Stanton v. Wormuth

640 F.Supp.3d 159

Kimberly STANTON, Plaintiff, v. Christine WORMUTH, Secretary of the Army, Defendant.¹

No. 21-cv-1340-MAU

United States District Court, District of Columbia

Signed November 14, 2022

Neil Stuart Hyman, Law Offices of Neil S. Hyman, LLC, Bethesda, MD, for Plaintiff.

Jessica B. Colsia, John Haberland, DOJUSAO, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MOXILA A. UPADHYAYA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Kimberly Stanton ("Stanton") brings this action against Defendant Secretary of the United States Department of the Army Corps of Engineers ("Defendant" or "Corps"), alleging one count of unlawful sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 26-32. Stanton argues that she was an employee of the Corps while serving as a marine endangered species observer aboard a Corps vessel where the alleged harassment occurred and that she has established a prima facie case of harassment under Title VII. See generally ECF No. 10.

Before the Court is the Corps' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 9. Upon consideration of the Parties' submissions,² relevant legal authorities, and the entire record, the Court GRANTS the Corps' motion.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

From November to December 2014, Stanton worked as a Marine Endangered Species Observer aboard the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers vessel Dredge Wheeler. ECF No. 9-3 ¶¶ 1, 2. The Corps used the Wheeler as part of a dredging operation in Freeport and Corpus Christi, Texas and contracted with Stanton's employer, East Coast Observers, Inc., to provide two observers aboard the vessel. See ECF No. 9-12. The observers' role was to report any sea turtle activity to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in compliance with the Endangered Species Act of 1973. ECF No. 9-3 ¶¶ 3, 4. Stanton and her supervisor, Leslie Osborne, were to "monitor all flow screens 24 hours per day, do necessary NMFS daily, incident and summary reporting, clean screens, and process live, injured, and/or deceased endangered animals in accordance with NMFS approved procedures." Id. ¶ 7. Osborne served as the "lead" observer aboard the Wheeler. ECF No. 9-4 at 35:14-18.

The Corps provided minimal services to Stanton and Osborne while they were on the vessel. As part of the contract between East Coast Observers and the Corps, the Corps provided the observers lodging and meals as well as use of a fax machine and telephone twenty-four hours a day so that the observers might comply with their reporting requirements. ECF No. 9-3 ¶ 7. The observers were required to reimburse the Corps for all lodging and meals. ECF No. 9-8 at 3. Captain Edward Morehouse provided operational and safety information as part of an initial orientation and fielded any of Stanton's logistical questions or concerns. ECF No. 9-5 at 2. Unlike Army employees aboard the vessel, Stanton was not issued a common access card and, accordingly, was not able to assess any Corps computers. ECF No. 9-4 at 42:11-22. During non-working hours, Stanton was free to move about the Wheeler, but largely stayed in her room. Id. at 43:21-22; 44:1-12.

Stanton alleges that on December 9 and 16, 2014, Mark Griffin, a 3rd Mate on the Wheeler, sexually and physically assaulted her. ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 5. Stanton reported the incidents to Randy Valles, Assistant Master of the Wheeler, on December 17, 2014. Id. Valles responded to Stanton that he would inform Captain Morehouse and that action would be taken. Id. ¶ 6. Valles also advised other crewmembers to refrain from contacting Stanton outside of work obligations. ECF No. 9-9 at 11. Stanton also alleges that on December 21, 2014, another crewmember on the vessel, Ivan Danilichav, physically assaulted her after they got into a disagreement. ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 7. Griffin and Danilichav both deny that they physically or sexually assaulted Stanton. ECF No. 9-3 ¶¶ 11-12.

Stanton sent a text message to Captain Morehouse in the middle of the night on December 21, 2014, to which Captain Morehouse responded the next morning. ECF No. 9-5 at 3. Captain Morehouse told her that he would investigate her allegations and asked if she needed medical attention. Id. Stanton declined medical attention and met with Captain Morehouse later that evening, after which Captain Morehouse reported the incident to Army Corps of Engineers leadership via a Commander's Critical Information Report. Id. Captain Morehouse further directed Stanton to stay in her room while he worked to inform the authorities. Id. at 4. Captain Morehouse testified that Stanton refused to remain in her room, which compelled him to threaten to forcibly remove her from the ship. Id. Stanton claims this demand was made upon threat of arrest. ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 9. On December 22, 2014, Stanton was escorted off the ship to make a statement to authorities but, according to Captain Morehouse, declined to do so. Id. at 4. Stanton claims that she gave a statement to the local authorities but did not press charges. ECF No. 9-4 at 80:19-25. Shortly thereafter, Stanton purchased a plane ticket to return to her family home. Id. at 83:19-25. She did not return to the Wheeler. Id. East Coast Observers attempted to get in touch with her but could not do so. ECF No. 10-4 at 39-40. The Corps began the first of two investigations on December 30, 2014. ECF No. 9-9 at 1. Neither investigation substantiated Stanton's assault claims. Id. at 7.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 15, 2015, Stanton filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which rendered a final decision on August 23, 2018. ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 2. Stanton claimed that two Wheeler crewmembers assaulted her while she was aboard the Wheeler and that the Corps retaliated against her after she reported the allegations. ECF No. 10-2. The EEOC determined that Stanton failed to initiate timely contact with an EEO counselor. ECF No. 10-4 at 3. The EEOC found, however, that the Corps qualified as her employer and retaliated against her for having engaged in the protected activity of having reported harassment. ECF No. 10-2; ECF No. 10-4 at 40-43.

On September 24, 2018, Stanton appealed the Final Agency Decision on the denial of her sexual harassment claim. ECF No. 10-1 at 5-6. Her appeal was dismissed on August 19, 2020. Id. She then filed a request for reconsideration on August 27, 2020, which the EEOC denied on February 25, 2021. Id. Stanton filed this Complaint on May 17, 2021. Id.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

A court may grant summary judgment when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A "material" fact is one capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" if there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-movant. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The mere existence of some factual dispute is insufficient on its own to bar summary judgment; the dispute must pertain to a "material" fact. Id. Accordingly, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court's inquiry is essentially "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In opposing summary judgment, the non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts" and, instead, must point to specific record facts that reflect a genuine issue warranting trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (emphasis added); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In doing so, the non-movant must cite competent, admissible evidence and may not rely on "statements that are impermissible hearsay or that are not based on personal knowledge." Shuler v. District of Columbia, 744 F. Supp. 2d 320, 327 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Conclusory assertions offered without any evidentiary support do not establish a genuine issue for trial. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

II. Plaintiff's Standing to Raise a Title VII Claim

The Corps' summary judgment motion turns largely on whether Stanton has standing to bring a Title VII claim. In a Title VII action against the federal government, a plaintiff must be "in a direct employment relationship with a government employer." Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1979). "Status as an employee is therefore of crucial significance for those seeking to redress alleged discriminatory actions in federal employment." Id. at 829-30. Individuals who are independent contractors or those not directly employed by the federal government are not protected by Title VII. See Palmer v. Napolitano, 867 F. Supp. 2d 120, 123 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Rogler v. Gallin, 402 Fed. Appx. 530, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Spirides, 613 F.2d at 829-30).

In arguing that she has standing under Title VII, Stanton relies almost exclusively on the EEOC's finding that the Corps was her joint employer. ECF No. 10-1 at 8-11. In doing so, Stanton fails to make any robust argument as to the facts of this case and instead argues that the doctrine of res judicata bars this Court from conducting its own analysis. Id. Stanton insists that this Court must instead defer to the EEOC's determination that the Corps was Stanton's joint employer. Id. In response, the Corps argues that this Court is not bound by the...