Staley v. Nat'l Capital Area Council

WOLFGANG STALEY, et al., Plaintiffs,

v. NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA COUNCIL,BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, Defendant.

Case No.: RWT 10cv2768

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Dated: June 9, 2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs Wolfgang Staley ("Staley"), a minor suing by and through his parent and next friend, Cindy Officer ("Officer"), and Officer, individually, bring this action against Defendant National Capital Area Council of the Boy Scouts of America ("NCAC") for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act. Staley and Officer claim that NCAC refused to provide a sign language interpreter for Staley, who is deaf, at Boy Scout meetings and trips in violation of federal law. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' ADA claims will be dismissed and the Court will order the parties to engage in limited discovery concerning Plaintiffs' Rehabilitation Act claims.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Staley is a thirteen year-old boy who has been deaf since birth. Compl. ¶ 9. He became a member of Boy Scout Troop 1533 in September, 2009. Compl. ¶ 11. Troop 1533 is a member of the Boy Scouts Patriot District, which is one of twenty districts within the National Capital Area Council of the Boy Scouts of America ("NCAC"). Id. NCAC, which is chartered by the National Council of the Boy Scouts of America, promotes scouting in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.

Troop 1533 meets weekly at Mantua Elementary School ("Mantua"), a public school in Fairfax, Virginia. Id. ¶ 12. Mantua provided an American Sign Language ("ASL") interpreter during Troop 1533's weekly meetings while Staley was a student at Mantua, but did not provide an interpreter for the troop's outdoor, off-campus scouting events, such as camping trips. Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.

While Staley was a member of Troop 1533, he participated in four troop camping trips. Affidavit of Cindy Officer, ECF No. 10-4 at ¶ 10. One of Staley's parents—his mother, his father, or his stepfather—accompanied Staley on each trip to serve as his sign language interpreter. Id. ¶¶ 11-13. Staley's parents incurred expenses for food, lodging and travel in connection with accompanying Staley on these trips. Compl. ¶ 19.

Staley is no longer a student at Mantua; he is now in middle school. Id. ¶ 12. Mantua has declined to provide an interpreter for Troop 1533's meetings since Staley has been in middle school. Id. at ¶ 20.

On October 2, 2009, Officer spoke with Peter Johnson, the Director of the Boy Scouts Patriot District, and requested that NCAC provide interpreter services at Troop 1533's weekly meetings and during the troop's camping trips. Id. at ¶ 13. On October 7, 2009, Lois Urbanek, Committee Chair for Troop 1533, sent an email to all of the parents with sons in Troop 1533; Diane Peterson, the lead ASL interpreter at Mantua; and Peter Johnson, indicating that the troop needed interpreter services at Troop 1533's weekly meetings and during camping trips. Id. at ¶ 14. Diane Peterson replied to the entire group stating that NCAC was obligated under federal law to provide interpreter services at Boy Scouts events. Id. The same day, Peter Johnson sent an email to Officer stating that the Boy Scouts would probably not provide an interpreter at Boy Scouts camping trips and suggested Officer look into forming an all-deaf scouting troop. Id. at ¶ 15.

On October 20, 2009, Officer, Johnson, Patriot District Commissioner Mark Greer and parents with sons in Troop 1533 met to discuss Officer's request that an interpreter be provided. Id. at ¶ 17. At that meeting, Johnson stated that NCAC was not responsible for providing interpreter services at Boy Scouts events and denied Officer's request that NCAC provide an interpreter for Staley. Id.

On October 21, 2009, Officer spoke with James Hamlin, NCAC's staff member responsible for scouts with disabilities. Id. at ¶ 18. Hamlin also told Officer that NCAC was not responsible for providing interpreter services at Boy Scouts events. Id.

On October 6, 2010, Officer, on behalf of Staley and herself, filed a two-count complaint against NCAC in this court, alleging violations of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 790, et seq. ECF No. 1. On February 1, 2011, NCAC filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56(a). ECF No. 6. NCAC contends that it is a private club exempt from the public accommodations provision of Title III of the ADA and that it is not covered by the Rehabilitation Act because it receives no federal funding. Id. at 1-2. The issues were fully briefed and a hearing was held on April 11, 2011. For the following reasons, NCAC's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, will be granted as to the ADA claim and denied without prejudice as to the Rehabilitation Act claim.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

I. Motion to Dismiss

To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court todraw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]' - 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

When deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must therefore consider all well-pled allegations in a complaint as true, see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and must construe factual allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, see Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson County, 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, the Court is not required to accept as true "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), conclusory allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979), or "allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences," Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 2002).

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

The Court must grant summary judgment to a moving party if it determines that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or . . . showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." F. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the motion." In assessing whethersummary judgment should be granted, "[t]he court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." F. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

ANALYSIS

I. ADA Claims

Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to combat what it perceived to be widespread discrimination against disabled individuals. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674 (2001). The ADA sought to comprehensively address the "outright intentional exclusion as well as the failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices" that prevented disabled individuals from being fully "integrate[d] into the economic and social mainstream of American life." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Plaintiffs allege that NCAC is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns, leases and/or operates various places of public accommodation, including a camping facility in Haymarket, Virginia; and two United States military facilities, Fort A. P. Hill and Quantico Marine Base. Affidavit of Cindy Officer, ECF No. 10-4 at ¶¶ 10, 14. Plaintiffs also claim the NCAC leases public accommodations such as ski resorts and horseback riding facilities for Boy Scout excursions, thus bringing it within the purview of the ADA.

Title III of ADA provides, in pertinent part, "No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182. Title III applies only to public accommodations and specifically exempts "private clubs or establishments" from its coverage. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12187 ("The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to private clubs or establishments exempted from coverage under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . ").

A. NCAC is a Private Club

NCAC argues that it is not subject to Title III because it is a "private club," and does not operate, own or lease places of public accommodation. NCAC relies heavily on Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), and Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 993 F.2d 1267, 1276 (7th Cir. 1993), in support of the argument that it is a private club. Contrary to NCAC's assertion, Dale did not settle the issue of whether the Boy Scouts of America—or any entity commissioned by it—is a private club within the meaning of the ADA. In Dale, the Supreme...