Spicer v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n

430 S.W.3d 526

Douglas SPICER, Appellant

v.TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION and Pleasant Valley United Methodist Church, Appellees.

No. 05–13–00465–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

April 22, 2014.

Recognized as Unconstitutional

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb, 2000bb-1, 2000bb-2, 2000bb-3, 2000bb-4.

Douglas Spicer, pro se.

Scott Dale Simmons, Texas Workforce Com'n Taxation Div., Office of the General Counsel, Austin, Philip Andrew Lionberger, Austin, Jonathan Mitchell, Austin. Daniel T. Hodge, Austin, Greg Abbott, Austin, for Appellees.

Before Justices FITZGERALD, LANG, and FILLMORE.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice FILLMORE.

This is an appeal from the trial court's summary judgment affirming the Texas Workforce Commission's (TWC) decision to deny Douglas Spicer unemployment benefits. In his first issue, Spicer contends “it might well be” a violation of federal law for the TWC and the trial court to fail to acknowledge his claim that section 201.066 of the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act (the TUCA) ¹ is unconstitutional. In his second and third issues, Spicer asserts that section 201.066 of the TUCA, which, as relevant to this appeal, exempts service in the employ of a church from the statutory definition of employment, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Background

Douglas Spicer was a pianist and organist for the Pleasant Valley United Methodist Church (Pleasant Valley). After Spicer's employment was terminated, he filed a claim for unemployment benefits. Spicer's claim was denied because he did not have sufficient benefit wage credits under section 207.021(a)(5) of the TUCA.² Spicer appealed the finding to the TWC Appeal Tribunal.

The Appeal Tribunal framed the issue as whether Spicer earned sufficient base periodwages to establish a claim for unemployment benefits. The Appeal Tribunal found that Spicer's base period began on October 1, 2010 and extended through September 30, 2011 and that, during his base period, Spicer earned wages only from Pleasant Valley. The Appeal Tribunal concluded that, pursuant to section 207.021(a)(5), Spicer was entitled to unemployment benefits only if he had sufficient credits. Because section 201.066 of the TUCA provides that employment does not include service in the employ of a church, the wages Spicer earned from Pleasant Valley were exempt, and he was not considered to be in employment as defined by the TUCA.

The Appeal Tribunal affirmed the denial of Spicer's claim. Spicer appealed to the TWC. The TWC determined the case was properly decided by the Appeal Tribunal and adopted the Appeal Tribunal's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Spicer filed a petition in the trial court seeking review of the TWC's decision. The TWC filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground there was more than a scintilla of evidence to support the TWC's determination that Spicer was not entitled to receive benefits. The TWC's summary judgment evidence consisted of its decision, the decision of the Appeals Tribunal, and Spicer's admissions that the only wages he received between October 1, 2010 and September 30, 2011 were from Pleasant Valley and that Pleasant Valley was a church.

Spicer did not rely on any evidence to contest the TWC's right to summary judgment and did not dispute the applicable facts. Rather, he asserted that section 201.066 of the TUCA was unconstitutional. The trial court granted the TWC's motion for summary judgment.³

Standard of Review

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex.2010). Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex.1985). When reviewing a summary judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.2009). We credit evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and we disregard evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. Id.

Judicial review of a TWC decision regarding benefit payments is by trial de novo in which the trial court determines whether substantial evidence supports the TWC's ruling. SeeTex. Lab.Code Ann. § 212.202(a) (West 2006); Collingsworth Gen. Hosp. v. Hunnicutt, 988 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex.1998) (citing Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex.1986)). The TWC's action is presumed valid, and the party seeking to set aside the decision has the burden of showing that it was not supported by substantial evidence. Collingsworth Gen. Hosp., 988 S.W.2d at 708;Murray v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 337 S.W.3d 522, 524 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.). Because substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence, the evidence in the record may preponderate against the TWC's decision but still amount to substantial evidence. State v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 883 S.W.2d 190, 204 (Tex.1994); Blanchard v. Brazos Forest Prod., L.P., 353 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied).

Under the substantial evidence standard of review, the issue is whether the evidence introduced before the trial court shows facts in existence at the time of the TWC's decision that reasonably support the decision. Collingsworth Gen. Hosp., 988 S.W.2d at 708. The reviewing court may not set aside the TWC's decision merely because it would reach a different conclusion. Id. Rather, the TWC's decision may be set aside only if the trial court finds it was made without regard to the law or the facts and therefore was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Id.

A trial court may grant summary judgment in cases tried under the substantial evidence rule because the only issue before the court is a question of law. Blanchard, 353 S.W.3d at 573;see also Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Alford, 209 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex.2006) (per curiam) (whether there is substantial evidence to support administrative decision is question of law). We review the trial court's judgment by comparing the TWC decision with the evidence presented to the trial court and the governing law. Potts v. Tex. Emp't Comm'n, 884 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ); Blanchard, 353 S.W.3d at 573. We determine whether the summary judgment evidence established as a matter of law that substantial evidence existed to support the TWC decision. Potts, 884 S.W.2d at 883;Blanchard, 353 S.W.3d at 573.

Analysis

Spicer argues that section 201.066 of the TUCA violates (1) the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and (2) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing him from freely exercising his religious beliefs.⁴ We must construe the statute, if such a construction is fairly possible, to avoid raising doubts of its constitutionality. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 780, 101 S.Ct. 2142, 68 L.Ed.2d 612 (1981); Walker v. Gutierrez, 111 S.W.3d 56, 66 (Tex.2003). As the party challenging the statute, Spicer had the burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality. Walker, 111 S.W.3d at 66;Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex.1974). This burden did not change even though Spicer was the nonmovant to the motion for summary judgment. See Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc.–Tex., 869 S.W.2d 367, 369–70 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993) (party opposing motion for summary judgment on ground statute violated provisions of Texas constitution had burden to demonstrate statute was unconstitutional), aff'd,889 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.1994).

In challenging the constitutionality of a statute, a party must show the statute is unconstitutional on its face or as applied. Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 n. 16 (Tex.1995). Spicer contends the exemption of service in the employ of a church from the definition of employment in the TUCA violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. He, therefore, asserts the statute is unconstitutional on its face. See In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 655 (Tex.2005) (to prevail on claim statute is unconstitutional on its face, party “bears the heavy burden” of showing statute is “unconstitutional in all of its applications”); 8100 N. Freeway, Ltd. v. City of Houston, 363 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Because Spicer asserts facial challenges to the statute, he must show section 201.066 is unconstitutional under all circumstances. See Appraisal Review Bd. v. Tex–Air Helicopters, Inc., 970 S.W.2d 530, 534 (Tex.1998); see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010).

Statutory Scheme

In 1935, in response to widespread unemployment associated with the Great Depression, Congress established a cooperative Federal–State program to provide benefits to unemployed workers. See St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church, 451 U.S. at 775, 101 S.Ct. 2142. The program, now set out in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3301–3311 (West 2011 & Supp.2013) (the FUTA), imposes a federal excise tax on all employers, except those specifically exempted by Congress. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 396–97, 102 S.Ct. 2498, 73 L.Ed.2d 93 (1982). Congress further provided that employers could avoid a significant portion of the Federal excise tax by payment into federally-approved State unemployment programs where those were available. Id. at 397, 102 S.Ct. 2498.⁵

In 1936, the Texas Legislature established the Texas unemployment compensation system. See Act of Oct. 26, 1936, 44th Leg., 3d C.S., ch. 482, 1936 Tex. Gen. Laws 1993, 1993. The stated purpose of the legislation was “to provide an orderly system of contributions for the care of the justifiably unemployed during times of economic difficulty, thereby preserving and...