Sprenger v. Bickle

307 Mich.App. 411

861 N.W.2d 52

SPRENGER

v.BICKLE.

Docket No. 317822.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 9, 2014, at Petoskey.

Decided Oct. 23, 2014, at 9:15 a.m.

Phelps Legal Group, PLC (by Eric W. Phelps, Traverse City), for plaintiff.

Law Offices of Paul T. Jarboe (by Paul T. Jarboe ) for defendant.

Before: MURPHY, C.J., and SAWYER and M.J. KELLY, JJ.

Opinion

MURPHY, C.J.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint regarding paternity and denying plaintiff's motion for genetic testing. Defendant cross-appeals that same order with respect to the trial court's denial of her request for an award of attorney fees and costs as sanctions under MCR 2.114. We affirm.

The paternity dispute between the parties, and more specifically the issue regarding plaintiff's standing to pursue a paternity complaint, was previously before this Court, resulting in a published opinion in Sprenger v. Bickle, 302 Mich.App. 400, 839 N.W.2d 59 (2013). The basic factual premise of the litigation was previously set forth by this Court as follows:

Plaintiff alleges that he is the biological father of a minor child born to defendant in November 2011, while she was lawfully married to someone else. Plaintiff and defendant were briefly engaged after defendant's divorce from Adam Bickle in April 2011. Although the parties dispute whether defendant was pregnant before her divorce, mutual friends of the couple and members of both their families assert that within days of the divorce, defendant and plaintiff were sharing the news that they were expecting a child. The engagement between plaintiff and defendant ended; in August 2011, defendant remarried Adam and they were still married when she gave birth three months later.

In December 2011, plaintiff filed a paternity action under the Paternity Act [MCL 722.711 et seq. ], alleging himself to be the biological father of the child and requesting the court to determine issues of legal and physical custody, parenting time, and child support. In response, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting lack of standing, MCR 2.116(C)(5), and failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, MCR 2.116(C)(8). In an April 6, 2012 ruling, the circuit court determined that plaintiff did not have standing and granted defendant's motion to dismiss.... [Id. at 402–403, 839 N.W.2d 59.]

This Court affirmed, ruling that the trial court had correctly determined that plaintiff lacked standing under the Paternity Act. Id. at 404–405, 839 N.W.2d 59. The panel observed that “[u]nless and until defendant and her husband ask a court to declare that the child was born out of wedlock, plaintiff lacks standing to claim paternity under the Paternity Act.” Id. at 404, 839 N.W.2d 59. The Court concluded its opinion by stating:

[T]he lower court dismissed plaintiff's case for lack of standing just weeks before the Revocation of Paternity Act became effective. Plaintiff filed a separate lawsuit under this new act, and that case is still pending. We have not been called upon to decide whether plaintiff has standing under the Revocation of Paternity Act. Rather, this case concerns whether plaintiff has standing under the Paternity Act. The majority holds the trial court correctly determined that he does not. [Id. at 409, 839 N.W.2d 59.]

We are now confronted with plaintiff's new action regarding paternity brought under the Revocation of Paternity Act (RPA), MCL 722.1431 et seq., which was dismissed on the basis that plaintiff once again lacked standing. The RPA generally provides a court with authority to “[d]etermine that a child was born out of wedlock” and to “[m]ake a determination of paternity and enter an order of filiation[.]” MCL 722.1443(2)(c) and (d). MCL 722.1441 “governs an action to determine that a presumed father is not a child's father,” MCL 722.1435(3), and this is the nature of plaintiff's action in this case. Plaintiff's new suit was predicated and relied on MCL 722.1441(3)(a) and (c), which provide in pertinent part:

(3) If a child has a presumed father, a court may determine that the child is born out of wedlock for the purpose of establishing the child's paternity if an action is filed by an alleged father and any of the following applies:

(a) All of the following apply:

(i ) The alleged father did not know or have reason to know that the mother was married at the time of conception.

(ii ) The presumed father, the alleged father, and the child's mother at some time mutually and openly acknowledged a biological relationship between the alleged father and the child.

(iii ) The action is filed within 3 years after the child's birth. The requirement that an action be filed within 3 years after the child's birth does not apply to an action filed on or before 1 year after the effective date of this act.

(iv ) Either the court determines the child's paternity or the child's paternity will be established under the law of this state or another jurisdiction if the child is determined to be born out of wedlock.

* * *

(c) Both of the following apply:

(i ) The mother was not married at the time of conception.

(ii ) The action is filed within 3 years after the child's birth. The requirement that an action be filed within 3 years after the child's birth does not apply to an action filed on or before 1 year after the effective date of this act.^{[ 1 ]}

As is clearly evident when examining these provisions, MCL 722.1441(3)(a) concerns situations in which the child at issue was conceived during wedlock, while MCL 722.1441(3)(c) concerns situations wherein the child was not conceived during the marriage, negating the need to supply the extra proofs required under Subsection (3)(a). Because of questions concerning the timing of conception here in relationship to entry of the divorce judgment, plaintiff chose to cover both possibilities encompassed by the two subsections. The trial court, following an evidentiary hearing, dismissed the new paternity action and denied plaintiff's motion for genetic testing. The court found that plaintiff had not demonstrated that conception occurred after the divorce judgment was entered for purposes of MCL 722.1441(3)(c) and that plaintiff knew defendant was married at the time of conception for purposes of MCL 722.1441(3)(a) if conception had actually occurred during the marriage. The trial court expressed that “the medical testimony demonstrated that it was highly likely that the defendant was married at the time of conception.” The trial court declined to award defendant any costs or attorney fees, given that the RPA was new and plaintiff had made a “legitimate run” under the RPA.

On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court's findings under MCL 722.1441(3)(a) and (c). We initially note that plaintiff repeatedly speaks of the court's alleged failure to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to plaintiff; however, summary-disposition principles are not applicable here, as the court conducted an evidentiary hearing and made factual findings based on the evidence presented. Under the RPA, a trial court is permitted to conduct an evidentiary hearing “at its discretion when there are contested factual issues and a hearing would assist the trial court in making an informed decision on the issue[s].” Parks v. Parks, 304 Mich.App. 232, 239–240, 850 N.W.2d 595 (2014). “When reviewing a decision related to the [RPA], this Court reviews the trial court's factual findings, if any, for clear error,” which occurs when this Court is firmly and definitely convinced that a mistake was made. Glaubius v. Glaubius, 306 Mich.App. 157, 164, 855 N.W.2d 221 (2014), citing Parks, 304 Mich.App. at 237, 850 N.W.2d 595. Our review is de novo with respect to construction of the RPA. Glaubius, 306 Mich.App. at 164, 855 N.W.2d 221.

With respect to the requirement in MCL 722.1441(3)(a)(i ) (“alleged father did not know or have reason to know that the mother was married at the time of conception”), we shall begin with the assumption that the child was conceived during defendant's first marriage to Adam Bickle, considering that conception during wedlock is a necessary attribute of proceeding under Subsection (3)(a). Plaintiff specifically testified that he knew defendant was married up until April 8, 2011, when defendant's divorce from Bickle was finalized. And plaintiff also conceded, as did defendant, that plaintiff and defendant engaged in sexual relations before entry of the divorce judgment. Therefore, keeping in mind for now our conception-timing assumption, plaintiff necessarily failed to establish that he did not know that defendant was married at the time of conception as required by MCL 722.1441(3)(a)(i ). Indeed, the evidence conclusively established the contrary.

Plaintiff argues that because the date of conception could conceivably have been either before or after the divorce was finalized, it could not be concluded that he knew or had reason to know that defendant was married at the time of conception. This argument fails to appreciate the structure of MCL 722.1441 and the relationship between and functions of Subsections (3)(a) and (c). Again, if conception occurred during wedlock, Subsection (3)(a) needs to be further examined and Subsection (3)(c) is rendered irrelevant or unsupportable, whereas if conception occurred out of wedlock, Subsection (3)(c) is triggered and Subsection (3)(a) is rendered irrelevant or unsupportable. In analyzing MCL 722.1441(3)(a), there needs to be a finding or an assumption that conception occurred during the marriage. Under plaintiff's faulty theory, any time an uncertainty exists regarding whether conception occurred during or out of wedlock, Subsection (3)(a)(i ) would be satisfied, which clearly was not the intent of the Legislature. If the child here was conceived during the marriage, plaintiff was fully aware that defendant was still married given his testimony. MCL 722.1441(3)(a) clearly envisions...