Stafford v. Hunt County

LAURIE STAFFORD, Plaintiff,

v.HUNT COUNTY, TEXAS, and RANDY MEEKS, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-CV-1378-M

NO. 3:10-CV-1395-M

UNITED STATES DISTRICT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

July 11, 2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket Entry #25]. For the reasons explained below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff Laurie Stafford suffers from astigmatism, an eye disorder which makes it difficult for her to see in the dark.² On November 4, 2008, Stafford quit her position as a jailer in Rockwall County Jail's control room, which was generally dark, after she concluded that her eye disorder could "jeopardize jail security."³ On December 8, 2009, Hunt County hired Stafford as a jailer.⁴ Before she was hired, Stafford did not inform Hunt County of her eye problems, nor of her reasons for leaving Rockwall County Jail.⁵

In Hunt County, each jailer must participate in a training program.⁶ Jailers must be able to perform a variety of duties at Hunt County's jail, including operating the control room'selectronic communication system and control boards and knowing the jail's emergency procedures.⁷ An essential function of a Hunt County jailer is working in the control room.⁸ If a trainee cannot work in the control room, she cannot satisfactorily complete her training.⁹

While in training, Stafford informed her field training officers ("FTOs") that she had trouble working in a dark control room due to her astigmatism.¹⁰ According to Sergeant Nash, who worked in the control room, there is no requirement that the lights in the control room must be kept off, and, during Stafford's training, he informed Stafford that she could leave the lights on while she worked in the control room.¹¹

On January 21, 2010, Stafford's doctor informed Hunt County that Stafford had an irregular astigmatism and that it would be "extremely difficult for her to work and function effectively in a control/dark room type of environment."¹² On January 28, 2010, Hunt County hired Dr. Coble to examine Stafford, to determine whether she was fit for duty and, if not, whether her eye problem could be accommodated.¹³ Dr. Coble informed Hunt County that Stafford had an astigmatism, had some difficulty in "lighted situations," and needed "proper visual correction."¹⁴ Stafford admitted that her vision could be improved, but not completely corrected, with the use of glasses.¹⁵ According to Stafford, her astigmatism only restricted activities that required her to take off her glasses, such as swimming, and did not have a "big impact" on her daily activities.¹⁶

On January 29, 2010, Manford Greninger, the Hunt County jail administrator, toldStafford he was aware she could not effectively perform all her assignments due to eyesight limitations, and told her she had ninety days to resolve the problem, or she would be terminated.¹⁷

Stafford admits that there was nothing extra that could have been done to allow her to work in the control room, acknowledges that she never asked for an accommodation, and states that she does not know if any accommodation could have been made.¹⁸ Stafford explains that even with the lights on, she could not work in the control room because she could not see the numbers on the control boards.¹⁹

During her training, Stafford also exhibited what Hunt County designates as "complacency" toward the inmates, meaning actions like allowing inmates too near her, calling an inmate "honey" or "darling," and touching inmates.²⁰ Hunt County teaches that jailers must avoid such complacency because "inmates can turn quickly on officers and . . . erupt into violence."²¹ On February 15, 2010, Hunt County's jailers discovered the inmates possessed a large amount of contraband at the jail.²² Jailers allowing inmates to have contraband violates jail policy.²³ According to Greninger, several inmates said that Stafford allowed or facilitated the passing of the contraband.²⁴ The Hunt County Chief Jailer, David McGee, questioned Stafford about potential misconduct by her, and then placed her on administrative leave with pay.²⁵ McGee investigated the allegations and found evidence that substantiated the inmates' claimsabout her involvement.²⁶ McGee says he confronted Stafford, who responded that she broke the rules "just because" and said that McGee should be more sympathetic to the inmates.²⁷ As a result of his investigation and conclusion that she violated jail policy, McGee recommended to Greninger that Stafford should be discharged.²⁸

On February 17, 2010, McGee called Stafford and instructed her to meet with Greninger; however, Stafford indicated she did not feel well. She never met with Greninger nor did she have further contact with McGee.²⁹ Greninger, who had authority to make hiring and disciplinary decisions in the jail, sent Stafford a letter of discharge, which explained the details of McGee's investigation and the conclusion that her actions violated jail policies.³⁰

On March 16, 2010, Stafford dually filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Texas Workforce Commission (the "Commission"), alleging disability discrimination.³¹ EEOC investigator Matamoros met with Stafford, who told him that her visual impairment was the reason for her termination.³² The EEOC issued a "right-to-sue" letter to Stafford stating that her lawsuit must be filed within ninety days of her receipt of the right-to-sue letter.³³

On June 15, 2010, Stafford filed suit against Hunt County and its sheriff, Randy Meeks, in the 196th District Court of Hunt County, Texas, alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). On July 14, 2010, Defendants removed the case to this Court. Defendants now move for summary judgment.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted if the pleadings, discovery, disclosure materials, and supporting affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.³⁴ A genuine issue of material fact exists when a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.³⁵ The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.³⁶ Once the movant carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment is inappropriate, by designating specific facts beyond the pleadings that prove the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.³⁷ In determining whether genuine issues of material fact exist, "factual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that an actual controversy exists."³⁸

III.ANALYSIS

A. Timeliness

The EEOC investigator's notes state that on March 16, he (1) informed Stafford of her right to sue, (2) signed the right-to-sue letter, and (3) "served" the right-to-sue letter on Stafford.³⁹ However, the record evidence does not indicate if service on Stafford was by mail or hand-delivery and Stafford testified she did not recall if she received the right-to-sue letter byhand or by mail. On June 15, 2010, ninety-one days after the EEOC investigator signed the right-to-sue letter, Stafford filed this suit.

1. TCHRA

A person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice must file a complaint with the Commission⁴⁰ within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act.⁴¹ If the Commission dismisses the complaint or has not filed suit or negotiated a conciliation agreement within 180 days after the filing of the complaint, it must notify the complainant in writing.⁴² The complainant may request from the Commission a written notice of right to file a civil action.⁴³ The Commission's failure to issue notice of a complainant's right to file a civil action does not affect the complainant's right to bring a civil action against her employer.⁴⁴ Under Texas Labor Code § 21.254, a discrimination claim under the TCHRA may be filed within 60 days after the date the plaintiff receives notice of the right to file a civil action.⁴⁵

Although the sixty-day period is not considered jurisdictional under Texas law and thus does not prevent a district court from considering the TCHRA claim, actions for TCHRA violations filed in federal court more than sixty days after the Commission issues notice of aright to file suit are routinely dismissed as untimely.⁴⁶ An EEOC right-to-sue notice is not interchangeable with a TCHRA "right to file a civil action" letter.⁴⁷ Receipt by Stafford of the EEOC's notice of right-to-sue does not trigger the analogous TCHRA's sixty-day filing period.⁴⁸

The record before the Court contains no evidence that Stafford received a right to file a civil action letter from the Commission. Further, Stafford filed the action within two years of filing her complaint with the Commission.⁴⁹ Therefore, the Court does not have a basis to dismiss Stafford's TCHRA claims based on the sixty-day provision in § 21.254 or the two-year limitations period of § 21.256.

2. ADA

Under the ADA, lawsuits must be filed within ninety days of the plaintiffs receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.⁵⁰ This requirement is strictly construed,⁵¹ and "is a precondition to filing suit in district court."⁵²

When the date on which a right-to-sue letter was actually received is either unknown or disputed, courts have presumed various receipt dates ranging from three to seven days after the letter was mailed.⁵³ Because Stafford did not allege the specific date on which she received theright-to-sue letter and the date the letter was received by her is unknown, the Court presumes that Stafford received the right-to-sue letter within three days of March 16, which makes her...