Spengemann v. Saul, Case No. 4:19-cv-02423-JAR

SAMANTHA SPENGEMANN, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIALSECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.

Case No. 4:19-cv-02423-JAR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

September 29, 2020

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying Plaintiff Samantha Spengemann's application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq., alleging disability beginning January 8, 2016. (Tr. 10). Plaintiff's application was denied on August 12, 2016. (Tr. 182-91). Plaintiff requested and was granted a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), which took place on May 10, 2018. (Tr. 134-81). Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing. The ALJ heard evidence from both Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert ("VE").

After considering the testimony and record evidence, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Plaintiff's application on October 25, 2018. (Tr. 7-26). On June 26, 2019, the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Tr. 1-4). Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. See Sims v. Apfel, 560 U.S. 103, 107 (2000).

Plaintiff filed this appeal on August 27, 2019. (Doc. 1). Defendant filed an Answer on October 28, 2019. (Doc. 11). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of the complaint (Doc. 13), Defendant filed a brief in support of the answer (Doc. 16), and Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant's brief. (Doc. 17).

II. FACTS

The Court adopts Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts (Doc. 13-1) to the extent they are admitted by Defendant. (Doc. 16-1). The Court further adopts Defendant's Statement of Additional Material Facts. (Doc. 16-2). Together, these statements provide a fair and accurate description of the relevant record before the Court. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary to address the parties' arguments.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The Court's role on judicial review is to determine whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Adkins v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 911 F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 2018); see also Johnson v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir. 2011). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion. Sloan v. Saul, 933 F.3d 946, 949 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Chismarich v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 978, 979 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)). The Court defers heavily to the findings and conclusions of the Social Security Administration. Wright v. Colvin, 789 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010)). The Court may not reverse merely because substantial evidence exists in the record that would support a contrary outcome or because the court would have decided the case differently.Chaney v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 672, 676 (8th Cir. 2016). In other words, a court should "disturb the ALJ's decision only if it falls outside the available zone of choice." Papesh v. Colvin, 786 F.3d 1126, 1131 (8th Cir. 2015).

To determine whether the ALJ's final decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court is required to review the administrative record as a whole and consider:

(1) The findings of credibility made by the ALJ;

(2) The education, background, work history, and age of the claimant;

(3) The medical evidence given by the claimant's treating physicians;

(4) The subjective complaints of pain and description of the claimant's physical activity and impairment;

(5) The corroboration by third parties of the claimant's physical impairment;

(6) The testimony of vocational experts based upon prior hypothetical questions which fairly set forth the claimant's physical impairment; and

(7) The testimony of consulting physicians.

Brand v. Sec'y of Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 623 F.2d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stamper v. Colvin, 174 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1063 (E.D. Mo. 2016).

The Social Security Act defines as disabled a person who is "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The impairment must be "of such severity that [the claimant] is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The social security administration has established a five-step process, described below, for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a), 404.1520(a). "If a claimant fails to meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled." Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2004)).

First, the claimant must not be engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b), 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must have a "severe impairment," defined as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 404.1520(c).

If the claimant has a severe impairment, the ALJ must determine at step three whether any of the claimant's impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in the applicable regulations ("Listings"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 404.1520(d). If the claimant has one of, or the medical equivalent of, these impairments, then the claimant is per se disabled without consideration of the claimant's age, education, or work history. Id.

If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a Listing, the ALJ must determine the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). RFC is an assessment of the claimant's ability to perform sustained work-related physical and mental activities in light of his or her impairments. SSR 96-8p. At step four, the ALJ must determine whether, given the RFC, the claimant can return to his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f); Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091-92 (8th Cir. 2012). If the claimant can still perform past relevant work, he or she will not be found disabled; if not, the ALJ proceeds to step five to determine whether the claimant is able to perform any other work in the national economy in light of his or her age, education and work experience.20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then he or she will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(g), 404.1520(g).

Through step four, the burden remains with the claimant to prove he or she is disabled. Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010). At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant maintains the RFC to perform a job existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Brock v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2012). "The ultimate burden of persuasion to prove disability, however, remains with the claimant." Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 931 n.2 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Stamper, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 1063.

IV. DECISION OF THE ALJ

At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from the alleged onset date of disability through the last date insured. (Tr. 13). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of obesity, obstructive sleep apnea, restless leg syndrome, and status post (s/p) broken bones in her lower extremities. (Id.). The ALJ also discussed records relating to Plaintiff's mild thyroid disorder, urge incontinence, and right hip osteoarthritis, but deemed these impairments non-severe. (Id.). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the Listings. Accordingly, the ALJ proceeded to step four.

After considering the entire record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work, as defined in 20 CFR § 404.1567(a), with certain additional restrictions. (Tr. 15-19). Based on this RFC and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not retain the ability to perform past relevant work as a cashier checker, apparel stock checker, or store laborer (Tr. 19). At step five, however, the ALJ determined that there are jobs existing in significantnumbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform according to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"). (Tr. 19-20). Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to work as an Assembler (DOT 713.687-018), Telephone Sales (DOT 299.357-014), and Document Preparer (DOT 249.587-018).

Thus, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled at any time from January 8, 2016 through June 30, 2018, the date last insured. (Tr. 20).

V. DISCUSSION

This appeal concerns two narrow questions: first, did substantial evidence support the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's impairments did not medically equal Listing 1.02A or 1.06? Second, was the ALJ's failure to order a medical expert review reversible error? For the reasons...