St. Andrie v. Singing River Health Sys.

347 So.3d 1197

Wanda ST. ANDRIE, Appellant

v.SINGING RIVER HEALTH SYSTEM, Appellee

NO. 2021-CA-00042-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

September 20, 2022

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: NORMAN WILLIAM PAULI JR., Hattiesburg, RICHARD T. GALLAGHER JR.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: BRETT K. WILLIAMS, A. KELLY SESSOMS III, Pascagoula, JASON R. SCHEIDERER

EN BANC.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Wanda St. Andrie alleges that Dr. Terrence Millette, while employed by Singing River Health Systems (SRHS), misdiagnosed her with multiple sclerosis (MS) and improperly caused her to undergo painful, expensive, and unnecessary treatments for a period of several years. In 2018, St. Andrie filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Millette and SRHS, alleging that SRHS was vicariously liable for Millette's negligence. Her suit is one of approximately twenty similar cases filed against Millette and SRHS. In 2020, St. Andrie filed an amended complaint that added an "independent negligence" claim against SRHS. St. Andrie's new claim alleges that SRHS had actual or constructive knowledge of Millette's negligence for many years but failed to protect or notify his patients. SRHS filed a motion for summary judgment on St. Andrie's independent negligence claim, arguing that it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Rev. 2019). The circuit court granted SRHS's motion and certified its order as a final judgment dismissing St. Andrie's independent negligence claim.

¶2. We conclude that St. Andrie's independent negligence claim is not barred by the statute of limitations because it "arose out of the [same] conduct, transaction, or occurrence" as her original complaint and therefore "relates back to the date of [her] original [complaint]." M.R.C.P. 15(c). Accordingly, the circuit court erred by granting SRHS's motion for summary judgment on that claim, and we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. In 2005, Millette diagnosed St. Andrie with MS and began treating her with MS medications. In 2011, Millette became an employee of SRHS, where he continued to treat St. Andrie for MS. In November 2016, SRHS sent a letter to all of Millette's patients that stated in part,

Recently, some questions were raised about how Dr. Millette diagnoses and treats patients with [MS]. As a result, we immediately began a review of Dr. Millette's medical activity. During the course of this ongoing review, the decision was made that Dr. Millette would no longer base his practice at [SRHS].

We recognize that competent medical professionals often have differing opinions, especially when it involves complex neurological conditions. Given the questions that have been raised about Dr. Millette's medical practices, we would like to work with you to obtain a re-evaluation of your diagnosis and treatment plan with another doctor.

Thereafter, SRHS arranged for St. Andrie to see another neurologist, Dr. Laura Minto. In January 2017, Dr. Minto advised St. Andrie that she never had MS.

¶4. In November 2017, St. Andrie served SRHS with a notice of claim under the MTCA. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) - (2). In May 2018, St. Andrie filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Millette and SRHS in the Jackson County Circuit Court.¹ Her suit is one of approximately twenty similar cases filed against Millette and SRHS. The cases were all assigned to a single judge, and the judge entered a common discovery order that, among other things, permitted counsel for all plaintiffs to participate in any depositions of SRHS executives and administrators.

¶5. In July 2020, St. Andrie filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. St. Andrie's original complaint asserted only a vicarious liability claim against SRHS based on Millette's negligence, but her proposed amended complaint asserted an "independent negligence" claim against SRHS, alleging that it breached its "duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard [her] from known or reasonably apprehensible danger," namely, Millette's pattern of repeatedly misdiagnosing patients with MS. The circuit court granted St. Andrie's motion, and she filed her amended complaint.

¶6. In a subsequent motion for summary judgment, SRHS argued, inter alia, that the MTCA's one-year statute of limitations barred St. Andrie's new "independent negligence" claim. SRHS argued that St. Andrie's new claim was barred because she filed her amended complaint after the one-year limitations period had expired and because her new claim did not "relate back" to the date of her original complaint under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).

¶7. In response, St. Andrie argued that her new claim was timely because she filed her amended complaint within one year of the date on which she discovered or by reasonable diligence should have discovered SRHS's independent negligence. See generally McLeod , 301 So. 3d at 572-76 (¶¶15-33) (discussing the MTCA's "discovery rule"). Specifically, St. Andrie argued that she could not have discovered SRHS's independent negligence until her attorney attended the trial in a related case styled Tingle v. SRHS in the Jackson County Circuit Court. St. Andrie argued that the evidence presented during the Tingle trial revealed that SRHS had possessed actual or constructive knowledge of Millette's negligence for many years but failed to notify his patients. In addition, St. Andrie argued that her new claim was timely because it related back to the date of her original complaint under Rule 15(c).

¶8. The circuit court granted SRHS's motion for summary judgment on St. Andrie's independent negligence claim and directed the entry of a final judgment dismissing that claim. See M.R.C.P. 54(b). St. Andrie then filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which the circuit court denied. The court reasoned that St. Andrie's independent negligence claim did not relate back to the date of her original complaint because "the new claim has legal and proof requirements separate and apart from the original complaint." The court also concluded that St. Andrie should have discovered her new claim prior to the Tingle trial. The court explained that the evidence presented during the Tingle trial was "developed in common discovery," and St. Andrie was "permitted to participate in common discovery." The court reasoned that St. Andrie should have discovered the basis for her claim during common discovery, but "St. Andrie's counsel chose not to participate in common discovery." St. Andrie then filed a notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶9. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo.

Forbes v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 993 So. 2d 822, 824 (¶7) (Miss. 2008). We also review issues of law de novo, "including issues concerning statutes of limitations." Id. Whether an amended complaint relates back to the original complaint under Rule 15(c) is also a question of law that we review de novo. Ralph Walker Inc. v. Gallagher , 926 So. 2d 890, 897 (¶11) (Miss. 2006).

¶10. St. Andrie makes two arguments as to why her independent negligence claim is not barred by the statute of limitations. First, she argues that her claim relates back to the date of her original complaint under Rule 15(c). Second, she argues that she did not discover, and could not have discovered with reasonable diligence, SRHS's independent negligence until her attorney attended the Tingle trial. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that St. Andrie's independent negligence claim is not barred by the statute of limitations because it relates back to the date of her original complaint. Therefore, the circuit court erred by granting SRHS's motion for summary judgment on that claim. Because that issue is dispositive, we need not address St. Andrie's second argument.

¶11. Under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1), "[w]henever [a] claim ... asserted in [an] amended [complaint] arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original [complaint], the amendment relates back to the date of the original [complaint]." M.R.C.P. 15(c)(1). To determine whether an amendment relates back to the original complaint, we will also consider "whether the opposing party has been put on notice regarding the claim ... raised by the amended pleading." Parker v. Miss. Game & Fish Comm'n , 555 So. 2d 725, 731 (Miss. 1989) (quoting Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1497, at 495 (1971) ). But with respect to the issue of notice, "[t]he rationale of Rule 15(c) is that a party who has been notified of litigation concerning a particular occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes of limitation were intended to provide." Id. (quoting Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown , 466 U.S. 147, 150 n.3, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) ).

¶12. Here, the relevant question is whether St. Andrie's "independent negligence" claim against SRHS relates back to the date of her original complaint, which asserted a claim against SRHS based on vicarious liability—i.e., that SRHS was liable for the negligence of its employee, Millette. St. Andrie's original complaint alleged that Millette had misdiagnosed her with MS and prescribed an inappropriate course of treatment for many years, including five years while he was employed at SRHS. St. Andrie alleged that SRHS was liable for Millette's negligence because Millette was an employee of SRHS acting within the course and scope of his employment. In her amended complaint, St. Andrie alleged that SRHS also was liable due to its own "independent negligence." Specifically, she alleged that SRHS "had actual or constructive knowledge of Dr. Millette's pattern of repeated misdiagnosis of patients with [MS] ... for many years." She alleged that SRHS failed to exercise reasonable care for her safety by failing to...