Sparks v. Dorethy

MICHAEL L. SPARKS, # K-98355, Petitioner, v. STEPHANIE DORETHY, Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-1044-NJR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

March 26, 2020

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

In 2002, Petitioner Michael L. Sparks was convicted of the first-degree murder of his estranged wife, following a jury trial in Madison County, Illinois. He was sentenced to 35 years' imprisonment and is now in custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections at Hill Correctional Center.

On September 29, 2014, Sparks filed this action seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). His pro se Petition raised 12 grounds for relief, 7 of which were dismissed on preliminary review by the Court because Sparks had not exhausted his state court remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. (Doc. 6). After Respondent answered (Doc. 23), Sparks's retained counsel filed his Reply. (Doc. 36). On May 4, 2017, the Court considered the remaining claims (1-5), denied relief, and dismissed the case. (Doc. 46).

Sparks appealed, and on January 9, 2018, the Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal order and remanded for this Court to dismiss Sparks's mixed petition so that he could make the choice whether to dismiss his unexhausted claims or seek a stay of the proceedings while he exhausted them. (Doc. 56-1). Sparks subsequently filed an Amended Petition (Doc. 58), which contains only his exhausted claims. The Amended Petition is now before the Court along with a Response filed by Respondent Stephanie Dorethy.¹ (Doc. 70). Sparks was given an opportunity to reply to the Response, but he did not do so. (Docs. 71, 74, 79).

The Amended Petition (Doc. 58) lists five grounds for relief (claims 1-2 and 4-6 below). The Response discusses the Brady claim as a distinct issue (claim 3 below); the Court adopts that enumeration for convenience:

1. Sparks's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial were violated when he was forced to wear an electronic stun belt during trial, without a hearing to determine manifest need for that security measure (Doc. 58, pp. 2-7);

2. Sparks's right to counsel, Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment right to due process were violated by the State's use of a jailhouse snitch (Tomerlin) to obtain an alleged confession from Sparks without his attorney being present (Doc. 58, pp. 7-12);

3. The state's failure to disclose Tomerlin's past plea bargains and record of testifying for the State in other cases amounted to a violation of Brady v. Maryland (Doc. 58, pp. 9-12, 20-21);

4. Sparks's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial were violated by the prosecutor's introduction of Tomerlin's "confession" testimony which he either knew to be false, or recklessly disregarded the likelihood it was false (Doc. 58, pp. 13-21);

5. Trial counsel's failure to investigate and interview witnesses to impeach Tomerlin's testimony on Sparks's alleged jailhouse confession violated Sparks's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel (Doc. 58, pp. 21-24);

6. Sparks was deprived of the effective assistance of appellate counsel, who failed to raise the claim (# 5) of ineffectiveness of trial counsel in Sparks's direct appeal (Doc. 58, pp. 24-25.

(Doc. 58; Doc. 70, pp. 4-5). Claims 1-3 and 5-6 are identical to the exhausted claims reviewed by the Court in the dismissal order at Doc. 46.

Respondent asserts that claims 1-3, as well as portions of claims 5 and 6, are procedurally defaulted; claims 1 and 3 are barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); and claims 4-6 are barredfrom re-litigation by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). (Doc. 70, pp. 5-11). Further, Respondent specifically preserves the arguments that the Amended Petition (Doc. 58) is successive and untimely. (Doc. 70, p. 1 n.1). The Court rejected Respondent's successive and untimely arguments in denying her motion to dismiss (Docs. 61, 65), but recognizes the preservation of these points.

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. State Trial Proceedings

This summary of the facts is derived from the detailed description by the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, in its Rule 23 Orders affirming Sparks's conviction on direct appeal and affirming the denial of his postconviction petition. People v. Sparks, No. 5-03-0297 (Apr. 11, 2006); People v. Sparks, No. 5-13-0059 (October 24, 2013); (Docs. 23-1; 23-3/Exhibits A and C).² The state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, which Sparks has not done. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).

Sparks's wife, Patricia (Pat), filed for divorce in 2000. In the days leading up to September 2, 2000, Sparks and Pat were dividing up their personal property after having sold their marital home. Pat had moved out of the house and was living with her mother. On the morning of September 2, 2000, Pat went to the house to retrieve some things. Sparks had breakfast with a neighbor and also went to the house. Pat's mother called the house at about 11:00 a.m., but there was no answer. (Doc. 23-1, pp. 3-4).

At about 11:00 a.m. on September 2, 2000, a Madison County sheriff's deputy was dispatched to the scene of an abandoned pickup truck. He found a man walking in circles in a nearby soybean field. That man turned out to be Sparks. Sparks did not respond when the deputy spoke to him. The deputy called the dispatcher and requested a license plate check. The truck was registered to MichaelSparks. The dispatcher called the Sparks residence, but there was no answer. The deputy realized that Sparks was carrying a .38-caliber handgun. Sparks dropped the gun when ordered to do so. The gun contained one spent round and four live rounds of ammunition. Upon searching Sparks, the deputy found a pocketknife and divorce papers in his pocket. There was a bag of savings bonds in the truck. (Doc. 23-1, pp. 1-2).

Another deputy went to the Sparks marital home and found the body of a woman, later identified as Patricia Sparks, lying on a bed. She had been shot once in the forehead from a distance of about two inches. She was alive when found but died shortly thereafter. (Doc. 23-1, p. 2).

A search of the home yielded a bullet casing from the bed where Pat was found. No tests were performed upon Sparks or Pat to detect gunpowder residue. The gun found with Sparks was not tested for fingerprints, and ballistics testing was unable to match the gun with the bullet retrieved from the crime scene. The trial court suppressed the introduction of many items seized in the search of the home and Pat's vehicle. (Doc. 23-1, pp. 2-3).

Sparks was arrested and charged with first-degree murder three days later. He was incarcerated while awaiting trial. A fellow jail inmate, Manuel Tomerlin, testified at trial that Sparks confessed to him that he intentionally shot his wife because he feared that Pat and her sister would take his money in the divorce. Tomerlin's own pending murder charges were later reduced to second-degree murder. (Doc. 23-1, pp. 2-3).

Sparks presented expert testimony that he suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of his service in Vietnam in 1967-68. Pat had previously filed for divorce in 1988, but the parties reconciled. The trial court allowed limited testimony regarding Sparks's alleged abuse of Pat during the marriage. (Doc. 23-1, p. 3). All but one of Sparks's statements made during his questioning at the jail soon after his arrest were suppressed by the trial court; the jury was allowed to hear that he admitted having been present in the marital home on the day of the shooting, and that he told police that "if he had shot Pat, then 'it would have been an accident.'" (Doc. 23-1, p. 9).

At the time of Sparks's trial, the Madison County sheriff's office required defendants charged with serious crimes such as murder to wear an electronic stun belt during trial. (Doc. 23-3, p. 7). The belt held two "packs"— each about the size of a deck of cards. Sparks was required to wear the belt under his clothes, i.e., a T-shirt, shirt, and suit jacket. The belt was not deployed while Sparks was wearing it. (Doc. 23-3, p. 9). At a hearing on Sparks's postconviction petition, the parties stipulated that the trial judge would have testified that he was not aware at any time before or during the trial that Sparks was wearing a stun belt. They also stipulated that Sparks's trial counsel would have testified that he had no recollection of whether Sparks wore a stun belt during trial or as to whether Sparks complained to him about the stun belt. (Doc. 23-3, p. 11). Other facts will be discussed as necessary in the analysis below.

2. Direct Appeal

Petitioner raised a number of points on appeal:

1. The conviction should be reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct, consisting of improper opening statement, inflammatory remarks during trial, improper questions, unfair argument, improper closing argument, and attacking the integrity of defense counsel.

2. The evidence was insufficient to establish that Sparks was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. The trial court erred in denying Sparks's motion to suppress evidence.

4. The trial court erred in admitting evidence of Sparks's prior bad acts.

5. The trial court erred in limiting the testimony of Sparks's expert on posttraumatic stress disorder.

6. Sparks's right to be present for all proceedings was violated by ex parte communications between jurors, third parties, and the trial court.

7. The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter.

(Doc. 23-4).

After his conviction was affirmed, Sparks, through counsel, filed a Petition for Leave to Appeal(PLA), which raised only the first, fourth, and sixth points. (Doc. 23-9). The Supreme Court denied the PLA. (Doc. 23-10).

3. Postconviction Petitions

Sparks's postconviction petition was summarily dismissed. On appeal, however, the Appellate...