St. Vincent Catholic Charities v. Ingham Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs

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ST. VINCENT CATHOLIC CHARITIES, Plaintiff, v. INGHAM COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Defendant.

No. 1:19-cv-1050

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

February 13, 2024

Hon Robert J. Jonker, U.S. District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PHILLIP J. GREEN, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff St. Vincent Catholic Charities (St. Vincent), having obtained a favorable judgment against Defendant (the Board), seeks an award of attorneys' fees, expenses, and interest. (ECF No. 85). Specifically, St. Vincent seeks attorneys' fees in the amount of $1,628,879.00 - or alternatively in the amount of $1,012,223.00^[1]-expenses in the amount of $9,775.39 and pre-judgment interest in the amount of $986.67. (ECF No. 85-1, PageID.2263-64). The Board does not contest St. Vincent's right to an award of fees, but argues that the award should be reduced to $282,868.19. (ECF No. 88, PageID.2454). The Court referred the motion to the undersigned judicial officer for report and recommendation. Having considered all the materials submitted by both parties, and for the reasons articulated below, the undersigned recommends that St. Vincent's motion for fees, expenses, and interest be granted in part, and that St. Vincent be awarded fees in the amount of $1,012,223.00, along with $9,775.39 in expenses, and pre-judgment interest in the amount of $986.67.

Relevant Facts and Procedural Background

St. Vincent is a Michigan non-profit corporation, affiliated with the Catholic Diocese of Lansing, Michigan, which provides refugee services programs in Ingham County, Michigan. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3-4). It has provided these services for some twenty years through annually renewed contracts with the county. (Id. at PageID.10-11). St. Vincent also provides foster care and adoption services. St. Vincent brought suit in Buck v. Gordon, Case No. 1:19-cv-0286 (W.D. Mich.), challenging state actions that would have prohibited it from expressing “the traditional Catholic belief that marriage as ordained by God is for one man and one woman.” Buck v. Gordon, 429 F.Supp.3d 447, 450 (W.D. Mich. 2019). On September 26, 2019, the Court issued a preliminary injunction in St. Vincent's favor. Id. at 469

On May 28, 2019, the Board passed a resolution that included a provision stating that, with respect to Ingham County's Community Agency Grant Program, priority would be given to those agencies that comply with the County's nondiscrimination policies. (Op. & Order, ECF No. 77, PageID.2199). Shortly thereafter, the Board denied St. Vincent's application for a $4,500 grant relating to its refugee services, the same application that had previously been approved. (Id. at PageID.2200). St. Vincent filed the instant action on December 13, 2019, claiming that the Board violated its free exercise and free speech rights under the First Amendment; that the Board retaliated against it for expressing its religious beliefs and in asserting its rights in the Buck v. Gordon case; and that the Board violated its equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 1).

On March 7, 2022, the Court ruled that the Board violated St. Vincent's rights under the First Amendment by denying its grant application due to its religious beliefs and in retaliation against it for its protected activity in Buck v. Gordon. (ECF No. 74). The Court noted that its decision “provides a predicate for all the relief St. Vincent could conceivably seek in the case and makes it unnecessary to address Plaintiff's less developed theories of compelled speech (Count I) and Equal Protection (Count V).” (Id. at PageID.2103). The Court sought additional briefing on potential declaratory, monetary, and injunctive relief. (Id.).

On July 21, 2023, after receiving the supplemental briefing, the Court awarded St. Vincent $4,800 in compensatory damages, but denied its request for declaratory and injunctive relief. (ECF No. 77, PageID.2212). The Court held that declaratory relief was unnecessary in light of its previous holding that the Board violated St. Vincent's rights when it denied its grant application, and that permanent injunctive relief was unnecessary due to changes in the makeup of the Board and the recognition from both parties that “the Board has ‘learned a lesson.' ” (Id. at PageID.2209, 2211). The Court entered judgment in favor of St. Vincent, and noted that St. Vincent “may recover interest and attorney fees as allowed by law.” (Judgment, ECF No. 78).

St. Vincent filed its motion for fees, expenses, and interest on October 16, 2023. (ECF No. 85). The Board responded on November 13, 2023. (ECF No. 88). With permission of the Court, St. Vincent replied on November 22, 2023. (ECF No. 90, 91).

Analysis

As the “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), St. Vincent is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). This is the “lodestar method” of calculation. See Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 546 (2010); Isabel v. City of Memphis, 404 F.3d 404, 415 (6th Cir. 2005); Adcock-Ladd v. Sec'y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000).^[2] The party seeking an award of fees bears the burden of proving its request is reasonable. See, e.g., Gonter v. Hunt Valve Co., Inc., 510 F.3d 610, 617 (6th Cir. 2007).

The Reasonable Hourly Rate

The Court begins this analysis by determining a reasonable hourly rate. “Ordinarily, courts look to ‘[rates] prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.' ” Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 536 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984)). There is a presumption in favor of the community market rates. See, e.g. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 (“‘[R]easonable fees' . . . are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel.”); Adcock-Ladd v. Sec'y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 350 (6th Cir. 2000) (“A trial court, in calculating the ‘reasonable hourly rate' component of the lodestar computation, should initially assess the ‘prevailing market rate in the relevant community.'” (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895)) (emphasis in Adcock-Ladd); Coulter v. Tennessee, 805 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1986) (“We . . . apply the principle that hourly rates for fee awards should not exceed the market rates necessary to encourage competent lawyers to undertake the representation in question.”). The “community market rule” has the “principle virtue of being the easiest way to cope with the ‘inherently problematic' task of ascertaining a reasonable fee in a situation where ‘wide variations in skill and reputation render the usual laws of supply and demand inapplicable[.]' ” Hadix, 65 F.3d at 536 (quoting Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990)).

The presumption in favor of local market rates may be overcome, however, in certain cases to “allow higher rates to be recouped by an ‘out-of-town specialist.' ” Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, Case No. 1:98-cv-0479, 2008 WL 906031, at *4 (W.D. Mich. March 31, 2008) (citing Hadix, 65 F.3d at 536)). In deciding whether to award out-of-town rates, “courts must determine (1) whether hiring the out-of-town specialist was reasonable in the first instance, and (2) whether the rates sought by the out-of-town specialist are reasonable for an attorney of his or her degree of skill, experience, and reputation.” Hadix, 65 F.3d at 535 (citing Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 768-69 (7th Cir. 1982); Maceira v. Pagan, 698 F.2d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 1983)).

Moreover, the Court may adjust the lodestar fee, upward or downward, as it deems it appropriate based on the so-called Johnson factors. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91 n.5 (1989) (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)). But these factors “are not die-hard requirements.” Communities for Equity, 2008 WL 906031, at *5.

All of these principles can be summarized in the axiom that courts are to determine a reasonable fee award, based on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Cf. Gonter, 510 F.3d at 616 (“In an attorneys' fee case, the primary concern is that the fee awarded be ‘reasonable.' ” (quoting Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 471 (6th Cir. 1999)). “A reasonable fee is ‘adequately compensatory to attract competent counsel yet which avoids producing a windfall for lawyers.' ” Id. (quoting Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in Gonter). The court may rely on its own expertise and judgment in making this assessment. See Garber v. Shiner Enterprises, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-646, 2007 WL 4557857, *1 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2007) (citing United States ex rel. Educ. Career Dev., Inc. v. Cent. Fla. Reg'l Workforce Dev. Bd., Inc., No. 6:04-cv-93, 2007 WL 1601747, *6 (M.D. Fla. June 1, 2007)).

In the instant case, St. Vincent asks the Court to use hourly rates from the District of Columbia (DC) in which the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty (Becket Fund) is located. (ECF No. 85-1, PageID.2254-59). The Becket Fund is a nonprofit public interest law firm that specializes in legal issues relating to religious liberty. (Haun Decl. at ¶ 8, ECF No. 85-2, PageID.2267-68). The DC rates for the Becket Fund attorneys who were involved in this litigation range from $600 to $1,300 per hour. (Id. at PageID.2257-58).

St Vincent argues that it was reasonable to retain the Becket Fund's services for ...