Spiezio v. Martinez

653 F.Supp.3d 8

Mary Anne SPIEZIO, as Administratrix of the Estate of Robert Amrhein, Plaintiff, v. Darlene MARTINEZ, Defendant.

1:21-CV-1254 (LEK/ML)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

Signed January 31, 2023

Elmer R. Keach, III, Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, P.C., Albany, NY, for Plaintiff.

Amanda K. Kuryluk, New York State Attorney General, Albany, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

LAWRENCE E. KAHN, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This action concerns the death of Robert Amrhein ("Plaintiff-Decedent"), who died in a car accident while in custody of the New York State Office for People with Developmental Disabilities ("OPWDD"). Dkt. No. 25 ¶¶ 6-8 ("Amended Complaint"). Plaintiff Mary Anne Spiezio ("Plaintiff") brought this action on behalf of Plaintiff-Decedent's estate against Defendant Darlene Martinez. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges Defendant was an employee of the OPWDD. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 27 ("Motion to Dismiss"). Plaintiff filed a response opposing Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 32 at 9 ("Response"). Defendant filed a reply. Dkt. No. 34 ("Reply"). For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND

On June 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an Amended Complaint after making a request to OPWDD pursuant to New York State law, under Jonathan's Law,¹ to provide the investigatory records of the New York State Justice Center and the final Accident Report of the Rensselaer County Sherriff's Department. Dkt No. 20-1 ¶ 5 ("Plaintiff's Affirmation in Support of Motion to Amend"). The Honorable Miroslav Lovric, United States Magistrate Judge, granted the motion to amend on June 28, 2022. Dkt. No. 24. The Amended Complaint brings claims against Defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause for: (1) deliberate indifference to bodily integrity and failure to provide for the safety of an institutionalized individual; (2) deliberate indifference to the medical needs of an institutionalized individual; (3) violations of Plaintiff-Decedent's substantive Due Process rights pursuant to a "special relationship" theory or a "state-created-danger" theory of liability; and (4) a supplemental State law claim for automobile negligence. Id. ¶¶ 32-54.²

A. Plaintiff's Recitation of the Facts³

On June 9, 2020, Plaintiff-Decedent, a resident of an OPWDD Group Home in Cambridge, New York, was transported by Defendant from his group home to a medical appointment in Albany, New York. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was acting "pursuant to her job duties as an employee of OPWDD." Id. ¶ 6.⁴ Plaintiff-Decedent was involuntarily committed to the custody of OPWDD due to his severe developmental disabilities. Id. ¶ 11. Defendant drove Plaintiff-Decedent in a Chevrolet passenger van owned by OPWDD, pursuant to her job as an employee of OPWDD. Id. ¶ 6. While in transport, in the southbound lane of State Route 40 in the Town of Schaghticoke, New York, Defendant "swerved off of the road to the right, colliding with a grove of trees." Id. ¶ 7. "[T]he brunt of the accident was borne by the passenger side of the vehicle, where [Plaintiff-Decedent] Robert Amrhein was sitting in the front seat." Id. Plaintiff states: "Martinez claims that she s[w]erved the vehicle to avoid a ground hog in the roadway." Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint included "several snapshots of the video of the accident, captured on the camera of a business on Route 40 . . . ." Id.

According to Plaintiff, Defendant violated OPWDD's "strict policies and procedures" for transportation of its residents by putting Plaintiff-Decedent in the front seat, rather than the back seat of the vehicle as required by OPWDD. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff asserts that Plaintiff-Decedent "would most likely not have been seriously harmed had he been restrained in the back seat" and the Amended Complaint included a photograph allegedly showing the severe damage to the front, right-hand passenger's seat of the Chevrolet van, where Plaintiff-Decedent was allegedly sitting. Id. ¶ 12.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant was under the influence of prescriptions Adderall and Xanax and that this is "confirmed by bloodwork taken by the Rensselaer County Sheriff's Department." Id. ¶ 15. Additionally, Plaintiff states that "Adderall was found in [Defendant's] purse on June 9, 2020, with a prescription being made out to her." Id. ¶ 15. Defendant allegedly denied the use of Adderall to the Rensselaer County Sheriff's Department and investigators from the New York State Justice Center. Id. ¶ 22. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also asserts that on April 29, 2022, an unnamed eyewitness to the Defendant's conduct testified in a deposition before Plaintiff's counsel that Defendant "appeared to be under the influence of Adderall, given her nervous behavior, and constantly repeating of words and phrases . . . ." Id. at ¶ 19.

Moreover, Plaintiff states that Defendant "was driving the transport van in a reckless manner and at an unsafe rate of speed, in addition to falling asleep because of her use of prescription medications." Id. at ¶ 14. According the Amended Complaint, on May 2, 2022, another unnamed eyewitness was deposed by Plaintiff's counsel and testified that Defendant's "operation of the transport van on June 9, 2020[,] was consistent with someone who had fallen asleep at the wheel." Id. at ¶ 20.

Following the crash, Defendant was "largely unharmed," but Plaintiff-Decedent "was pinned in his seat for several minutes until he died." Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff-Decedent "was conscious for a period of time after the accident" and that Plaintiff-Decedent "died an agonizing . . . death, having suffered from severe internal injuries." Id. ¶ 8. According to Plaintiff, Defendant made no effort to provide first aid to Plaintiff-Decedent. Id. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff states that ultimately Defendant "pled guilty to a violation of New York State's Vehicle and Traffic Law" and "had her license suspended for causing a fatal car accident." Id. at ¶ 24.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's "conduct goes beyond negligence . . . as she was clearly and deliberately indifferent to Robert Amrhein's constitutional rights given the grossly negligent and reckless manner in which she conducted herself on June 9, 2020." Id. at ¶ 10.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Section 1983 states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States] shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), "a party may assert the following [defense] by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must plead "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim has facial plausibility "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This plausibility standard, "is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The Supreme Court has stated that while "the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). In the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "construe[s] plaintiffs' complaint liberally, 'accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor.' " Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2008)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Request to Exclude Darlene Martinez's Deposition Transcript

In her Reply, Defendant requested the exclusion of a deposition transcript of Darlene Martinez used in a separate state law action, which was filed in Plaintiff's Response to the Motion to Dismiss. Reply at 1-3; Dkt. No. 32-1. Defendant argues that "a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Id. at 1. In addition, Defendant argues that " 'the court cannot consider matters outside the pleadings, such as a deposition transcript [from another action].' " Id. at 2 (quoting Iannuzzi v. Washington Bank, No. 07-CV-964, 2008 WL 3978189, at *6 n.2, 2008...