St. Vincent Charity v. Paluscsak

1

2023-Ohio-4641

ST. VINCENT CHARITY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL PALUSCSAK, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 111932

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga

December 21, 2023

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-18-898214

Davis & Young, Matthew P. Baringer, and Thomas W. Wright, for appellee St. Vincent Charity.

Porter Wright Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Tracey L. Turnbull, and Jared M. Klaus, for appellee United Collection Bureau, Inc.

The Law Office of Boyd W. Gentry, Boyd W. Gentry, and Zachary P Elliott, for appellees George Gusses Co., L.P.A., George Gusses, Robin A. Worline, and Joseph T. Szyperski.

Robert S. Belovich, L.L.C., and Robert S. Belovich; The Misra Law Firm, L.L.C., and Anand N. Misra, for appellant.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

ANITA LASTER MAYS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Michael Paluscsak ("Paluscsak") appeals the trial court's decision granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs-appellees St. Vincent Charity Medical Center ("SVCMC"); United Collection Bureau Inc. ("UCB"); and attorneys George Gusses, Robin Worline, and Joseph Szperski and their law firm, George Gusses Co. LPA, collectively known as "the Gusses." We affirm the trial court's decision.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} In September 2015, Paluscsak had an MRI performed on his knee at SVCMC. He was billed $1,175.40 for the procedure, but he did not pay it. After the bill went unpaid for 18 months, SVCMC referred the account to UCB for collections. On June 2, 2017, UCB sent a collections letter to Paluscsak and also hired the Gusses to file a debt collection action against Paluscsak. On July 11, 2019, the Gusses filed a lawsuit.

{¶3} On August 14, 2017, Paluscsak filed an answer to the Gusses' complaint and also filed counterclaims on behalf of a putative class based on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act ("OCSPA"). Paluscsak claimed that the appellees committed fraud and abuses of process because the debt collection was initiated in the name of "St. Vincent Charity" and not the formal name "St. Vincent Charity Medical Center." Paluscsak argued in his counterclaim that the letters from UCB and the Gusses falsely stated that he owed money to St. Vincent Charity when the entity does not exist. Further, Paluscsak contended that the Gusses signed a complaint on behalf of St. Vincent Charity, omitting the words "Medical Center" in an effort to cheat unsuspecting and unsophisticated consumers.

{¶4} Although Paluscsak did not file an objection, he claims that the Gusses violated the FDCPA because they filed the complaint in Cleveland Municipal Court instead of Garfield Heights Municipal Court, where he resides. However, the matter proceeded in the Cleveland Municipal Court.

{¶5} After the filing of the complaint and counterclaim, a number of motions were filed and ruled upon. SVCMC dismissed its complaint against Paluscsak in the municipal court, leaving Paluscsak's counterclaim as the sole issue. UCM filed a motion to certify the case to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court ("trial court"). The municipal court granted the motion because the amount sought in Paluscsak's counterclaim exceeded the jurisdictional monetary limit of the municipal court. On May 22, 2018, the case was transferred to the trial court.

{¶6} On June 19, 2018, Paluscsak moved for default judgment against the appellees. SVCMC filed a motion for leave to file an answer to the counterclaim. The trial court granted SVCMC's motion, but denied Paluscsak's motion for default judgment. On July 10, 2018, the trial court also dismissed Paluscsak's claims for fraud and abuse of process. On August 14, 2018, the trial court dismissed Paluscsak's counterclaim against the appellees for fraud and abuse of process and denied the motion with respect to the FDCPA and OCSPA claims.

{¶7} The trial court dismissed Paluscsak's case because his counsel failed to appear. Paluscsak filed an appeal in St. Vincent Charity v. Paluscsak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108641, 2020-Ohio-1501 ("Paluscsak I "), where the court reversed the trial court's decision, stating: "The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing appellant's counterclaim for failure to prosecute based on appellant's failure to participate in the May 7, 2019 phone conference." Id. at ¶ 49.

{¶8} On September 14, 2020, the trial court ordered Paluscsak to appear in person for a deposition on October 1, 2020. Paluscsak appealed the order to this court and subsequently to the Supreme Court, and both appeals were dismissed. On August 26, 2021, Paluscsak filed a motion to compel discovery from the Gusses, and, on September 20, 2021, filed the same motion against UCB. On December 13, 2021, the trial court denied both motions.

{¶9} On January 10, 2022, UCB and the Gusses filed motions for summary judgment, with SVCMC filing to join the summary judgment motions. The motions argued that Paluscsak does not have standing because he admitted that he had not suffered any injury as a result of UCB's use of SVCMC's abbreviated name of St. Vincent Charity and that the use of the abbreviated name was not false, deceptive, or misleading. The motions also argued that Paluscsak's FDCPA and OCSPA claims fail as a matter of law.

{¶10} On August 15, 2022, the trial court granted the appellees' summary judgment motions. The trial court reasoned that Paluscsak had no standing because he was not injured by the use of the nickname or the case being filed in Cleveland instead of Garfield Heights. The trial court also reasoned that Paluscsak's claims under FDCPA and OCSPA fail as a matter of law because he did not demonstrate he was injured.

{¶11} Paluscsak filed this appeal and assigned six assignments of error for our review:

1. The trial court committed prejudicial error in holding that Paluscsak lacked standing to bring his counterclaim;

2. The trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to consider claims on collection actions taken in violation of R.C. 1319.12 and the resulting unauthorized practice of law;

3. The trial court committed prejudicial error in finding that counterclaim defendants did not violate the FDCPA by filing a collection lawsuit in a court district where Paluscsak did not reside or where he did not sign a contract on which the collection claim was based;

4. The trial court committed prejudicial error in finding the counterclaim defendants did not violate the FDCPA by filing a collection lawsuit in the name of an unregistered fictitious name;

5. The trial court committed prejudicial error in concluding that the counterclaim defendants did not violate the OCSPA; and

6. The trial court abused its discretion and prejudicial error in denying Paluscsak's motion to compel.

II. Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

{¶12} Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate when "(1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) after construing the evidence most favorably to the party against whom the motion is made, reasonable minds can only reach a conclusion that is adverse to the nonmoving party." Chester/12 Ltd. v. Epiq Constr. Servs., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 111626 and 112198, 2023-Ohio-1886, ¶ 17, citing Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370, 696 N.E.2d 201 (1998); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).

{¶13} "The moving party has the initial burden of setting forth specific facts that demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment." Id. at ¶ 18, citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). "If the moving party fails to meet this burden, summary judgment is not appropriate." Id. "If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden of setting forth specific facts using evidence permitted by Civ.R. 56(C) to show that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. "Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to meet this burden." Id.

{¶14} "We review the trial court's judgment de novo, using the same standard that the trial court applies under Civ.R. 56(C)." Id. at ¶ 19, citing Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). "Accordingly, we stand in the shoes of the trial court and conduct an independent review of the record." Id.

B. Standing

{¶15} In Paluscsak's first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error holding that he lacked standing to bring his counterclaim. "'Standing' is defined as '[a] party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.'" Torrance v. Rom, 2020-Ohio-3971, 157 N.E.3d 172, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), quoting Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27, citing Black's Law Dictionary 1442 (8th Ed.2004). "A party must establish standing to sue before a court can consider the merits of a legal claim." Id., citing Ohio Contrs. Assn. v. Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, 643 N.E.2d 1088 (1994). "'To have standing, a party must have a personal stake in the outcome of a legal controversy with an adversary.'" Id., quoting Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 322, 2010-Ohio-6036, 944 N.E.2d 207, ¶ 9, citing Ohio Pyro, Inc. at ¶ 27. "The lack of standing may require a court to dismiss an action." Id., citing Thies v. Wheelock, 2017-Ohio-8605, 100 N.E.3d 903, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.).

{¶16} "In order for [Paluscsak] to establish standing, he must show he suffered '(1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the appellees' allegedly unlawful conduct and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.'" Id. at ¶ 24, quotin...