Spiteri v. Russo

CARMEL SPITERI, Plaintiff, v. JOHN LEO RUSSO, ARTHUR GEORGE TRAKAS, SUPREME COURT JUDGE FERNANDOCAMACHO, in his official capacity, NEW YORK STATE GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO,in his official capacity, NEW YORK STATE SEX OFFENDER BOARD OF EXAMINERSCOMMISSIONER MICHELLE HARRINGTON, in her official capacity, THE NEW YORK STATESEX OFFENDER REGISTRY DIRECTOR MICHELLE MULLIGAN, in his official capacity,NEW YORK STATE, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFENDER UNIT,and DOES 1-10, Defendants.

12-CV-2780 (MKB) (RLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: September 7, 2013

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Carmel Spiteri brings the above-captioned action pro se seeking a writ of mandamus, declaratory relief and injunctive relief against Defendants John Leo Russo and Arthur George Trakas, attorneys practicing in New York, (collectively the "Attorney Defendants"), the Governor of New York, Andrew Cuomo, New York State Court Judge, Fernando Camacho, Michelle Harrington as Commissioner of New York State Sex Offender Board of Examiners (the "Board"), Michelle Mulligan as Director of the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services¹ (the "Division"), New York State, (collectively the "StateDefendants"), the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") Sex Offender Unit and Does 1-10. Plaintiff asserts various federal constitutional claims against the State Defendants and federal and state law claims against the Attorney Defendants. On September 3, 2012, Plaintiff moved for injunctive relief to, among other things, enjoin the State Defendants from "imposing sanctions, or taking any action" with respect to Plaintiff's registration as a sex offender. On February 15, 2013, the State Defendants and the Attorney Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint and in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief. The Court heard oral argument on June 14, 2012. For the reasons set forth below, the State Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint is granted and the complaint is dismissed with prejudice in its entirety as to the State Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief as to the State Defendants is denied. The Attorney Defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint as to Plaintiff's federal claims are granted and these claims are dismissed with prejudice. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims and dismisses those claims against the Attorney Defendants without prejudice.

Table of Contents

I. Procedural Background....................................................................................................... 3

II. Factual Background............................................................................................................6

a. Plaintiff's California Conviction.........................................................................................6

b. Plaintiff Living and Working in New York........................................................................8

c. Plaintiff's New York State SORA Proceedings................................................................10

III. Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 16

a. Standard of Review...........................................................................................................16

i. Rule 12(b)(1)............................................................................................................ 16

ii. Rule 12(b)(6)............................................................................................................ 16

b. SORA Legislative Scheme...............................................................................................18

i. General Provisions...................................................................................................18

ii. Nonresident Worker Provisions............................................................................... 21

iii. Level III Sex Offender Requirements...................................................................... 22

c. State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint ....................................................... 24

i. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.......................................................................................24

ii. Absolute Immunity — Judge Camacho...................................................................29

iii. Sovereign Immunity................................................................................................. 32

d. Plaintiff's Substantive Claims Against the State Defendants...........................................42

i. Procedural Due Process — Generally...................................................................... 42

ii. Due Process — Vagueness ...................................................................................... 50

iii. Substantive Due Process.......................................................................................... 55

iv. Equal Protection....................................................................................................... 65

v. Privileges and Immunities........................................................................................ 74

vi. Right to Travel ......................................................................................................... 77

vii. Ex Post Facto...........................................................................................................79

viii. Cruel and Unusual Punishment................................................................................ 80

ix. Full Faith and Credit ................................................................................................ 81

x. Premption ................................................................................................................. 84

xi. Commerce Clause and Dormant Commerce Clause................................................ 90

e. Plaintiff's Substantive Claims Against the Attorney Defendants..................................... 92

i. RICO Claim ............................................................................................................. 93

ii. RICO Conspiracy................................................................................................... 111

iii. FLSA ...................................................................................................................... 112

iv. State Law Claims...................................................................................................125

f. Motions to Strike............................................................................................................. 129

g. Motions to Take Judicial Notice..................................................................................... 132

IV. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................134

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff commenced this action on May 31, 2012 by filing a complaint seeking, among other things, damages, declaratory and injunctive relief against several individuals includingGovernor Cuomo, the Attorney Defendants, Judge Camacho,² the Queens District Attorney, Richard Brown, and several agencies including the Sex Offender Monitoring Unit of the NYPD's Special Victims Division, the Division, the Board, and others. Plaintiff served only the Attorney Defendants with the initial complaint.

On August 24, 2012, Plaintiff filed the amended complaint (the "Complaint") seeking a writ of mandamus, declaratory relief and injunctive relief against the Attorney Defendants, Governor Cuomo, Judge Camacho, Harrington,³ Mulligan, the NYPD Sex Offender Unit and Does 1-10.⁴ In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts several constitutional claims against the State Defendants including violations of the Due Process, Equal Protection, Ex Post Facto and Full Faith and Credit Clauses. In his opposition to the State Defendants' motion to dismiss theComplaint, Plaintiff asserts additional constitutional claims for cruel and unusual punishment and violations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Commerce Clause, Dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause, as well as a right of access to the courts and right to travel claims. As to the Attorney Defendants, Plaintiff asserts several federal claims, including Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") enterprise, RICO conspiracy and Fair Labor Standard Act ("FLSA") unpaid overtime along with a Thirteenth Amendment constitutional claim. In addition, Plaintiff asserts state law claims against the Attorney Defendants for unjust enrichment, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, legal malpractice, unpaid wages, unpaid overtime wages and unpaid spread-of-hours wages.

By letter dated September 3, 2012, Plaintiff sought to file a motion to seek a temporary restraining order to, among other things, "declare that Plaintiff [was] not subject" to New York State Sex Offender Registration Act ("SORA") requirements, enjoin the State Defendants from imposing sanctions or taking any other action against Plaintiff, and enjoin the Attorney Defendants from "[m]entioning, discussing, annotating and/or documenting in any of their pleadings, motions and/or legal papers" that Plaintiff has or continues to violate New York State or federal sex offender registration requirements. (Docket Entry No. 52, Sep. 3, 2012 Letter.) On September 28, 2012, the Court converted Plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order to a request for a preliminary injunction.⁵ On October 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion for "Permanent Injunction" which the Court has construed as a motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiff requests relief from New York SORA registration requirements, including relief from having to return...