Staple v. The Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla.

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FERNANDO STAPLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21-11832

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

July 2, 2024

DO NOT PUBLISH

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cv-62313-CMA Before BRANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON, ^[*] District Judge.

OPINION

LUCK Circuit Judge:

Fernando Staple requested a modified work schedule from his employer the School Board of Broward County, because his religion requires abstaining from secular work on his Sabbath, which begins at sundown on Friday. After his request was denied Staple sued the school board, alleging that it failed to reasonably accommodate his religious practice in violation of Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act. He separately alleged the school board substantially burdened his Sabbath observance in violation of the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act. But the district court dismissed Staple's complaint because he failed to state a claim for relief under any of those statutes. And the district court concluded that Staple lacked Article III standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief under the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Staple argues on appeal that the district court erred in dismissing each claim. He's partly right. We conclude that the district court erred in dismissing his claims under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act for failure to state a claim. But, although Staple has standing to seek his requested relief under the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the district court correctly concluded he failed to state a claim under that statute. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings on the Title VII and Florida Civil Rights Act claims.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Staple is a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Seventh Day Adventists like Staple observe the Sabbath on Saturday, and, "in order to keep the weekly Sabbath holy," they "abstain from secular work from sun-down on Friday through sun-down on Saturday."

When Staple began working as a bus operator for the school board in 1991, he requested and received a modified schedule accommodating his Sabbath observance. The modified schedule allowed Staple to start work early on Fridays during the winter months (when the sun sets earlier) so that he could leave before sundown. The school board also had other employees fill in for Staple during Sabbath hours. This arrangement allowed Staple to work a full day outside of Sabbath hours so that he could observe them without taking any paid leave.

Staple requested the same modified schedule after being promoted to shift supervisor in 1994 and terminal manager in 1997. The school board granted those requests too, continuing to allow Staple to start work early on winter Fridays so that he could leave before sundown. That's how things stood until Staple's retirement in 2017.

Staple was rehired by the school board as an afternoon shift supervisor in 2018. Again, he asked that the school board assign him the same full work schedule outside of Sabbath hours for winter Fridays. The school board initially granted that request. But about a month later, the school board backpedaled, telling Staple that he had to formally request the modified schedule through its equal opportunity department. Staple submitted the formal request as directed. The school board didn't allow Staple to work under his old modified schedule while the request was pending. Instead, the school board required him to use his accrued paid leave to abstain from working Sabbath hours.

The school board "denied" Staple's formal request, again directing that he use paid leave for observing Sabbath hours. The school board explained that when Staple did not work Sabbath hours during the normal Friday shift, transportation specialists in the same bargaining unit had to cover for him. That practice, according to the school board, conflicted with labor laws "because it resulted in bargaining unit employees supervising other employees in the same bargaining unit." But the school board regularly uses transportation specialists from the same bargaining unit to cover for other absent shift supervisors. Transportation specialists from the same unit also cover for Staple when he uses paid leave to observe the Sabbath.

Staple filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and received a right-to-sue letter. He then filed this lawsuit against the school board. His operative amended complaint alleged three counts. Counts one and two were religious discrimination claims for damages under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act, alleging the school board failed to reasonably accommodate Staple's religious practice of observing the Sabbath. Count three was a Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim, requesting a declaration and injunction that the school board could not "condition[ Staple]'s observance of Sabbath [h]ours on the exhaustion of accrued paid leave." It alleged that the school board substantially burdened Staple's religious beliefs by "requiring [him] to exhaust his accrued leave in order to comply with [those] beliefs."

The school board moved to dismiss the amended complaint, and the district court granted the motion. It dismissed counts one and two-the religious accommodation counts-for failure to state a claim. The district court explained that religious accommodation claims have "separate and distinct" elements from disparate treatment claims under Title VII's disparate treatment provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). One separate and distinct element, in the district court's view, relates to what employment practices are actionable: although adverse employment actions that fall short of discharge or discipline are enough for disparate treatment claims, a religious accommodation claim requires the plaintiff to be "discharged or disciplined for failing to comply" with a job requirement. Staple's religious accommodation claims, the district court concluded, fell short because he "ha[d] not alleged he was discharged or disciplined for failing to work during th[e] Sabbath hours."

The district court separately dismissed count three for two independent reasons. First, the district court determined that Staple did not have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief under the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act. It reasoned that Staple's future injury was "contingent," at best, because he did not allege that he was likely to run out of paid leave to use for Sabbath hours, nor did he allege the school board would compel him to work those hours if he ran out of leave. Second, the district court concluded count three failed to state a claim on the merits. The district court explained that the Florida statute requires a "substantial burden" on religious exercise but, again, Staple didn't allege the school board compelled him to work Sabbath hours; "in fact, the arrangement appear[ed] to do the opposite" by allowing Staple to use his paid leave.

Staple appeals the dismissal of his religious accommodation claims and the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo orders granting a motion to dismiss, "accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Taylor v. Polhill, 964 F.3d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2008)).

DISCUSSION

Our analysis proceeds in two parts. We begin with the district court's dismissal of Staple's religious accommodation claims under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act.^[1] We then turn to the dismissal of his Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim.

Religious Accommodation Claims

Title VII's disparate treatment provision prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Id. § 2000e(j). As the statutory text shows, "Title VII imposes on employers both a negative duty not to discriminate" because of an individual's religion "and a positive duty to accommodate" his religious practices. Hebrew v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 80 F.4th 717, 721 (5th Cir. 2023).

The district court concluded Staple had to plead "he was discharged or disciplined for failing to work during th[e] Sabbath hours" because a religious accommodation claim has "distinct" elements from what the disparate treatment provision requires, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and one distinct element of a religious accommodation claim is "discharge[]" or "discipline[]." It relied on statements from some of our older cases that a religious accommodation claim requires the plaintiff to be "discharged for failing to comply with [a] conflicting employment requirement" although lesser adverse actions are enough for disparate treatment claims. See Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Beadle v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 592 n.5 (11th Cir. 1994)).

But, to the extent some of our older cases have said or implied the adverse action element of a religious accommodation claim is distinct...