Sperry v. Wildermuth

JEFFREY J. SPERRY, Plaintiff, v. LINDSEY WILDERMUTH, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 16-3222-SAC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

December 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 52) filed by Defendants. Defendants' motion is granted for the reasons stated herein.

Background

Mr. Sperry describes the nature of his case as follows: "In September 2015, prison officials started targeting plaintiff for mistreatment and retaliation. The KDOC has a system established where every member in the administration conspires with every other member to violate the constitutional and civil rights of plaintiff and every other inmate." ECF No. 25 at 4. He then goes on to bring ten (10) counts.¹ To summarize, Plaintiff claims: (1) he was illegally placed in administrative segregation for 17 months; (2) he was held for just over two months in a cell infested with roaches; (3) he has been systematically prevented from getting an 8-hour period of continuous sleep since January 25, 2016; (4) Defendants have illegally seized two of Plaintiff's books, threeperiodicals, and one photograph; (5) he was denied access to the law library while he was held in administrative segregation; (6) and (7) some of Plaintiff's personal property, including some of his legal materials, was illegally seized; (8) none of the 25+ disciplinary hearings he has received have been fair, unbiased, or properly documented; (9) the prison grievance system is meaningless and manipulated by Defendants to automatically deny all relief and to create obstacles between prisoners and judicial review; and (10) he was denied all of his rights while housed in administrative segregation.

On September 1, 2020, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 52) and accompanying Memorandum in Support (ECF No. 53), along with the required Notice to Pro Se Litigant Who Opposes a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 54), which explains Plaintiff's burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56.1.

Under D. Kan. Rule 6.1(d), Plaintiff had twenty-one days to respond to the motion. Plaintiff has filed three motions requesting extensions of time to respond, which were all granted. In granting Plaintiff's third, and final, request for an extension, the Court set a deadline of December 16, 2020 for Plaintiff to file a response to Defendants' motion. See ECF No. 62. Plaintiff has failed to file a response by the deadline.

Standard of Review

The Court must construe pro se filings liberally. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)). The Court does not, however, "take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant's attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record." Id. Moreover, "pro se parties [must] follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants." Id.

Rule 12(b)(6)

A court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In order to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). All well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences derived from those facts are viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2008). Conclusory allegations, however, have no bearing upon the court's consideration. Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007).

Summary Judgment

Because the Court has considered the Martinez report (ECF No. 48) filed in this case in evaluating Plaintiff's claims, it decides the motion under the request for summary judgment contained therein. See Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1125 (10^th Cir. 2010) (district court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a prisoner's complaint filed pro se characterized as "irregular" where court had not limited its review to the complaint).

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and other materials before the Court show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.

On summary judgment, the initial burden is with the movant to point out the portions of the record which show the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thomas v. WichitaCoca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10^th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1013 (1992). Instead of disproving a claim or defense, the movant need only show "a lack of evidence" on an essential element. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10^th Cir. 1998). If the movant meets that burden, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts based on admissible evidence from which a rational fact finder could find in the non-movant's favor. Id. The non-movant's "burden to respond arises only if" the movant meets its initial burden of production. Neal v. Lewis, 414 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10^th Cir. 2005). The essential inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52.

The Court views all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Pinkerton v. Colorado Dept. of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1058 (10^th Cir. 2009). However, Plaintiff's pro se status does not exempt him from complying with the essential federal rules of civil procedure, including Rule 56, Birbari v. United States, 2012 WL 2087180 at *3 (10^th Cir. Jun. 11, 2012), or a court's local rules, Calia v. Werholtz, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214 (D. Kan. 2006).

Local Rule 7.4(b) provides that a party or attorney who does not timely file a response to a motion waives the right to later file a response and that the Court "will consider and decide the motion as an uncontested motion. Ordinarily, the court will grant the motion without further notice." See Bigler v. U.S. Bank Tr., 2017 WL 2362087, at *1 (D. Kan. 2017). However, such a ruling may not be consistent with Tenth Circuit law. See Ellison v. English, 2019 WL 3716448, at *1 (D. Kan. 2019) (citing Issa v. Comp USA, 354 F.3d 1174, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2003)) ("[T]he Tenth Circuit has directed that a district court may not grant a motion to dismiss or a motion forsummary judgment based solely on the plaintiff's failure to respond.") Therefore, the Court will analyze Defendants' motion on its merits despite Plaintiff's failure to abide by the local rules, but in doing so, the Court deems Defendants' facts undisputed to the extent they are supported by the record. See Fed. R. Civ P. 56(e).

Analysis

Having considered the matter, the Court finds Defendants' motion should be granted.

Count I - Administrative Segregation

Plaintiff alleges that his placement and confinement in administrative segregation violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual" punishment. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has rejected arguments that segregation or solitary confinement are cruel and unusual punishment, generally, finding that "the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983). "To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh," but not cruel and unusual, "they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). "[A]dministrative segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration." Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468. See also Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1407 (10th Cir. 1996).

However, specific conditions of a prison's administrative segregation unit may violate the Eighth Amendment. To be considered cruel and unusual, the conditions of confinement must: 1) be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting punishment, 2) involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, or 3) deprive an inmate of the minimal civilizedmeasure of life's necessities. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346-47. Under the Eighth Amendment, prisons are required "to provide humane conditions of confinement by ensuring inmates receive the basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and by taking reasonable measures to guarantee the inmates' safety." Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10^th Cir. 2008).

"An inmate making an Eighth Amendment claim for constitutionally inadequate conditions of confinement must allege and prove an objective component and subjective component associated with the deficiency" claimed. Shannon v. Graves, 257 F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2001). "The objective component requires conditions sufficiently serious so as to 'deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). "Alternatively, a condition must be sufficiently serious so as [to] constitute a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-35 (1993)). "The subjective component requires that...