Springer v. Runyan

1

Lewis Springer and Karen Springer, Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners v. Wes Runyan, Tamy Runyan, Tracy Wilson, and David Wilson, Defendants Below, Respondents

No. 22-586

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

May 20, 2024

(Summers County CC-45-2021-C-39)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioners Lewis Springer and Karen Springer ("petitioners") appeal the Circuit Court of Summers County's June 23 2022, order granting Respondents Wes Runyan, Tamy Runyan,^[1]Tracy Wilson, and David Wilson's^[2] (collectively "respondents") motion to dismiss filed pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).^[3] The parties are current or former owners of tracts of land in the Big Bend Mountain Retreat ("BBMR") in the Talcott District of Summers County. The petitioners contended that the respondents were unjustly enriched because respondents used water from an underground well ("the well property") owned by the BBMR water association without paying for it. The respondents argued that the petitioners' unjust enrichment claim is barred by the doctrine of laches. The circuit court determined that the petitioners' claim was barred by the doctrine of laches and accordingly granted the respondents' motion to dismiss.

After careful review of the briefs of the parties, their oral arguments, the appendix record, and the applicable law, we determine that the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. See id. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's order and remand the case for further proceedings. Because this case presents no substantial question of law, we find that it satisfies the "limited circumstances" of Rule 21(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure and is appropriate for disposition by a memorandum decision rather than an opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The parties are or were landowners in BBMR and this litigation concerns the well property and the use of water in BBMR. Following litigation in 2010 concerning the use of BBMR well property the circuit court ordered the formation of a water association to accept ownership of the well property. A 2012 deed ("water association deed") transferred property to BBMR Water Utility Association ("water association")^[4] and provided that the water association would be comprised of those landowners who use the water system and "[t]he Association will fully account to its members for expenses and capital expenditures." The water association deed further provided that all BBMR residents "will pay their pro-rata share of the costs of operating the water system" and will "have an absolute right to use the water system upon payment of the rates established by the Association[.]" Notwithstanding the language of the water association deed, it does not appear from the record that a formal water association was ever created or that water rates were ever established.

The Runyan respondents purchased their lot in BBMR on March 11, 2021, and their deed referenced the water association deed. Following their purchase, they hooked their mobile home to the well property water access port and thereafter, although the petitioners purportedly informed them of the requirement that they pay for the water, they refused to do so. The petitioners then placed a lock on the well house and on the Runyan respondents' water meter, thus denying them access to the water. The Runyan respondents filed an action for injunctive relief in circuit court, seeking to enjoin the petitioners from blocking access to the well water. Ultimately the parties stipulated to the entry of a permanent injunction enjoining the petitioners from blocking access to the well property.

The petitioners have owned property in BBMR since before the water association deed was executed, and they claim to have expended more than $20,000 for upkeep, maintenance, operation, and preservation of the well property, including the well house and the well, to ensure access to clean, drinkable water to operate the water system. They filed the instant complaint against the respondents, claiming that the respondents have been unjustly enriched^[5] by using BBMR water without paying for either the water or any operational costs. Specifically, the petitioners alleged the following: litigation expenses in obtaining a right to the well property and then defending the water association against an injunction brought against the water association; pipe and pump replacement including costs associated with drilling; pressure washing the well house; staining the well house; payment to Mr. and Mrs. Gillis^[6] for well house repairs; locks, lighting and general fixtures for the well house; travel expenses to attend to matters related to the water association; mailing expenses; trade name registration; general property maintenance including grass cutting, weeding, ensuring proper draining, tree and brush trimming; and electric bills for the well property. With the exception of a $2,000 payment from the Wilson respondents, the petitioners maintain that they have received no other monies from the respondents for use of the well water, well operations, maintenance or repairs.

In response to the petitioners' complaint, the respondents jointly moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). They maintained that the petitioners' claim of unjust enrichment was barred by the doctrine of laches, and that the petitioners have "not pled, nor can they maintain, that there was a benefit that was retained in an inequitable and unconscionable manner." Further, they contended that the petitioners' claimed expenses were for items that did not directly impact the ability of BBMR residents to get or maintain access to the well water property. Rather, the respondents argued that many of the petitioners' alleged expenses stemmed from the petitioners' unilateral decisions to take action to further their own position, either in this case or in the prior proceedings. The respondents further claimed that they were prejudiced because the petitioners were "seeking recovery of monies allegedly expended over the course of thirteen (13) years, only one (1) of which these [respondents] have owned property in the subject area."

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss the circuit court considered two documents that were not attached to the petitioners' complaint: the water association deed, and a list of expenses exceeding $30,000 for upkeep of the well property. The list of expenses contains dates, payments, and descriptions of out-of-pocket payments purportedly made by the petitioners from 2006 to 2021.^[7] Although it is somewhat unclear, it appears from the record that this document may have been created by the petitioners and provided to the respondents during negotiations in the previous injunction proceeding.

The circuit court found that although the respondents rely on the two documents not attached to the complaint, "disposition of this case is proper under Rule 12 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure and not Rule 56." The court concluded that it could properly consider the two documents pursuant to Forshey v. Jackson, 222 W.Va. 743, 671 S.E.2d 748 (2008) (discussed infra in greater detail). As to the water association deed, the court opined "[t]he deed is not in dispute and, as a recorded instrument, is [ ] susceptible to judicial notice." Concerning the list of expenses, the court noted that "[t]he expenses listed in this document prepared by [the petitioners] are consistent with those discussed, in general terms in [the petitioners'] complaint. Furthermore, as the same were made part of the record in the related injunctive proceeding before this court, the same is susceptible to judicial notice."

Ultimately, the circuit court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss and concluded that the petitioners' complaint was barred by the doctrine of laches. The court determined that:

To bar a claim by laches, it must be shown, initially, that there has been a lack of diligence by the party against who the defense is asserted. If taken as true, Plaintiffs allege that the "association" was created when the deed was filed in February 2012. Thus, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs knew their rights or were cognizant of their interest in seeking reimbursement of any funds expended to operate the well. Despite that and despite the Plaintiffs expending money for the past ten (10) years, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have never asserted [a] claim for unjust enrichment or otherwise apparently sought reimbursement for many, if not all, of the costs for which they now seek the same. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that, aside from the instant litigation, that they have sought to seek reimbursement through any legal actions, such as a lien or a civil action, against any current or former property owner. This, at its very core, suggest that the Plaintiff has known of his alleged rights for the past ten (10) years and has failed year after year to exercise any actual or perceived right to reimbursement of any funds he may have expended.

The petitioners now appeal.^[8]

II. Standard of Review

In assessing the merits of a motion to dismiss, the circuit court must employ a stringent standard of review:

" '" 'The trial court, in appraising the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)." Syllabus Point 3, Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co., Inc., 160 W.Va. 530, 236 S.E.2d 207 (1977).' Syl. Pt. 2, Boone v. Activate Healthcare, LLC, 245 W.Va. 476, 859 S.E.2d 419 (2021)."

Syl. Pt. 2, Judy v. E. W.Va. Cmty. & Tech Coll., 246 W.Va....