Spreadbury v. Bitterroot Pub. Library

862 F.Supp.2d 1054

Michael E. SPREADBURY, Plaintiff,

v.BITTERROOT PUBLIC LIBRARY, City Of Hamilton, Lee Enterprises, Inc., and Boone Karlberg P.C., Defendants.

No. CV 11–64–M–DWM–JCL.

United States District Court,

D. Montana,

Missoula Division.

May 30, 2012.

Michael E. Spreadbury, Hamilton, MT, pro se.

Natasha Prinzing Jones, Thomas J. Leonard, William L. Crowley, Boone Karlberg, P.C., Anita Harper Poe, Jeffrey Brandon Smith, Garlington Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, MT, for Defendants.

ORDER

DONALD W. MOLLOY, District Judge.

March 6, 2012, 856 F.Supp.2d 1195, 2012 WL 734163 (D.Mont.2012), United States Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch entered Findings and Recommendations (doc. 250) concerning two summary judgment motions (docs. 148, 150) filed by Defendants Bitterroot Public Library (“the Library”), City of Hamilton (“the City”), Dr. Robert Brophy, Trista Smith, Nansu Roddy, Jerry Steele, Steve Snavely, Steven Bruner–Murphy, Ryan Oster, Kenneth Bell, and Jennifer Lint (collectively, the “Municipal Defendants”). Judge Lynch recommended the motions be granted in part and denied in part.

Specifically, he determined disputed issues of fact remained as to the following issues: (1) whether Officer Snavely negligently investigated Plaintiff Michael E. Spreadbury's purported trespass on Library property on August 20, 2009; (2) whether Officer Bruner–Murphy negligently investigated allegations that Spreadbury was stalking the Library Director; and (3) whether Robert Brophy, the Chairman of the Bitterroot Public Library's Board of Trustees, negligently revoked Spreadbury's library privileges. Because Judge Lynch determined these negligence claims survived, he also denied summary judgment on Spreadbury's claims for punitive damages and for injunctive relief relating to access to the Library.¹

The Library and the City timely filed objections (doc. 256), and Spreadbury, proceeding pro se, filed a “Response to City, Library Objection to Court Order, Findings Doc. # 250” (doc. 257). Construed liberally, his filing appears to include objections to Judge Lynch's findings as well as a response to the arguments of the City and Library. The parties are entitled to de novo review of those findings or recommendations to which they object. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The portions of the Findings and Recommendation not specifically objected to are reviewed for clear error. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Bus. Mach., Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir.1981).

For the reasons discussed below, Judge Lynch's Findings and Recommendations are adopted in part and rejected in part. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all issues.

I. Spreadbury's Objections

A. Termination of Library Privileges

Spreadbury was not wrongfully deprived of his statutory and constitutional liberty interest in the right to use a public library when the Library Defendants ² banned him from the premises. The record demonstrates that he intimidated various library staff and patrons after the Library refused his request to include a letter he had written to President Obama in its collection. We all have a right to use our public libraries. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1255 (3rd Cir.1992) (recognizing “the right to some level of access to a public library, the quintessential locus of the receipt of information”). But the right is not unqualified. Id. A person may be constitutionally deprived of a liberty interest if afforded due process, and Spreadbury was granted adequate procedural protections. Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F.3d 708, 716 (9th Cir.2011).

Judge Lynch properly identified the Library as a limited public forum.

[A]s a limited public forum, the Library is obligated only to permit the public to exercise rights that are consistent with the nature of the Library and consistent with the government's intent in designating the Library as a public forum. Other activities need not be tolerated.

Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1262. A public library may refuse service to anyone who willfully violates a library policy. Mont.Code Ann. § 22–1–311. The relevant Library Operation Policy in place at the time stated:

Patron behavior that becomes disruptive to other library users or staff or constitutes a public nuisance is not allowed and the person(s) will be asked to leave. The library reserves the right to refuse service to anyone not complying with established library policies.

(Quoted in doc. 152–10). Contrary to Spreadbury's assertions, the policy does not state that the Library may only refuse service to a disruptive patron if it has previously asked the patron to leave. Such an interpretation would require the Court to insert words in the policy that are not there.

Spreadbury willfully engaged in behavior that became disruptive. On at least two occasions prior to the termination of his library privileges, he confronted staff in an intimidating manner. (Docs. 152–1, –7, –8, –9; 158–1, –2.) Additionally, his reference to the Unabomber in a letter to the Library director could reasonably be construed as threatening. (Doc. 152–4.) Willfulness “does not require any intent to violate the law [or] to injure another.” Mont.Code Ann. § 1–1–204(5). It is enough that Spreadbury had a “purpose or willingness,” id., to confront staff and reference the Unabomber, and a reasonable person would see his behavior as disruptive. Accordingly, Spreadbury violated a Library policy, and the Library could refuse him service so long as it provided him the minimum due process requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Hill v. Derrick, 2006 WL 1620226, *8 (M.D.Pa.2006).

The Library provided adequate procedural protections. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (describing the three factors a court must weigh in determining the adequacy of the process by which a person was deprived of a liberty interest). Based on repeated disruptive incidents that frightened staff, he was given written notice that he was banned from the premises and told the reason why. (Doc. 152–10). He was also afforded an opportunity to be heard. He emailed a member of the Board of Trustees requesting permission to attend a meeting to argue that his rights should be restored, and he submitted a Reconsideration Request Form to Library staff again demanding his letter be accepted into the Library's collection. (Docs. 152–6, –13, –14). The Library considered and denied his requests for reconsideration, and the Library Board supported the decisions. (Doc. 152–6). Finally, the ban furthered the government's significant interest in maintaining the peaceful character of a library. Brown v. State of Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142, 86 S.Ct. 719, 15 L.Ed.2d 637 (1966) (noting a library is “a place dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty”). The Library was not required to follow the specific procedures Spreadbury believes it should have, and it provided sufficient process to protect Spreadbury's limited liberty interest.

“Prohibiting disruptive behavior is perhaps the clearest and most direct way to achieve maximum Library use.” Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1263 (upholding a library rule prohibiting disruptive behavior). Unfortunately, Spreadbury has continued to engage in disruptive behavior, resulting in a criminal trespass charge, an order of protection that has been affirmed by the Montana Supreme Court,³ and his nolo contendere plea to felony intimidation.

B. Qualified Immunity of City Officers

Spreadbury disputes Judge Lynch's finding that Officer Snavely, who investigated him for criminally trespassing on Library property, is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 257 at 4–6.) He insists there is a clearly established constitutional right not to be investigated for trespass on public property. ( Id. at 5.) He is incorrect. There is no “clearly established” right to be free from investigation, and the criminal trespass charge was not clearly precluded under Montana law.

There is no constitutional right not to be investigated by law enforcement for suspected violations of the law. E.g. S.E.C. v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742, 104 S.Ct. 2720, 81 L.Ed.2d 615 (1984) (an investigation by the SEC into possible violations of securities laws does not implicate the Due Process or the Sixth Amendment); Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. System of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir.2010) (allegations that defamation by a state actor impaired future employment opportunities or caused psychological trauma are insufficient to invoke constitutional protection from being investigated); Aponte v. Calderon, 284 F.3d 184, 193 (1st Cir.2002) (“Investigations alone do not trigger due process rights.”); United States v. Crump, 934 F.2d 947, 957 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Trayer, 898 F.2d 805, 808 (D.C.Cir.1990) ( “But, of course, there is no constitutional right to be free of investigation.”).

Spreadbury argues that it is not a violation of the law for a member of the public to be on public land even if he has been banned from the property. Even assuming there is a right not to be investigated for noncriminal conduct, it is not clearly established under Montana law that criminal trespass is inapplicable on public land. “[A] person commits the offenseof criminal trespass to property if the person knowingly ... enters or remains unlawfully in or upon the premises of another.” Mont.Code Ann. § 45–6–203(1). “Property of another” includes real property “in which a person other than the offender has an interest that the offender has no authority to defeat or impair, even though the offender may have an interest in the property.” § 45–2–101(62). The privilege to enter on the premises of another “may be revoked at any time by personal communication of notice by the landowner or other authorized person.” § 45–6–201(1). And as discussed above, a Library is authorized to restrict access to patrons if...