Stanley v. Cnty. of Bernalillo Comm'rs

AUGUSTINE STANLEY, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF BERNALILLO COMMISSIONERS, TOM ZDUNEK, and RAMON C. RUSTIN, Defendants.

No. CIV 14-0550 JB/SCY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

July 31, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed June 11, 2015 (Doc. 51)("PFRD"), of the Honorable Steven C. Yarbrough, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of New Mexico. In the PFRD, Judge Yarbrough advised the Court to: (i) grant the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed January 29, 2015 (Doc. 30)("MTD"), as it relates to Plaintiff Augustine Stanley's federal claims: and (ii) remand Stanley's remaining claims to the Second Judicial District Court, County of Bernalillo, State of New Mexico. See PFRD at 1. Stanley did not file any objections to the PFRD. The Defendants, however, filed timely objections to the PFRD, explaining that they did not oppose the dismissal of Stanley's federal claims, but they object to the recommendation that the Court remand the state law claims. See Defendants' Objections to Proposed Finding and Recommended Disposition, filed June 29, 2015 (Doc. 52)("Objection"). Because all parties have agreed to the dismissal of the federal claims, see Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed February 13, 2015 (Doc. 34)("Response"); Objection at 1, the Court will adopt the Judge Yarbrough's recommendation that the MTD be granted with regard to these claims. As for theDefendants' objections to the remand of the state law claims, the Court has considered the issue de novo and agrees with the Judge Yarbrough that principles of judicial comity weigh in favor of remand. The Court will, therefore, adopt the PFRD in its entirety and remand Stanley's state claims to state court.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 6, 2014, Stanley filed this lawsuit in state court alleging that the Defendants discriminated against him in violation of state law when they fired him from his job as a detention officer because of his state-authorized use of medical marijuana. In the original Complaint of Violations of the New Mexico Human Rights Act, filed in state court February 6, 2014, filed in federal court June 20, 2014 (Doc. 4-1), Stanley brought claims solely under New Mexico law -- specifically, the New Mexico Human Rights Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-1 to -15, the Lynn and Erin Compassionate Use Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2B-2, and New Mexico common law. On May 1, 2014, Stanley moved to amend his complaint to "state . . . additional claims rising [sic] out of his termination." Motion to Amend Complaint ¶ 4, at 2,¹ filed in state court May 1, 2014, filed in federal court June 20, 2014 (Doc. 4-1). The state court granted this motion, and Stanley proceeded to file an amended complaint, see First Amended Complaint for Violations of Statutory and Constitutional Rights and Petition for Extraordinary Relief, filed in state court June 10, 2014, filed in federal court June 13, 2014 (Doc. 1-1)("Amended Complaint"), that listed five counts: (i) a claim of statutory immunity under the Lynn and Erin Compassionate Use Act, (ii) a claim under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, (iii) a generic due process claim, (iv) a grouping of federal statutory claims underTitle VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); and (v) a "petition for extraordinary writ," Amended Complaint at 49, 60-62. Additionally, while not formatted as a separate count, in the Amended Complaint, Stanley continued to maintain that the New Mexico Human Rights Act required the Defendants to accommodate his marijuana usage. Amended Complaint at 56-57. In light of Stanley's novel federal claims, the Defendants removed the lawsuit to federal court. See Notice of Removal of Action by Defendants Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331, 1441, 1443, and 1446, filed June 13, 2014 (Doc. 1).

Not long thereafter, the New Mexico Supreme Court disbarred Stanley's attorney. Memorandum of Attorney Disbarment as to Paul Livingston, filed August 26, 2014 (Doc. 19). Stanley then retained a new attorney who determined that Stanley should withdraw his federal claims and simplify his state law claims. See Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint at 2, filed January 15, 2015 (Doc. 26). To this end, on January 15, 2015, Stanley moved to amend his Amended Complaint to assert only claims under the New Mexico Human Rights Act and the Lynn and Erin Compassionate Use Act. The Defendants opposed the proposed amendment as futile, both as a matter of statutory interpretation and based on the doctrine of federal preemption. See Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, filed January 29, 2015 (Doc. 32). The Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss the federal and state law claims in Plaintiff's outstanding complaint. See MTD at 1. Stanley responded to the MTD by confirming that he was no longer pursuing any federal claims against the Defendants. See Response at 1-2. Stanley refused to concede, however, that his proposed state law claims lacked merit. Instead, he countered that, while the New Mexico courts have not ruled on the issue of employment protection for those who use medical marijuana, a New Mexico court would likely rule that public employers cannotdiscriminate against valid medical marijuana users. See Response at 5-6. Stanley pointed out that the case law that the Defendants cite all involve private employers, which could be a distinguishing factor given the specific language of the Lynn and Erin Compassionate Use Act. See Response at 4.

LAW REGARDING SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

It is a fundamental precept of American law that the federal courts are "courts of limited jurisdiction." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). Federal courts "possess only that power authorized by [the] Constitution and statute." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Among the powers that Congress has bestowed upon the courts is the power to hear controversies arising under federal law -- federal-question jurisdiction -- and controversies arising between citizens of different states -- diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32. Additionally, Congress has conferred upon federal district courts the ability to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims that are part of the same case or controversy as a claim over which the court exercises original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Congress' supplemental jurisdiction statute provides that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). As this language plainly indicates, supplemental jurisdiction must be exercised unless one of the above circumstances occurs. See McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 1994)("The statute plainly allows the district court to reject jurisdiction over supplemental claims only in the four instances described therein."); Exec. Software N. Am. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1557 (9th Cir. 1994)("[I]t is clear that Congress intended the exercise of discretion to be triggered by the court's identification of a factual predicate that corresponds to one of the section 1367(c) categories."); Palmer v. Hosp. Auth., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir. 1994)("[S]upplemental jurisdiction must be exercised in the absence of any of the four factors of section 1367(c)."). On the other hand, if one of the four § 1367(c) factors is present, "supplemental jurisdiction is not a matter of the litigants' right, but of judicial discretion." Estate of Harshman v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 379 F.3d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 2004). Nonetheless, when all claims over which a federal court exercises original jurisdiction have been resolved, the strong preference is to remand the remaining claims to state court. See Merrifield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 654 F.3d 1073, 1085 (10th Cir. 2011); Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011)("When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims." (citation omitted)); Brooks v. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213, 1229 (10th Cir. 2010)("[I]f federal claims are dismissed before trial, leaving only issues of state law, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice." (citation omitted)); Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 669 (10th Cir. 1995)("[T]he most common response to a pretrial disposition of federal claims has been to dismiss the state law claim or claims without prejudice."). As the Tenth Circuit has explained, "[n]otions of comity and federalism demand that a state court try its own lawsuits, absent compelling reasons to the contrary." Ball v.Renner, 54 F.3d at 669. In all cases, district courts should seek to exercise (or not exercise) supplemental jurisdiction to vindicate values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Merrifield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 654 F.3d at 1085; Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d at 669.

ANALYSIS

In the Objection, the Defendants argue that the Court should retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims "based upon the doctrine of preemption." Objection at 2. The Defendants specifically contend that "it is proper for the Court to retain jurisdiction to decide state law claims [when preemption is implicated] even though the federal claims must be dismissed." Objection...