Springer v. (1) U.S. Attorney for the N. Dist. of Okla.

LINDSEY KENT SPRINGER, Plaintiff, v. (1) UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OFOKLAHOMA, Danny C. Williams, Sr., Officially;(2) UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Eric D. Holder, Jr., Officially;(3) EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, Susan B. Gerson, Officially;(4) OFFICE OF INFORMATION POLICY, Sean R. O'Neill, Officially;(5) DIVISION COUNSEL FOR FOIA AND PA MATTERS, Carmen M. Banerjee, Officially; Defendants.

Case No. 15-CV-0142-JED-FHM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

October 30, 2015

OPINION AND ORDER

This is a civil action brought under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq. Plaintiff, Lindsey Kent Springer, is a federal prisoner and appears pro se. On August 3, 2015, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, to dismiss (Docs. 27, 28). In support of the motion for summary judgment, Defendants provided the Declaration of Princina Stone, an Attorney-Advisor with Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act (FOIA/PA) staff of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA), United States Department of Justice (DOJ) (Doc. 28-1), and the Declaration of Linda M. Richardson, an Administrative Services Assistant for the DOJ, EOUSA (Doc. 28-2). Plaintiff filed responses in opposition to Defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment (Docs. 32, 33), along with his own declaration (Doc. 34). Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff's response (Doc. 45). Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file surreplies (Doc. 54), and the surreplies were filed of record (Docs. 55, 56). Defendants filed a response to the motion for leave to file a surreply (Doc. 60) to which Plaintiff replied (Doc. 66), and Defendants filed a motion to strike the surreplies (Doc. 61), to which Plaintiff responded (Doc. 65). Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff's response (Doc. 69).

Additionally, Plaintiff filed motions to disqualify Danny Williams, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, and Cathryn McClanahan, an Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma (Doc. 29); to substitute a party (Doc. 30); to strike Defendants' motion to dismiss, Doc. 27, as identical to their motion for summary judgment, Doc. 28, or, alternatively, for extension of time to respond (Doc. 31); "[F]or Order Making Public the Appointment by Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., Appointing Thomas Scott Woodward Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 546(a)" (Doc. 43); and to strike all "Docket Entries signed by Cathryn D. McClanahan" (Doc. 52), along with a declaration (Doc. 53) . Defendants filed responses (Docs. 38-40, 44, 58) and a motion to strike the declaration (Doc. 59). Plaintiff filed replies to these responses (Docs. 49, 50, 47, 46, 63) and a response to the motion to strike (Doc. 64). Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff's response to the motion to strike (Doc. 68).

Plaintiff filed a "Motion for Removal of Magistrate Frank H. McCarthy," along with a declaration (Docs. 15, 16), and Plaintiff also filed a "Notice to the Court" (Doc. 41). Defendants filed a motion to strike the "Notice to the Court" (Doc. 42), Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 48), and Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 57). Additionally, Plaintiff filed a motion for limited discovery related to the appointment of McClanahan (Doc. 62), to which Defendants responded (Doc. 67).

For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment shall be granted. In addition, Defendants' motion to dismiss the individual defendants, sued in their official capacity, shall be granted. Plaintiff's motions to disqualify Magistrate Judge McCarthy, Danny Williams, and Cathryn McClanahan shall be denied. Plaintiff's motion to substitute a party shall be granted. Plaintiff's motion for order making public shall be denied. Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a surreply is granted and the surreplies shall remain filed of record. All other pending motions shall be declared moot.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

A. Motion to Disqualify Magistrate Judge Frank H. McCarthy

Plaintiff filed a motion titled "Motion for Removal of Magistrate Frank H. McCarthy" (Doc. 15). Plaintiff states that Magistrate Judge McCarthy "should not be allowed to sit with this Court for any purpose the laws or Congress and Constitution would allow Magistrates to conduct involving Plaintiff," id. at 7, because "due [to Plaintiff's] persistent attempt to obtain constitutional justice, [Magistrate Judge McCarthy] could not keep an objective reasoning involving my case herein in regard to me personally." Doc. 16 at 2, ¶ 10. Plaintiff requests that another magistrate judge be appointed pursuant to "LCvR 40." Doc. 15 at 8.

Plaintiff seeks disqualification of Magistrate Judge McCarthy based on an allegation of bias or prejudice. For disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a movant must show that a reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality; "rumor, speculation, and opinions are not sufficient." Cauthon v. Rogers, 116 F.3d 1334, 1336 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1305 (10th Cir. 1997)); see United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993). For disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), the movant must establish that the judge has personal bias or prejudices. Disqualification must be predicated 'upon extrajudicial conduct rather than on judicial conduct,' and upon 'a personal bias "as distinguished from [a] judicial one," arising "out of the judge's background and association" and not from the judge's view of the law."' Green v. Nevers, 111 F.3d 1295, 1303-04 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). "Bias or prejudice," as used in § 455(b)(1), refers to a "favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion" only if it was "somehow wrongful or inappropriate." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994) (emphasis in original).

The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to completion of the judge's task.

Id. at 550-51.

According to Plaintiff, Magistrate Judge McCarthy issued a search warrant in Plaintiff's prior criminal case. Doc. 15 at 1. Plaintiff states that he attempted to challenge evidence gathered pursuant to the search warrant in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding, Doc. 16 at 1-2, ¶¶ 2, 4-5. Plaintiff further states that the Tenth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability, id. at 2, ¶ 6, and that, as of the time he filed this motion, his Application for Certificate of Appealability is "pending before Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, as the Circuit Justice over the Tenth Circuit." Doc. 15 at 2. Additionally, Plaintiff states that he "plan[s] on raising issue under Habeas Corpus the erroneous orders surrounding suppression denial if my attempt to obtain a Certificate of Appealability is ultimately unsuccessful." Doc. 16 at 2, ¶ 8. Plaintiff asserts that because he is "still in controversy over the actions of Magistrate McCarthy taken on September 15, 2005, and thereafter," id. at 2, ¶ 10, and has chosen to engage in "almost 10 years of litigation with apparently no end in sight,"¹ Doc. 15 at 8, Magistrate Judge McCarthy "could not keep an objective reasoning involving [Plaintiff's] case herein in regard to [Plaintiff] personally." Doc. 16 at 2, ¶ 10.

Plaintiff fails to allege facts that demonstrate personal bias or prejudice. Nowhere in Plaintiff's motion or in his declaration does he state any facts supporting his conclusory statement that Magistrate Judge McCarthy would not be able to act reasonably towards Plaintiff. Even though Plaintiff continues to challenge the search warrant issued by Magistrate Judge McCarthy, the Supreme Court in Liteky noted that "[i]t has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant." Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551. Of greater significance, the issues in this case are unrelated to the search warrant issued by Magistrate Judge McCarthy a decade ago. For those reasons, Plaintiff's "Motion for Removal of Magistrate Frank H. McCarthy" shall be denied.

B. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Named Defendants/Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Party

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that "all individuals named as federal defendants must be dismissed" because "[t]he only proper defendant to a FOIA suit is a federal agency, not the individual components or officials." Doc. 27 at 1-2 n.1 (citation omitted). In addition, Plaintiff filed a motion to substitute a party (Doc. 30) requesting that Attorney General Loretta Lynch be substituted as a defendant in place of former Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr. In response, Defendants assert that the "substitution of one individual federal defendant for another would be improper" because the Court should dismiss all named defendants from this action. Doc. 38 at 2.

FOIA actions are focused on reforming the unlawful actions of agencies and not of individual employees within those agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (". . . the district court . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.") In a FOIA action, a plaintiff cannot sue agency employees in their individual capacity. See Kinard v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil No. 05-452, 2006 WL 1774366, at *4 (D.D.C. June 27, 2006) (unpublished)² (dismissing defendants sued in both their individual and official capacities) ("Plaintiff...