Squire v. Suffolk 1st Present [Sic] Police

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KASHON K. SQUIRE, Plaintiff, v. SUFFOLK 1ST PRESENT [SIC] POLICE, DULE LATIFE, Defendants.

KASHON K. SQUIRE, Plaintiff, v. RAYMOND NEW, MATHEW CORR, Defendants.

KASHON K. SQUIRE, Plaintiff, v. SHAQUAISUR BROOKS, SUFFOLK POLICE 1ST PRESENT [SIC], PATHWAYS TO REABILATIONS [SIC], SUFFOLK COUNTY, NEW YORK STATE, Defendants.

Nos. 23-CV-2401(JS)(ST) (“Squire I”), 23-CV-2402(JS)(ST) (“Squire II”), 23-CV-2491(JS)(ST) (“Squire III”)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

July 5, 2023

For Plaintiff: Kashon K. Squire, pro se

For Defendants: No appearances.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Presently before the Court are the applications to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) filed by incarcerated pro se plaintiff Kashon K. Squire (“Plaintiff”) in the above-captioned cases. (IFP Apps., ECF No. 2, in each case.) For the reasons that follow Plaintiff's IFP applications are GRANTED; however, each Complaint is DISMISSED for failure to allege a plausible claim for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is no stranger to this Court. Prior to filing the present three Complaints, Plaintiff had six previous in forma pauperis complaints dismissed by this Court for failure to prosecute.^[1] Each of the present Complaints is sparse and is submitted on the Court's form complaint for civil rights actions under Section 1983.^[2]

I. Complaint under Docket No. 23-CV-2401 (“Squire I”)

This Complaint names the “Suffolk 1^st Present Police”, which the Court understands to be the Suffolk County Police Department's First Precinct (“First Precinct”), and Dule Latife (“Latife”). In its entirety, Plaintiff alleges that, in 2013, his

home was shot 18 time then about a week later I was shot and told to die by the responding officers as well they told that they would not call medic and interfered with medical care for my injuries. I went to police in 2018 because I neve new the person name who shot me found out his name and they said they are not going to arrest him.

(Squire I Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ II.) In the space that calls for any injuries suffered, Plaintiff wrote: “shot and the bullets hit my lungs and it almost collapse and I have a bullet in my leg and a cut down my chest.” (Id., ¶ II.A.) For relief, Plaintiff “would like the police that responded fired and my medical bills paid and $150,000 for damages to my body and pain and suffering. I'm trying to sue for failr to protect and failr to prosecute.” (Id., ¶ III.)

II. Complaint under Docket No. 23-CV-2402 (“Squire II”)

This Complaint names as defendants Raymond New (“New”), who is identified as a staff member of the shelter located at 129 Clinton Avenue in Bay Shore, New York, and Police Officer Mathew Corr (“Officer Corr”); in said Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on August 18, 2022, he:

was sleep in my bed on 8-18-22 at 8:39 AM when Raymond New came into my room wakeing me up to talk to me about calling police. He harassed me out of my sleep and I got up and closed my door and he clamed his hand got closed in the door but it didn't he called police and they tried to look me up but I felt I did nothing wrong due to the fact that he unlocked my door without knocking it was early and I was statled out of my sleep. Im being held and keep getting set up on charges. I'm being harassed there violating my 8^th Amendment. When I get free ther starting something else to lock me up.

(Squire II Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ II.) Where prompted for a description of any injuries suffered, or medical treatment required, Plaintiff left the space blank. (Id., ¶ II.A.) The relief sought by Plaintiff via this Complaint is his release from custody and to “have charges droped.” (Id., ¶ III.)

III. Complaint under Docket No. 23-CV-2491 (“Squire III”)

Like Plaintiff's Squire I Complaint, this Complaint names the First Precinct, as well as adds Shaquaisur Brooks (“Brooks”), “Pathways to Reabilitations” (“Pathways”), Suffolk County, and New York State as defendants. In its entirety, Plaintiff alleges that, “sometime in 2018” at 96 Ohio in Medford, New York:

I Kashon Squire was living at 96 Ohio Medford Root 112 the people there had problems with my spouse then there where people cross the street taking pitchers of our home. My truck happened to get tampered with and takein by the state police. My spouse comes to me and tell me the people at the shelter tell her to set me up on charges they start a fight and I felt the mother was in on it me and the mother have been waring for coustody of my kids dss shelter starts a fight to justify the other on coustody then when that don't work they move in my home and start a fight. I also feel that they tried to start a fight with Linda hope then justify a order of protect then my spouse leaving me to believe she has something to do with me getting shot.

(Squire III Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ II.) Although Plaintiff does not allege any injuries (id. ¶ II.A), for relief, he requests that someone “pay for my truck being tampered with, full coustody of my kids and payed for time in jail and payed for and pay for negligence from dss A hate crime pay for me being shot.” (Id. ¶ III.)

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's In Forma Pauperis Applications are Granted

The Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by his financial status to commence these three actions without prepayment of the filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, Plaintiff's IFP applications in Squire I, Squire II, and Squire III are GRANTED.

II. Legal Standards

A. Consideration of the Complaint Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A

Section 1915 requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), 1915A(b). An action is frivolous as a matter of law when, inter alia, it is based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory” or when it “lacks an arguable basis in law . . . or [when] a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-CV-0974, 2021 WL 1979077, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2021).

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally and to interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). However, the complaint must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, a court may dismiss a complaint that is “so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988); Tawfik v. Georgatos, No. 20-CV-5832, 2021 WL 2953227, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2021) (Seybert, J.).

B. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1). However, the short and plain statement must be “sufficient to give the defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Jones v. Nat'l Commc'ns & Surveillance Networks, 266 Fed.Appx. 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Indeed, pleadings must give “‘fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests'” in order to enable the opposing party to answer and prepare for trial, and to identify the nature of the case. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)), overruled in part on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 557 (a pleading that offers “labels and conclusion” or “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement” does not satisfy Rule 8).

C. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must “allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed...