Answer, ECF No. 12 (July 12, 2019).

On March 12, 2020, following a series of discovery disputes, see generally Min. Entry, ECF No. 39 (Feb. 6, 2020), Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to Defendant's liability under the Truth in Lending Act, see Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 42 (Mar. 12, 2020); Mem. in Supp. of Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 42-1 (Mar. 12, 2020) (“First Pl. Mot. Summ. J.”). This motion was denied without prejudice to renewal, along with an order directing the parties to schedule a deposition of Mr. Sparano as soon as practicable. See Min. Entry, ECF No. 50 (Apr. 9, 2020).

On September 22, 2020, Mr. Sparano renewed his motion for partial summary judgment. See Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 56 (Sept. 22, 2020); Pl. Mot. Summ. J. JLO Automotive opposed this motion, see Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 60 (Oct. 13, 2020) (“Def. Opp'n”), and Mr. Sparano submitted a reply in further support, see Reply Supp. Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 62 (Oct. 27, 2020) (“Pl. Reply”).

On September 24, 2020, JLO Automotive submitted a cross-motion for summary judgment on all claims. See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 57 (Sept. 24, 2020); Def. Mot. Summ. J. Mr. Sparano opposed this motion, see Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Summ. J. Mot., ECF No. 61 (Oct. 14, 2020) (“Pl. Opp'n”), and JLO Automotive submitted a reply in further support, see Reply to Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 63 (Oct. 27, 2020) (“Def. Reply”).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court will grant a motion for summary judgment if the record shows no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The non-moving party may defeat the motion by producing sufficient evidence to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247-48 (emphasis in the original).

“[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id.; see Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[M]ateriality runs to whether the dispute matters, i.e., whether it concerns facts that can affect the outcome under the applicable substantive law.” (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248)).

When a motion for summary judgment is supported by documentary evidence and sworn affidavits and “demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, ” the non-moving party must do more than vaguely assert the existence of some unspecified disputed material facts or “rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Instead, a party opposing the motion for summary judgment “must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Id. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 (1967); First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)).

A court must view any inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion. See Dufort v. City of N.Y., 874 F.3d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 2017) (“On a motion for summary judgment, the court must ‘resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.'”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Truth in Lending Act

The Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) aims “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms . . . and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a); see also...