Stanton v. State

2020 Ark. 418

613 S.W.3d 368

Marvin Arrell STANTON, Appellant

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee

No. CR-19-926

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: December 17, 2020

Jeff Rosenzweig, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Christopher R. Warthen, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice

Marvin Stanton was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. This was his third trial for the murder of Jesse Hamilton. The first conviction was reversed on direct appeal, then a mistrial occurred on remand. Because of the prosecutor's improper campaigning in the courthouse during trial, Stanton's conviction must once again be reversed, and this case will return to Miller County for a fourth trial.

I.

A.

On a September evening in 2015, Stanton pulled his motorcycle into a Texarkana gas station with three other friends. His friends parked their motorcycles in open parking spots, but Stanton stopped at the gas pump. His preferred parking spot was occupied by Jesse Hamilton's truck. Hamilton was with his friends, Lavon Strong and SanMarcus Jacobs. The three men were about to leave the station when Stanton yelled at Hamilton to "move [his] fucking truck." As Stanton approached, Hamilton and his friends stepped outside the truck and an argument ensued. While arguing with Hamilton, Stanton flashed his .45 caliber pistol. Though he was unarmed, Hamilton responded that he was unafraid of a gun.

The argument became physical after Stanton shoved Hamilton against the truck. The two men scuffled on the ground for twenty-five seconds before Hamilton got the better of Stanton. They stood up and separated several feet from each other. But Stanton was not done. He pulled his gun and trailed the red laser sight down Hamilton's body until it reached his abdomen. Stanton pulled the trigger. A hollow point round penetrated Hamilton's abdomen, damaging his aorta and intestines, and exited through his back. He was transported to a local hospital, where doctors attempted life-saving surgery. Their efforts proved unsuccessful and Hamilton died four hours later.

B.

Stanton has stood trial three times for Hamilton's death. His first trial resulted in a conviction of first degree murder and employing a firearm to commit the murder. We reversed on direct appeal due to improper admission of character evidence. See Stanton v. State , 2017 Ark. 155, 517 S.W.3d 412. Stanton's second trial ended in mistrial during the guilt phase. This appeal centers on the third trial.

Prosecutor Stephanie Barrett prosecuted the case. At the time of the third trial, Barrett was campaigning for a position in the Arkansas Court of Appeals and seeking signatures for placement on the ballot.¹ On the first day of trial, a family member of Barrett's campaigned and solicited signatures on Barrett's behalf in the courthouse. Prospective jurors were asked to sign election petitions for Barrett and other judicial candidates as they walked through the courthouse. Campaign materials featuring Barrett's photograph and her asserted credentials were placed on the bailiff's security station throughout the first day and a half of trial. The venire pool and members of the public mandatorily encountered this table each time they entered the courtroom and went through security.

Defense counsel learned about the campaigning after the first day of trial. When he raised the issue the following morning, the deputy prosecutor claimed that a sitting circuit court judge suggested that Barrett solicit signatures from jury pools entering the courthouse and personally engaged in that practice. Barrett was instructed to hand over the signed petition sheets. She obtained the sheets at lunch, discovered that a seated juror had signed the petition, yet said nothing until after the evening recess. Of the nine signatures collected, four belonged to prospective jurors, including one juror who was ultimately selected.

The next morning, Stanton moved for mistrial based on an appearance of impropriety. The circuit court questioned each juror about the campaigning and its impact on their impartiality. Most jurors were asked to sign petitions, and some had signed petitions for various judicial candidates. The juror who signed Barrett's petition could not recall whose petition she signed. Each juror assured the court that they could remain fair and impartial. Satisfied with their answers, the circuit court refused to grant mistrial. Stanton then sought to remove the juror who signed Barrett's petition. That too was denied.

The trial concluded later that day. The jury rejected Stanton's justification defense and convicted him of first degree murder. He was sentenced to life in prison plus fifteen years for a firearm enhancement. Following the conviction, Stanton moved for a new trial and sought to recuse all judges in the Eighth Judicial District South from the case. The circuit court refused to conduct a hearing and denied the motions in an untimely written order. This appeal followed.

II.

Stanton raises four challenges to his conviction. He first appeals the circuit court's decisions related to the prosecutor's campaigning and solicitation of signatures at the courthouse. This issue merits reversal and we remand for a new trial. Stanton also challenges the circuit court's refusal to provide two jury instructions, the exclusion of evidence regarding Hamilton's intoxication, and limitations imposed on the cross-examination of a witness. When one point warrants reversal, we generally decline to consider the remaining points on appeal. See Burton v. State , 367 Ark. 109, 115, 238 S.W.3d 111, 116 (2006). But given that the issue regarding evidence of Hamilton's intoxication may arise again on remand, we will address that point at this time.

III.

The primary issue in this case involves Prosecutor Stephanie Barrett's campaigning in the courthouse during Stanton's murder trial. This issue is a novel one, but we believe it is easily resolved by long-standing principles involving the administration of justice. Prosecutors are "representative[s] not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States , 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). As such, prosecutors have a solemn obligation to protect the integrity of the court and the criminal justice system. See Ferri v. Ackerman , 444 U.S. 193, 202–03, 100 S.Ct. 402, 62 L.Ed.2d 355 (1979) ("the prosecutor and the judge represent the interest of society as a whole"); see also Ark. R. Prof. Conduct 3.8, cmt. 1 (prosecutor is "minister of justice"). When a prosecutor or judge fails in these duties, the integrity of the entire criminal justice system may be impugned.

Stanton contends that Barrett's courthouse campaigning to jurors and potential jurors created an appearance of impropriety that fatally undermined the integrity of his trial. This argument embraces four subpoints challenging four of the circuit court's decisions: (1) the denial of mistrial; (2) the refusal to remove the juror who signed Barrett's petition; (3) the refusal to recuse; and (4) the refusal to conduct a hearing on the motion for new trial and delayed entry of an order denying the motion. We conclude that a mistrial was required and reverse on the first subpoint. The remaining subpoints do not warrant further discussion.

A.

Our general standard for mistrial is well established. A mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy appropriate only when there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing with the trial or when the fundamental fairness of the trial has been manifestly affected. See McClinton v. State , 2015 Ark. 245, at 2–3, 464 S.W.3d 913, 914. The circuit court's decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion or manifest prejudice to the moving party. Id.

In determining whether the prosecutor's actions rose to the level of mistrial, Stanton urges application of an "appearance of impropriety" standard. He relies on Elmore v. State , 355 Ark. 620, 623, 144 S.W.3d 278, 280 (2004), where we concluded that the judge's refusal to remove his spouse from the jury created an appearance of impropriety warranting reversal of the conviction. The State, on the other hand, contends this issue should be reviewed under the standard for removing a juror. That standard requires Stanton to prove both bias and prejudice resulting from the alleged juror misconduct. See Butler v. State , 349 Ark. 252, 261, 82 S.W.3d 152, 157 (2002). The State also points to a court of appeals’ decision requiring a showing of prejudice and an abuse of discretion when reviewing the denial of mistrial based on the impact of spectators’ badges featuring a picture of the victim. See Kenyon v. State , 58 Ark. App. 24, 946 S.W.2d 705 (1997).

We believe the State misses the mark. This case has nothing to do with juror misconduct or the impact of actions taken by members of the public. To the contrary, this case centers solely on the actions of the prosecutor and the circuit court's implicit approval of such actions. Though Elmore involves only judicial conduct, we agree with Stanton that the "appearance of impropriety" standard applies here. Like judges, attorneys "must strive to avoid not only professional impropriety, but also the appearance of impropriety. The duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety ... is part of the foundation upon which are built the rules that guide lawyers in their moral and ethical conduct." Ark. R. Prof. Conduct pmbl., cmt. 13A. Disturbingly, solicitation of signatures from prospective jurors for political purposes is apparently a common practice for some sitting judges. Our concerns with Barrett's conduct apply with equal force to the same conduct taken by sitting...