Stanley v. DeJesus

205 A.D.3d 717

167 N.Y.S.3d 545

Morgan STANLEY, etc., appellant,

v.Juan DEJESUS, respondent, et al., defendants.

2020–02253

Index No. 506414/17

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—February 28, 2022

May 4, 2022

Robertson, Anschutz, Schneid, Crane & Partners, PLLC, Westbury, NY (Joseph F. Battista and Leah Lenz of counsel), for appellant.

The Silber Law Firm, LLC, New York, NY (Meyer Y. Silber of counsel), for respondent.

FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Noach Dear, J.), dated January 13, 2020. The order denied the plaintiff's motion, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Juan DeJesus, to strike his answer, and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due and owing to the plaintiff, and granted the cross motion of the defendant Juan DeJesus for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the cross motion of the defendant Juan DeJesus for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new determination of the plaintiff's motion, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Juan DeJesus, to strike his answer, and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due and owing to the plaintiff.

In 2006, the defendant Juan DeJesus (hereinafter the defendant) executed a note and mortgage encumbering certain real property located in Brooklyn. In August 2010, the plaintiff commenced an action to foreclose the mortgage (hereinafter the 2010 action). Thereafter, by notice of motion dated May 28, 2013, the plaintiff moved to discontinue the 2010 action. The motion was unopposed. In an order dated July 26, 2013 (hereinafter the order of discontinuance), the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion and directed that the 2010 action be discontinued.

In February 2017, the plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose the mortgage action against, among others, the defendant. The defendant interposed an answer in which he asserted, among other things, an affirmative defense that this action was time-barred.

Thereafter, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant, to strike his answer, and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due and owing to the plaintiff. The defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, contending, among other things, that the statute of limitations began to run in 2010, such that the instant action, commenced in 2017, was time-barred. In an order dated January 13, 2020, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion and granted the defendant's cross motion. The plaintiff appeals.

A mortgage foreclosure action is subject to a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213[4] ). "[E]ven if a mortgage is payable in installments, once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and the Statute of Limitations begins to run on the entire debt" ( Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Weisblum, 143 A.D.3d 866, 867, 39 N.Y.S.3d 491 [internal quotation...