Stark v. Rutheford

442 F.Supp.3d 1084

Timothy Lee STARK, Plaintiff,

v.Mick RUTHEFORD, Robert Brewington, Jeff Milner, Jim Hash, Paul Crockett, Phil Schuetter, Linnea Petercheff, Defendants.

No. 4:18-cv-00056-SEB-DML

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, New Albany Division.

Signed March 3, 2020

Timothy Lee Stark, Charlestown, IN, pro se.

Bryan Findley, Mollie Ann Slinker, Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE, United States District Court

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 41], filed on April 19, 2019, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff Timothy Lee Stark pro se initiated this civil rights action against several Indiana Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") officers who, acting pursuant to Indiana law, seized a coyote and racoon in Mr. Stark's possession. Mr. Stark alleges that the U.S. Department of Agriculture's ("USDA") licensing protocols preempted Indiana statutes regulating animals. He also contends that his "[c]onstitutional civil rights have been violated by an illegal seizure of [his] property by [Defendants]." [Dkt. 1, at 2].

Defendants have responded that there is no such preemption, and that the seizure of Mr. Stark's property was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. Defendants further contend that even if this Court does find a constitutional violation, they are shielded from civil liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Factual Background

The material facts giving rise to this lawsuit are undisputed. On February 22, 2017, Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") officers Robert Brewington and Michael "Mick" Rutherford arrived at Mr. Stark's home in Charlestown, Indiana to conduct a routine game breeder's inspection. Rutherford Decl. ¶ 4. The inspection was authorized under 312 ADMIN CODE 9-10-4(p) (2019), and Mr. Stark was present at his home throughout the inspection. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.

During the inspection, Officer Brewington and Officer Rutherford observed a raccoon and coyote being confined on the premises. Brewington Decl. ¶ 5. In response to their request, they were provided paperwork in the form of handwritten receipts reflecting that the animals had been donated by two individuals located from Illinois. Rutherford Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. Specifically, the coyote was reportedly donated on April 5, 2016 from a Mr. Charles Smith residing at 392 W. Hwy. 321, Nashville, IL 62263. Stinson Decl. ¶ 10. As for the raccoon, it was allegedly donated on September 3, 2016 from a Mr. Mark Rugby residing at 112 Fairway Lane, Mount Vernon, IL 62864. Id. at ¶ 11. The paperwork provided by Mr. Stark to the officers was forwarded to Operations Staff Specialist Linnea Petercheff at the Department of Fish and Wildlife ("DFW"), who, along with Detective Sergeant Trent Stinson and the Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center, investigated its validity. Rutherford Decl. ¶ 7; Stinson Decl. ¶¶ 12-13.

Defendants investigation found no records of a either Charles Smith or Mark Rugby. Stinson Decl. ¶ 15. Moreover, the investigation concluded that (1) Smith and Rugby were not licensed in Illinois to possess animals, and (2) the two individuals' addresses were not legitimate Illinois addresses. Petercheff Decl. ¶ 7. Mr. Stark does not dispute any of DNR's investigatory findings. See generally , Stark Decl. On this basis, Ms. Petercheff concluded that the animals had been illegally obtained by Mr. Stark. Petercheff Decl. ¶ 8. Following this determination, Officer Brewington submitted an affidavit for a search warrant to the state court, which was thereafter issued. Brewington Decl. ¶¶ 9-11.

On May 2, 2017, the officers, acting pursuant to the judicially authorized search warrant, returned to Mr. Stark's property to seize the animals. [Dkt. 1 at 1]. Mr. Stark met Officer Brewington and Officer Rutherford at the gate to his property, where he again produced the handwritten receipts and reiterated that he had taken all steps required by Indiana law to lawfully possess the animals. Id. at 2. Unpersuaded, the DNR officers informed Mr. Stark that the DNR had determined that the animals were being possessed illegally. Brewington Decl. ¶ 14. Mr. Stark alleges that at this point he was threatened with arrest if he failed to produce the animals in response to the officers' request. Stark Decl. ¶ 6. Additionally, Mr. Stark claims that, if there was a lawful warrant, it was never mentioned or produced to him. Id. at ¶ 9. After accepting the proffered cages from Officer Brewington, Mr. Stark returned with the caged animals and allowed the DNR officers to take possession of the animals. Brewington Decl. ¶¶ 15-20.

During the seizure, Officers Jim Hash, Paul Crockett, and Jeff Milner waited in the driveway leading up to the entrance of Mr. Stark's property to provide law enforcement assistance, if needed. Hash Decl. ¶ 6; Crockett Decl ¶ 6; Milner Decl. ¶ 9. Both Officer Hash and Officer Crockett remained in the driveway throughout the seizure, while Officer Milner drove up to Mr. Stark's entrance gate in order to assist officer Rutherford. Hash Decl. ¶ 6; Crockett Decl ¶ 6; Milner Decl. ¶ 10. These officers did not speak with Mr. Stark nor did they assist directly with the animal seizure. Hash Decl. ¶¶ 11-13; Crockett Decl ¶¶ 11-12; Milner Decl. ¶¶ 13-14.

The animals were taken to a licensed rehabilitator following their seizure. Petercheff Decl. ¶ 9 The rehabilitator maintained possession of the animals for no fewer than eighteen days. Id. at ¶ 10. During that time, the deadline for an administrative appeal passed without Mr. Stark taking any action to effectuate an appeal. Id. at ¶ 11. Accordingly, the animals were released into the wild. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where the are no genuine disputes of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court must grant a motion for summary judgment if it appears that no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the nonmovant on the basis of the designated admissible evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. We weigh neither the evidence nor evaluate the credibility of witnesses, id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, but view the facts and the reasonable inferences flowing from them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. McConnell v. McKillip , 573 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1097 (S.D. Ind. 2008).

II. Discussion¹

As previously stated, this dispute involves two issues: (1) the federal preemption of Indiana state and local laws and (2) the violation of Mr. Stark's Fourth Amendment rights.

a. Preemption

Mr. Stark's first argument is that the Animal Welfare Act ("AWA"), 7 U.S.C. § 2131 et seq. and specifically its provisions regarding USDA licensing regulations preempt State laws governing the welfare of animals. He maintains that because he was federally licensed by the USDA, which regulations required him to list all animals on his premises, the Indiana statutes regulating his animal activities are preempted by this federal law. [Dkt. 1, at 2].

As Plaintiff correctly contends, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution empowers the Federal Government to preempt state or local laws under certain conditions. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. F.C.C. , 476 U.S. 355, 357, 106 S.Ct. 1890, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 (1986). But this power is not without limits. The Supreme Court has held that preemption generally occurs under three different scenarios. First, "[p]re-emption occurs when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, expresses a clear intent to pre-empt state law." See , Jones v. Rath Packing Co. , 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). Second, "preemption may occur where Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law." Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas , 489 U.S. 493, 509, 109 S.Ct. 1262, 103 L.Ed.2d 509 (1989). Finally, preemption may occur when the state law at issue conflicts with federal law, either (i) because it is impossible to comply with both, or (ii) because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of congressional objectives. Id. Importantly, the critical question in any preemption analysis is always whether Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947).

Here, none of the "varieties" of preemption is applicable. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n 476 U.S. at 357, 106 S.Ct. 1890. As a preliminary matter, we note that the state and local laws at issue fall within the category of public welfare, health, and safety—areas of law that states have traditionally occupied under their historic police powers. Rice , 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146. Therefore, we begin with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states were not to be superseded by the AWA unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Id. As for the intent of Congress in these circumstances, Seventh Circuit precedent—which we are bound to follow—directs that the AWA does not evince an intent to preempt state or local regulation of animals or public welfare. DeHart v. Town of Austin, Ind. , 39 F.3d 718, 722-23 (7th Cir. 1994). To the contrary, the Congressional intent was to foster federal cooperation with state and local governments, not to exclude state and local governments entirely from the field.² Id...