Stafford v. Commissioner of Correction

207 Conn.App. 85

261 A.3d 791

William L. STAFFORD, Jr.

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

AC 43208

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 11, 2021

Officially Released August 31, 2021

Melissa King and Hannah Kogan, certified legal interns, with whom were Timothy H. Everett, assigned counsel, and, on the brief, Christopher Boyer, certified legal intern, for the appellant (petitioner).

Madeline A. Melchionne, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, Stamford, CT, Clare E. Kindall, solicitor general, Hartford, CT, and Steven R. Strom, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (respondent).

Prescott, Cradle and Suarez, Js.

PRESCOTT, J.

The petitioner, William L. Stafford, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which challenged the categorical refusal by the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, and the initial failure by the Board of Pardons and Paroles (board), to deem the petitioner eligible for parole despite the fact that he is incarcerated for a parole eligible offense.

On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly dismissed his petition on the grounds that (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to state a claim involving the deprivation of a recognized liberty interest, and (2) the petition was rendered moot by a witness’ testimony at the habeas trial. We agree with both jurisdictional claims and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the habeas court and remand with direction to render judgment stating that the petitioner is parole eligible.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of the petitioner's claims.¹ In 1981, the petitioner was charged with two counts of felony murder in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 53a-54c,² the first of which was alleged to have been committed on June 30 or July 1, 1981, and the second of which was alleged to have been committed on August 16, 1981. On October 14, 1982, the petitioner entered guilty pleas as to both counts. On the first count, the petitioner was sentenced to an indefinite term of incarceration of not less than twenty-five years nor more than life pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 53a-35.³ On the second count, the petitioner was sentenced to a definite term of fifty-five years of incarceration pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 53a-35a.⁴ The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. "The petitioner ‘maxed out’ on the fifty-five year sentence on May 28, 2014, and is deemed to have been ‘released’ from that conviction."⁵ Just prior to the expiration of that sentence, the petitioner submitted the first of three inmate request forms to Institutional Parole Officer Vadnais (IPO Vadnais),⁶ seeking a parole eligibility date for his indeterminate twenty-five years to life sentence. IPO Vadnais responded to all three requests, indicating each time that the petitioner was not eligible for parole on the indeterminate felony murder sentence because the determinate felony murder sentence was not a parole eligible offense.⁷

Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as a self-represented litigant. On May 10, 2016, the petitioner, through counsel, filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the respondent improperly determined that the petitioner is not parole eligible, despite the fact that he is currently incarcerated for a parole eligible offense pursuant to General Statutes § 54-125, which constitutes a violation of the petitioner's rights under the due process and ex post facto clauses of the United States constitution. The relief requested in the amended petition includes, inter alia, (1) a declaration by the court that the petitioner is eligible for parole, (2) an order that the respondent classify the petitioner as eligible for parole, and (3) that the board and the Department of Correction (department) classify the petitioner as parole eligible and accord him consideration in accordance with the criteria set forth in § 54-125.⁸ The respondent filed a return on July 9, 2018, in which he alleged as a "defense" that the petitioner is not eligible for parole consideration.

At the petitioner's habeas trial, on February 26, 2019, three witnesses testified: (1) Michelle Deveau, a records specialist with the department; (2) Richard Sparaco, the executive director of the board; and (3) the petitioner. Specifically, Deveau testified, inter alia, that the department generates a parole eligibility date for the board that is based on relevant statutes and her office's calculations. She acknowledged that the presentence investigation report prepared at the time of the sentencing of the petitioner⁹ stated that "[u]nfortunately [for] ... society [the petitioner] will be eligible for parole in the future." Nevertheless, Deveau testified that the petitioner was not, and would never be, eligible for parole pursuant to General Statutes §§ 53a-37,¹⁰ 53a-38 (b),¹¹ and 54-125a¹² because, even though the petitioner reached the maximum term of his definite sentence, that sentence still serves as a bar to the petitioner's parole eligibility on the indeterminate sentence.¹³

By contrast, Sparaco testified, inter alia, that the petitioner is parole eligible because, when his fifty-five year sentence reached its maximum, on May 28, 2014, the petitioner was left to serve only his indeterminate sentence, which was imposed for a parole eligible offense pursuant to § 54-125. Sparaco's testimony in this regard was contrary to what the respondent had indicated Sparaco's opinion would be in his expert witness disclosure.

Sparaco explained, in his testimony, that "[p]arole eligibility is the gateway to a hearing," it is statutorily determined, and the board does not exercise discretion in determining eligibility. Sparaco further testified that (1) he became aware of the petitioner's case in 2015 because of the present habeas litigation, (2) the board did not receive notice of the petitioner's eligibility from the department "as we do with many other cases," (3) the board has determined that the petitioner is parole eligible, and (4) the board has not reached a conclusion as to whether the petitioner should be afforded a parole hearing.¹⁴

Following the habeas trial, the court issued a memorandum of decision and dismissed the petition. The court concluded that the petitioner's claims were not justiciable for two reasons: (1) the petitioner has failed to state a claim involving the deprivation of a recognized liberty interest and, thus, has failed to state a claim over which the habeas court has jurisdiction; and (2) the issue of obtaining a parole eligibility determination has become moot because there is no longer a viable dispute in light of Sparaco's testimony that the board has found the petitioner to be eligible for parole but has declined to grant him a hearing. The petitioner then filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the court granted on May 28, 2019.

On December 11, 2019, the petitioner filed a motion for articulation, seeking further explanation as to why the habeas court did not address whether it had jurisdiction to decide the petitioner's ex post facto claim, as distinct from his due process claim, and to clarify certain findings with respect to its conclusion that the petition was moot. The court denied the motion for articulation, and the petitioner sought review from this court pursuant to Practice Book § 66-5.¹⁵ This court granted the motion for review but denied the relief requested therein. This appeal followed. On appeal, the respondent concedes that the petitioner is parole eligible. Additional facts will be set forth as needed.

I

As an initial matter, before addressing the petitioner's claims, we first discuss whether, in light of the respondent's concession before this court that the petitioner is parole eligible, this appeal is moot. We conclude that it is not.

The following legal principles guide our review. "Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction. ... Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute ... (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse ... (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power ... and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Renaissance Management Co. v. Barnes , 175 Conn. App. 681, 685–86, 168 A.3d 530 (2017). "[I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged. ... Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. ... [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction .... The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sousa v. Sousa , 322 Conn. 757, 770, 143 A.3d 578 (2016).

"Under our well established jurisprudence, [m]ootness presents a circumstance wherein the issue before the court has been resolved or had lost its significance because of a change in the condition of affairs between the parties. ... In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way. ... In other words, the ultimate question is whether the determination...